Padilla v. Wyman
Decision Date | 08 May 1974 |
Citation | 34 N.Y.2d 36,356 N.Y.S.2d 3 |
Parties | , 312 N.E.2d 149 In the Matter of Rosa PADILLA, Appellant, v. George K. WYMAN, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Bernard C. Durham, New York City, William B. Haley, Long Island City, Jonathan A. Weiss, New York City, and Toby B. Golick, Jamaica, for appellant.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Amy Juviler, Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Ilene J. Slater, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality, under the equal protection clause, of provisions of statute, State regulation and local policy statement which taken together make the amount received by a recipient of old age assistance depend to some extent on the size and composition of the family unit with which she resides.
Prior to August 1, 1971, petitioner, a recipient of public assistance under the Old Age Assistance program, lived alone in her apartment. Under the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 131--a of the Social Services Law, Consol.Laws, c. 55, in addition to her grant for rent, as the member of a one-person household, she received a monthly allowance of $84 for basic needs (her so-called 'pre-added allowance') (also 18 NYCRR 352.2(d)). Following hospitalization for a stroke, on August 2 petitioner moved into the apartment occupied by her daughter and her granddaughter, both of whom were themselves recipients of public assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 131--a and regulation 352.2((e)(1)), petitioner's grant for basic needs was then reduced to $60 a month in accordance with the calculations set forth in the department's 'Table for Cooperative Budgeting'.
The reduction in grant was first upheld in a determination made by the State Commissioner of Social Services following a fair hearing sought by petitioner. The Appellate Division then confirmed the State Commissioner's determination. The case is now before us on asserted constitutional grounds (CPLR 5601, subd. (b), par. 1).
Petitioner's challenge to the reduction in her grant is two-fold. First, she contests the principle of reduction in the amount of per capita assistance to recipients in multiperson households. Second, she asserts that, even if reduction in consequence of numbers of persons in the household were to be sustained, it is impermissible for the amount of the per capita grant to vary further according to the status of the other members of the household. Thus, she asserts that there would have been no reduction in the amount of her grant if, instead of joining her daughter and granddaughter who were on public assistance, she had chosen to reside with two self-maintaining nonlegally responsible relatives or friends or with two other, nonrelated welfare recipients. We think neither objection is well taken.
The rationale behind the reduction in amount of grants to recipients in a multiperson household is not obscure. The amount of a grant is directly related to the measure of a recipient's needs. In a multiperson household the per capita cost of many items, since they are shared, will be less. This consequence involves no attribution of the contribution by any one member of the household to the maintenance of any other member. Each contributes his own share to the reduced pooled costs. Nor is any reduction in the standard of living implied. Accordingly the reduction in petitioner's grant in consequence of her having joined her daughter and granddaughter to form a three-person household has a rational basis and must be sustained. (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491; see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285.) *
On the second branch of her assault, petitioner points to the department's regulation which provides: '(b) For the purpose of such monthly grants and allowances a child or children or adults residing with self-maintaining nonlegally responsible relatives or friends, shall be considered as a separate household' (18 NYCRR 352.2(b)); and to a statement which has been published by the New York City Department of Social Services: (Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance and Social Services, published by the New York City Department of Social Services (1967), p. 220). Petitioner then observes that under this State regulation and this city policy statement she would have been treated substantially differently if, instead of joining her daughter and granddaughter who were on relief, she had formed a three-person household either with self-supporting relatives or friends or with other welfare recipients who were not related to her. Subdivision (b) would have forestalled a reduction in her benefits in the first instance; the policy statement, in the second. There is plausibility to the contention that even if the amount of petitioner's public assistance grant may be reduced on...
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