Ex parte Joseph Collett, petitioner. Jessie a. Kitpatrick, petitioner, v. the Texas and Pacific Railway Co. the United States of America, petitioner, v. National City Lines, Inc., et al. isc., 233, Misc., and 269, Misc

Decision Date31 May 1949
Docket NumberNos. 206,M,s. 206
PartiesEx parte Joseph COLLETT, petitioner. Jessie A. KITPATRICK, petitioner, v. The TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. The UNITED STATES of America, petitioner, v. NATIONAL CITY LINES, Inc., et al. isc., 233, Misc., and 269, Misc
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus and prohibition.

Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Certiorari.

Motion for Leave to File Petition for Certiorari Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651.

Concurring opinion.

For majority opinions see 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944; 337 U.S. 75, 69 S.Ct. 953; 337 U.S. 78, 69 S.Ct. 955.

Mr. Lloyd T. Bailey, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Mr. Robert P. Hobson, Louisville, Ky., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must decide whether the venue provisions of the Judicial Code1 render applicable the doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 Petitioner instituted such an action against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in October, 1947, in the court below, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. No trial was had before September 1, 1948, the effective date of the present Judicial Code.3 Thereafter the Railroad filed a motion to transfer the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

The court below found that all 35 witnesses and the petitioner himself live in Irvine, Kentucky, which also was the scene of the accident; that Irvine is 420 miles, 'approximately twenty-four hours * * * by public transportation,' from East St. Louis, where the court below sits, but only 26 miles from Richmond and 48 from Lexington, in which two cities the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sits. Furthermore, the court below determined that jury schedules at both Richmond and Lexington made early trial possible. Thus concluding that the transfer would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses, and would be in the interest of justice, the District Court granted the Railroad's motion. Petitioner then filed directly in this Court a 'motion for leave to file petition for order to show cause why writs of mandamus (against the court below) and prohibition (against the Kentucky District Court) should not issue, and petition for same.' Petitioner makes no allegation that the court below abused its discretion; his sole contention is that the order of transfer exceeded the District Court's authority. Since that issue seemed of importance in the administration of justice,4 we assigned the case for hearing on the motion. 1948, 335 U.S. 897, 69 S.Ct. 295.

Prior to the current revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, forum non coveniens was not available in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1942, 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 1947, 330 U.S. 501, 505, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055. The new Code, however, provides that 'For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.' This is § 1404(a). The reviser's notes, which accom- pany each section of the Code, here read as follows: 'Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conve iens, permitting tranfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28, which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so.'5 The precise issue before us is whether, despite these expressions, the law remains unchanged. Petitioner so contends.

First. The court below relied on the language of § 1404(a), supra, which it regarded as 'unambiguous, direct, clear.' We agree. The reach of 'any civil action'6 is unmistakable. The phrase is used without qualification, without hint that some should be excluded. From the statutory text alone, it is impossible to read the section as excising this case from 'any civil action.'

The only suggestion petitioner offers in this regard is that 'any civil action' embraces only those actions for which special venue requirements are prescribed in §§ 1394—1403 of Revised Title 28,7 since these sections immediately precede § 1404(a), and all are within the Venue Chapter, §§ 1391—1406, inclusive, of the Code. To accept this contention, we would be required completely to disregard the Congressional admonition that 'No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28 * * * in which any section is placed * * *.'8 Furthermore, petitioner's argument proves too much: §§ 1391—1393, which also are in the Venue Chapter and also refer to 'any civil action', would be read as applying only to actions for which special venue requirements are established in neightboring sections of the Code, although they were obviously intended by Congress to be the general venue sections applicable to ordinary actions. It seems more reasonable to hold that § 1404(a) in terms applies generally, i.e., to 'any civil action.'

Second. Although petitioner wishes to restrict the literal meaning of 'any civil action', he would expand the sense of 'may transfer * * * to any other district or division where it might have been brought' beyond the exact scope of those words. Obviously, the express language gives no clue as to where the action 'might have been brought.' Yet the essence of petitioner's position is that the order below, transferring his suit, effects a repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which granted him the right to sue in any district 'in which the defend- ant shall be doing business at the time o commencing such action.'9

Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404(a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and distinct problems.10 Section 1404(a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously.

The Code, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed.11 We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of forum non conveniens to Liability Act suits derives from the Kepner decision. And there this Court expressly stated that 'If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative * * *.' 314 U.S. at page 54, 62 S.Ct. at page 10, 86 L.Ed. 28. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing, one way or the other, respecting forum non conveniens, there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law of implied repeals is, therefore, irrelevant.

Third. Petitioner's chief argument proceeds not from one side or the other of the literal boundaries of § 1404(a), but from its legislative history. The short answer is that there is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear. 'The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction.' Gemsco v. Walling, 1945, 324 U.S. 244, 260, 65 S.Ct. 605, 614, 89 L.Ed. 921. This canon of construction has received consistent adherence in our decisions.12

Nevertheless, we need not rest our decision on it solely. For the legislative history does not support petitioner's position. Petitioner's argument is based on these twin premises: Congress intended no 'controversial change' to be incorporated in the Code; and § 1404(a) is such a change.

To establish the former premise, petitioner cites a number of statements by legislative leaders in charge of the Code revision. For example, Representative Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws which initiated the work, said at the hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, 'The policy that we adopted * * * was to avoid wherever possible and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as substantive changes of law.'13 And Senator Donnell, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering the Code, said on the floor that '* * * the purpose of this Bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and non-controversial nature.'14 But these statements, clearly, are not unequivocal promises that no changes would be made. The legislation was announced to be a revision as well as a codification. It is obvious that the changes in law retained in the Code were not considered as 'controversial' by these Congressional spokesmen.

Petitioner does not offer any definition of...

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