Udy v. Custer County
| Decision Date | 24 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 26346., No. 26345 |
| Parties | David Leslie UDY, Plaintiff, v. CUSTER COUNTY, Defendant. Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife, and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho, Defendants-Respondents. David Leslie Udy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Custer County, Defendant-Respondent. Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife, and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho, Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Douglas W. Crandall, Boise, argued for appellants Chivers and McDonald.
Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for appellant Udy. Reed W. Larsen argued.
Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respondents. Kirtlan G. Naylor argued.
This is an appeal from the district court's decision granting summary judgment in a negligence action in favor of Respondents Custer County and Sheriff Mickey Roskelley. The district court held that Sheriff Roskelley did not have a legal duty to remove or warn of rocks on a State highway. We affirm.
On March 1, 1998, David Udy was driving his truck on Highway 75 approximately two miles north of Clayton in Custer County. Roy Chivers and Roxanna McDonald were passengers in Udy's truck. While driving, Udy encountered a large rock in the road. Udy was unable to avoid hitting the rock as another vehicle was approaching in the opposite lane. Udy's vehicle struck the rock, blowing out the right front tire and causing Udy to lose control. The truck subsequently rolled, causing injuries to Udy and his passengers.
On the night before the accident, Custer County Sheriff Mickey Roskelley and his wife had traveled on Highway 75 to Clayton to serve some papers. Roskelley admitted that on his return from Clayton, he observed several small rocks on the fog line approximately one-third of a mile from the scene of Udy's subsequent accident. Sheriff Roskelley did not remove the rocks or notify other deputies or the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) of the presence of the rocks.
On January 8, 1999, Udy filed a complaint against Sheriff Roskelley and Custer County alleging that Roskelley observed and negligently failed to remove from the highway the rock Udy later struck with his vehicle. The Chivers and McDonalds also filed a complaint against Roskelley and the county alleging injuries as a result of Roskelley's negligence in leaving the rock on the highway. The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 8, 2000, the district court granted the defendants' motion, ruling that as a matter of law, Sheriff Roskelley owed no duty to remove or warn of the rock struck by Udy's vehicle. Udy, the Chivers, and the McDonalds appeal the district court's decision. The question presented on appeal is whether Sheriff Roskelley owed a duty of care to the Appellants to warn of or remove the rocks on Highway 75.
A. Sheriff Roskelley's Duty
We initially examine the Appellants' argument that the district court erred by ruling that Sheriff Roskelley does not have a statutory duty to remove obstructions from the highway. It is clear that there is no statute explicitly placing a duty on county sheriffs to remove rocks or obstructions from highways, and the Appellants do not assert otherwise. In addition to the absence of such an express mandate, the district court held that there was no duty implicitly existing by virtue of any other statutory authority. The Appellants disagree and challenge the district court's conclusion that the IDT has an exclusive duty to maintain Custer County's highways. They assert that the legislature, through Idaho Code section 31-2202, intended to impose a duty on county sheriffs to protect against hazards on the physical surface of the highway. The Appellants, however, acknowledge that there is no authority for their argument. Instead, focusing on I.C. § 31-2202(13), they assert that a common sense reading of the statute implies that a county sheriff owes a duty to remove or alert someone of the presence of the rocks on the surface of the road if the rocks pose a hazard to the traveling public. We disagree.
The Appellants' arguments raise an issue of statutory construction, which is subject to our free review. See City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219, 221, 912 P.2d 106, 108 (1996); Harris v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1992). Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. See In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992); Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 893 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct.App.1995). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, "the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction." Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). See also Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404, 913 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996); State v. Watts, 131 Idaho 782, 784, 963 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App.1998).
Idaho Code section 31-2202 provides, among a lengthy list of duties, that each county sheriff shall:
The plain and ordinary meaning of this statute suggests that a sheriff is to work with the Idaho State Police to protect the highways surfaces from damage. This would not appear to include a duty to remove rocks or other obstructions from the State's highways, nor a duty to communicate to some other person or entity the need for removal of rocks or obstructions. The language instead indicates that law enforcement personnel are to make sure that vehicles do not damage the physical surface of the highway. Had the legislature intended to impose a duty on county sheriffs to remove or notify someone of the presence of highway obstructions, it could easily have done so. As the district court observed in this case, adding a phrase like "maintaining the state highways for traffic safety" to I.C. § 31-2202 could reasonably be interpreted to include the removal of obstructions. The Court must assume, however, that the legislature did not include such a phrase because it did not want to impose this duty on county sheriffs as a matter of statutory liability.
Instead, the legislature has placed the responsibility of maintaining State highways,1 such as Highway 75, on the ITD.2 Idaho Code section 40-201 imposes upon the State the duty to "improve and maintain the highways" within its jurisdiction. I.C. § 40-201. See also I.C. § 40-502 (); Roberts v. Transp. Dep't, 121 Idaho 727, 731, 827 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Smith, 124 Idaho 671, 674, 862 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct.App.1993) (). The presence of this statute indicates that the State of Idaho, through its Department of Transportation, has a statutory duty to remove rocks and other obstructions as part of its maintenance of the State's highways. We therefore hold that Sheriff Roskelley did not have a statutory duty to remove the rocks from Highway 75 or to notify anyone else of the need for removal of the rocks.
No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). Generally, the question whether a duty exists is a question of law, over which we exercise free review. See, e.g., Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991). This Court follows the rule that "one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). Further, there is a "general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). However, one also owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility. See Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). With these principles in mind, we next examine whether Sheriff Roskelley owed a common law duty to warn of or remove the rocks from Highway 75.
The Appellants first assert that the district court erred in finding that Sheriff Roskelley did not voluntarily assume a duty. They contend that because Sheriff Roskelley testified that it was his practice to remove or contact someone to remove obstructions from the highway, Sheriff Roskelley assumed a duty to remove the rocks, even if he did not have a statutory duty to do so. We disagree with the Appellants' argument.
This Court has recognized that it is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist. "If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875...
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