Gallardo v. State

Citation236 Ariz. 84,336 P.3d 717,698 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 29
Decision Date30 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. CV–14–0208–PR/A.,CV–14–0208–PR/A.
PartiesSteve GALLARDO, an Individual; Lydia Guzman, an Individual; Marcus Lara, an Individual; Rose Marie Duran Lopez, an Individual; Randolph Lumm, an Individual; and Martin Quezada, an Individual, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona, a Body Politic; Helen Purcell, in Her Official Capacity As Maricopa County Recorder ; Karen Osborne, in Her Official Capacity As Maricopa County Director of Elections; Maricopa County Board of Supervisors; and Denny Barney, Steve Chucri, Andy Kunasek, Clint L. Hickman, and Marie Lopez Rogers, in Their Official Capacities As Members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Defendants/Appellees.
CourtSupreme Court of Arizona

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General; Robert L. Ellman, Solicitor General; David D. Weinzweig, Senior Litigation Counsel, Phoenix, for State of Arizona.

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney; M. Colleen Connor and Bruce P. White, Deputy County Attorneys, Civil Services Division, Phoenix, for Helen Purcell, Karen Osborne, Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Denny Barney, Steve Chucri, Andy Kunasek, Clint L. Hickman, and Marie Lopez Rogers.

Paul F. Eckstein, Jessica L. Everett–Garcia, D. Andrew Gaona, Alexis E. Danneman, Perkins Coie, LLP, Phoenix; and Robert A. Kengle, Rosa E. Zamora, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, for Steve Gallardo, Lydia Guzman, Marcus Lara, Rose Marie Duran Lopez, Randolph Lumm, and Martin Quezada.

Kory A. Langhofer and Thomas J. Basile, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Phoenix, for Mario E. Diaz and Friends of Mario E. Diaz, Amici Curiae.

Justice BERCH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice BALES, Vice Chief Justice PELANDER, Justice BRUTINEL, and Justice TIMMER joined.

Opinion

Justice BERCH, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We granted review to determine whether A.R.S. § 15–1441 (I), which adds two at-large members to the governing board of any community college district located in a county with a population of at least three million people, is a special law prohibited by article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution. We hold that the amended section is not an unconstitutional special law.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Community college districts are authorized by statute. A.R.S. §§ 15–1401 to –1410, –1441 to –1453. Ten such districts exist in Arizona, each comprising five precincts. Id. § 15–1441(A). Before the amendment at issue here, each district was governed by a local community college district board consisting of five members, one elected from each precinct for a six-year term. Id. § 15–1441(C).

¶ 3 In April 2010, the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. § 15–1441(I) to require the election of two at-large members to community college boards in very populous counties:

[I]n addition to the governing board members who are elected from each of the five precincts in a community college district, a county with a population of at least three million persons shall elect two additional governing members from the district at large.

2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 48, § 1 (2d Reg.Sess.). The amendment also reduced board member terms from six years to four years, for each “county with a population of at least three million persons.” Id. (amending A.R.S. § 15–1441(C), (I) ).

¶ 4 Because only Maricopa County has a population of more than three million, it is the only county to which the amendment now applies. Arizona's next most populous counties, Pima and Pinal, will likely not have three million people before the end of the century. Maricopa County is set to elect its first two additional at-large governing board members at the November 2014 general election.

¶ 5 Plaintiffs, six registered voters from Maricopa County, filed a complaint in superior court seeking a declaration that the legislation is unconstitutional and an injunction to prevent the election of the at-large board members. Plaintiffs contended, among other claims, that, as amended, A.R.S. § 15–1441(I) violates Arizona's constitutional prohibition against special laws. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19.

¶ 6 The superior court concluded that § 15–1441(I) does not violate the special law prohibition. The court of appeals reversed, holding that this statute is an unconstitutional special law. Gallardo v. State of Arizona (“Gallardo I ”), 236 Ariz. 1, 335 P.3d 523 (2014). It found that the opportunity to enter the class, and thus receive the benefit of the law, must “be not only possible, but reasonably probable,” and must be able to occur “within a reasonable time.” Id. at 5 ¶ 12, 335 P.3d 523 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because no other county will qualify to enter the class for more than eighty years, the court concluded that the class was not practically or reasonably elastic or expandable. Id. at 5, 6 ¶¶ 13, 16–17, 335 P.3d 523.

¶ 7 We granted review to clarify the test for determining when a law is an unconstitutional special law. The issue has statewide importance, as at least thirty-five Arizona statutes rely on population classifications.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 At the outset, Defendants argue that in determining whether a statute is a special law, we must apply a strong presumption in favor of its constitutionality, and Plaintiffs must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Although prior cases have used similar language, it incorrectly states the standard. Determining constitutionality is a question of law, which we review de novo. League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer, 213 Ariz. 557, 559 ¶ 7, 146 P.3d 58, 60 (2006). Assessing the constitutionality of a law fundamentally differs from determining the existence of historical facts, the determination of which is subject to deference. State v. Gonzalez–Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118, 927 P.2d 776, 778 (1996). We therefore disapprove the use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for making constitutionality determinations.

¶ 9 We do, however, presume that “the legislature acts constitutionally.” Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 220 Ariz. 587, 595 ¶ 21, 208 P.3d 676, 684 (2009) (quoting State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 61, 570 P.2d 1070, 1074 (1977) ). But if a law burdens fundamental rights, such as free speech or freedom of religion, any presumption in its favor falls away. See id. at 595 ¶ 20 n. 7, 208 P.3d at 684 n. 7 (observing that “content-based restrictions on speech are ‘presumptively invalid,’ so “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that a legislative enactment is constitutional”) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) ); see also Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 11, 308 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2013) (observing that [w]hen the statute in question involves no fundamental constitutional rights or distinctions based on suspect classifications, we presume the statute is constitutional and will uphold it unless it clearly is not”). In this case, the law in question touches only peripherally on the right to vote. See Ariz. Minority Coal., 220 Ariz. at 595 ¶ 20 n. 7, 208 P.3d at 684 n. 7 (finding that “redistricting alone” does not affect the “essence of the fundamental right” to vote (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we will accord our traditional presumption of constitutionality to the legislative enactment. Id.

B. Special Laws

¶ 10 Special laws favor one person or group and disfavor others. Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 148–49, 800 P.2d 1251, 1256–57 (1990). Article 4, part 2, section 19(11) of the Arizona Constitution prohibits special laws that affect [t]he conduct of elections.” The Constitution also prohibits special laws if “a general law can be made applicable.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (20).

¶ 11 This Court set forth the test for determining when a law is a special law nearly twenty-five years ago in Republic Investment. To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have “a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,” (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing “other individuals or entities to come within” and move out of the class. Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 149, 800 P.2d at 1257 (quoting Petitioners for Deannexation v. City of Goodyear, 160 Ariz. 467, 472, 773 P.2d 1026, 1031 (App.1989) ). We suggested that the analysis proceed in the following order:

[T]he court must first ascertain whether the law has a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. If it does not, of course, our inquiry is over. But if it does, we must further decide if the act legitimately classifies by population, geography, or time limitations. If we find a legitimate classification, we must then determine if the act permits other individuals or entities to come within the class, and thus within operation of the law, within a reasonable time, or if at all.

Id. (quoting Petitioners for Deannexation, 160 Ariz. at 472, 773 P.2d at 1031 ).

1. Rational Basis

¶ 12 The first prong of the special laws test requires that the law bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. Id. Such a relationship is identical to that required for equal protection analysis. See State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 193, 848 P.2d 273, 278 (1993) ; Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 149, 800 P.2d at 1257 ; Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 557–58, 637 P.2d 1053, 1060–61 (1981). A law “may withstand equal protection review, yet still be found unconstitutional under the special/local law provision” if it fails the additional assessments required under the inclusiveness and elasticity prongs of the special laws analysis, not because a more rigorous or exacting type of rational basis analysis applies. Republic...

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