338 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2003), 03-1146, U.S. v. Vesey
|Citation:||338 F.3d 913|
|Party Name:||U.S. v. Vesey|
|Case Date:||August 05, 2003|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit|
Submitted: June 10, 2003.
Rehearing Denied: Sept. 29, 2003.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Raphael M. Scheetz, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellant.
Daniel C. Tvedt, argued, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, 1 District Judge.
MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
Clayton Vesey was convicted in the district court 2 of delivery of cocaine base and possession with intent to deliver cocaine base and powder cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Mr. Vesey contends that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence, stricken portions of the government's expert witness's testimony, and admitted the testimony of his own expert witness. We affirm.
Mr. Vesey contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the search that yielded the evidence was unconstitutional. According to Mr. Vesey, the search violated his fourth amendment rights because the police forcibly entered his home only ten seconds after knocking and announcing their presence. "We review the district court's fact-finding in support of its ruling on the motion to suppress for clear error, and we review de novo the district court's ultimate application of the law to the facts." United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001).
Under the fourth amendment's so-called "knock-and-announce" principle, whether police officers have waited long enough after knocking to infer that they have been constructively denied admittance, and thus may enter, "does not turn on any hard and fast time limit, but depends upon the circumstances confronting the officer serving the warrant," see United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 949, 115 S.Ct. 363, 130 L.Ed.2d 316 (1994); United States v. Goodson, 165 F.3d 610, 614 & n. 2 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1030, 119 S.Ct. 2385, 144 L.Ed.2d 787 (1999). An officer's delay before entering ordinarily should be long enough to ensure that the resident has had time to hear the police knock and to answer the door. See generally Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32, 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). The fourth amendment's reasonableness inquiry is flexible, however, Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, and the suspected presence of drugs in the place to be searched has been held to lessen the time that police officers are required to wait, United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 926 (6th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1086, 119 S.Ct. 836, 142 L.Ed.2d 692 (1999).
The circumstances of this case amply support the district court's conclusion that the police officers' ten-second delay was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Having obtained a warrant to search for drugs and related...
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