Com. v. Moniz

• Citation: 338 Mass. 442,155 N.E.2d 762
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Antone T. MONIZ (two cases). COMMONWEALTH v. Benjamin P. ROGERS (three cases).
• Decision Date: 22 January 1959
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 762

155 N.E.2d 762

338 Mass. 442

COMMONWEALTH v. Antone T. MONIZ (two cases).

COMMONWEALTH v. Benjamin P. ROGERS (three cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued Nov. 3, 1958.

Decided Jan. 22, 1959.

John W. McIntyre, Asst. Dist. Atty., Attleboro, for the Commonwealth.

Harry P. Haveles, Boston, and James A. Heaney, Fall River, for defendants.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

In Commonwealth v. Moniz, 336 Mass. 178, 143 N.E.2d 196, on June 4, 1957, and before the decision of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, we sustained the exceptions of the defendants to the direction of verdicts of guilty under indictments charging violation of G.L. c. 272, §§ 28A and 32; c. 136, § 3, in connection with the public showing of a motion picture entitled 'Garden of Eden' in a theatre in Fall River on January 1, 2, and 3, 1956. Thereafter a jury found each defendant guilty. These are the defendants' exceptions to the denial of their motions for directed verdicts of not guilty.

The evidence showed that on January 3 'there was a mixed audience, including several young people who appeared to be eighteen or nineteen years old.'

The statutes, the indictments, and the motion picture are described in the earlier opinion. While the wording of the several statutory provisions varies, the issue presented under each indictment is whether the picture could reasonably and constitutionally be found to be obscene. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 549-550, 62 N.E.2d 840. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. In our prior decision (336 Mass. 178, 181, 143 N.E.2d 196) we said that the test for a motion picture, as for a book, is whether there is a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt those exposed to it by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.

We have described the picture (ibid., 336 Mass. at page 180, 143 N.E.2d at page 197), which we have seen, as follows: 'It depicted the experiences of an elderly man, a young woman and a child [nonnudists] in a so called nudist colony. Members of the colony were shown in the nude, walking in the woods, bathing in the lake, lying on the shore, and playing games. Except for several scenes in which men and women were shown naked to the waist the pictorial representations of unclothed persons were views photographed from the rear.'

Apart from the effect of the showing of nudity, the picture is substantially free of erotic appeal. The single episode (other than the general nudity) specified by the Commonwealth as sexually stimulating is not significant in view of the requirement to judge the picture as a whole in the light of current customs and habits of thought. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt 318 Mass. 543, 548-549, 551, 62 N.E.2d 840. The plot is far-fetched and thin, and the picture is dull. Notwithstanding the declared patronage of the Sun Bathers' Association of America and the warranted assumption that the picture exemplifies the tenets of the Association, the conclusion could reasonably be drawn that the promoters of the picture relied on the curiosity of the general public in respect of life inside a nudist colony for its box office success. But that is not a reason for not judging the picture for what it is. We agree with the Commonwealth that the advertised limitation, 'For Adults Only,' and some other aspects of the advertising could be found to have a tendency to attract persons having a prurient interest. But there was a lawful reason for a determination that children should be excluded (see Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 551-552, 62 N.E.2d 840; Butler v. State of Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412; the indictments are not for misleading prospective patrons (see proposal of Model Penal Code Tent. Draft No. 6, § 207.10, 'Promoting Sale of Material Represented as Obscene'); and the inducing acts here could not be found to be obscene publications.

We have no doubt, therefore, that if this picture can be found obscene, it is only because it shows naked men and women together and in the presence of nonnudists.

We assume, and believe, that such a showing is greatly offensive to many citizens as violative of accepted standards of propriety and decent behavior. But a work may not be adjudged obscene only because it is offensive in this way. 'The prohibitions of the statute are concerned with sex and sexual desire.' Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 550, 62 N.E.2d 840, 844. See Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 78 S.Ct. 365, 2 L.Ed.2d 352, discussed infra.

Effect being the test, and current community standards relevant, the jury 'representing a cross section of the people * * * should commonly be a suitable arbiter' (318 Mass. 543, 551, 62 N.E.2d 840). It has been said that the jury in such cases is 'peculiarly competent.' Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469. See Chafee, Government & Mass Communications, 219-221. For discussions of the difficulties of applying and reviewing the application of the subjective test see 52 Harv.L.Rev. 40, 73-74; 38 Minn.L.Rev. 295, 368-395. If this principle were applied without qualification it might perhaps be deemed to sustain the jury verdicts on the premise that they may reflect a community view that any showings of nudity have a tendency to cause lascivious thoughts and to arouse lustful desires. Having regard for the status of nonlascivious nudity as established in the decided cases (see Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42; United States v. 4200 Copies Intl. Journal, D.C., 134 F.Supp. 490, 494), we question whether this view could be deemed a permissible application of the statutory standard. In any event we are satisfied that the constitutional issue is contolling.

In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098, the Supreme Court determined that 'expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' The majority opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (applicable also to Alberts v. State of California, decided therewith), holding that obscenity is not protected, stated (354 U.S. at page 488, 77 S.Ct. at page 1311), 'The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area * * * must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.' The court also said (354 U.S. at page 484, 77 S.Ct. at page 1309), 'All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance--unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion--have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.' The court laid down the constitutional standards to be applied in determining the issue. ¹ The opinion dealt with plainly pornographic material ('the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect'--Warren, C. J., 354 U.S. at page 496, 77 S.Ct. at page 1315). But the decision was broadly stated and Harlan, J. (354 U.S. at page 496, 77 S.Ct. at page 1315), expressed the fear that constitutional protections of free speech had been weakened. He made the point, relevant here, that, in determining whether a particular work may be suppressed constitutionally, the appellate court must make a factual judgment for itself. ² 354 U.S. 476, 497-498, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1316, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. Later cases show, we think, that his fear, at least in aspects here relevant, was unfounded and that notwithstanding the majority's reference in the Roth case to the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards' (354 U.S. at page 489, 77 S.Ct. at page 1311), the court recognizes and applies the principle that courts must themselves judge the pruriency of the material to determine the constitutional issue.

In Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 78 S.Ct. 365, 2 L.Ed.2d 352, the court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals that nudist magazines for general distribution which contained pictures of naked men, women and children accompanying textual matter which the Post Office Department had found not to be obscene and which advocated and explained nudism could be found to be obscene because of the pictures, so that he magazines could lawfully be barred from the mails. Fahy, J., in a concurring opinion, had said, 'Pictures permeate the magazine and the pictures are dominated by those which the contemporary community deems indecent.' 101 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 249 F.2d 114, 120. The Supreme Court granted certiorari forthwith and summarily, without opinion, reversed the judgment on the authority of the Roth case.

Perhaps the disposition of the Sunshine Book case means only that the nonsalacious presentation of nudity cannot reasonably be found obscene (see Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 557-558, 62 N.E.2d 840). But however the semantic emphasis is laid, the case shows that the nudist life may not only be discussed, but may be pictured,...