Rea v. State

• Decision Date: 03 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. F-2000-1452.,F-2000-1452.
• Parties: Elmer Allen REA, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

34 P.3d 148

2001 OK CR 28

Elmer Allen REA, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-2000-1452.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

October 3, 2001.

Billy Joe Ellington, Pawnee, OK, Attorney for Defendant.

Alan B. Foster Asst. District Attorney, Pawnee County Courthouse, Pawnee, OK, Attorney for the State.

Danny G. Lohmann, Appellate Defense Counsel, Norman, OK, Attorney for Appellant.

Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, Attorney for the State.

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHNSON, Vice-Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 On February 4, 2000, Appellant, Elmer Allen Rea, was tried in a non-jury trial in Pawnee County District Court, Case No. CF-99-32 for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 645. The Honorable Jefferson D. Sellers, District Judge, found Appellant guilty. Formal sentencing was held March 17, 2000, and Judge Sellers sentenced Appellant to ten years imprisonment and a $500.00 fine. From the Judgment and Sentence imposed, Appellant filed this appeal. ¶ 2 Appellant raises the following proposition:

The sentence imposed was excessive and should be modified.

After thorough consideration of the proposition, and the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts and briefs of the parties, we affirm the sentence for the reasons set forth below.

¶ 3 Appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because he suffers from diminished mental capacity. Appellant's mental health history shows that he has been treated at various facilities, for various psychiatric and substance-abuse problems, since the age of twelve. Appellant was twenty-one years old at the time of sentencing.

¶ 4 Appellant opted for a trial to the district court, without a jury. He presented evidence concerning his mental health history. The Presentence Report, submitted to the district court before imposition of sentence, further detailed Appellant's mental health history. Thus, the sentencing body (in this case, the court) had a wealth of information about Appellant at its disposal before imposing sentence. The record affirmatively shows that the district court considered Appellant's mental health history in assessing the sentence, and we find no abuse of its broad discretion on that point.¹ Cf. Bowers v. State, 1982 OK CR 103, ¶ 15, 648 P.2d 835, 838

(jury's punishment assessment would not be disturbed on appeal, where jury considered evidence of defendant's diminished mental capacity in arriving at sentence). The court imposed the maximum sentence for the offense, but contrary to Appellant's argument, the sentence was imposed after full consideration of Appellant's personal circumstances and the circumstances of the case.² We find no merit to this portion of Appellant's proposition.

¶ 5 Appellant further suggests that we abandon our "shock the conscience" standard of sentence review in favor of a "proportionality" standard, citing People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990), as support.³ We decline to do so. As the Milbourn court noted, id. at 2, the "preeminent requirement" in fashioning proper appellate review of sentences is to respect and give purpose to the sentencing scheme promulgated by the legislature. Legislatures, not courts, define punishment. State v. Young, 1999 OK CR 14, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 949. Oklahoma law permits the sentencing body (judge or jury) to impose a sentence anywhere within a specified statutory range. Given that our state legislature has afforded such broad discretion to the sentencer, our "shock the conscience" standard provides an appropriate scope of review.

DECISION

¶ 6 The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

LUMPKIN, P.J., and STRUBHAR and LILE, JJ., concurs.

CHAPEL, J., concurs in part/dissents in part. CHAPEL, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part:

¶ 1 I concur in the majority's decision affirming Rea's conviction. I believe Rea's sentence is disproportionate and would modify. I disagree with the majority's refusal to adopt a proportionality standard of review for excessive sentence claims. I have previously indicated I believe a proportionality standard is both fair and appropriate.⁴ I do not see why the majority relies on the People v. Milbourn⁵ explanation that appellate sentence review must respect and give purpose to the legislature's sentencing scheme. I agree that legislatures define punishments. I agree that our state legislature allows a sentencer broad discretion to impose sentence within a statutory range of punishment. However, the logic behind the conclusion that this mandates our standardless "shock the conscience" review escapes me. I conclude, instead, that in order to respect and give purpose to the legislature's intent to provide fair and just punishment for crimes, we must employ a meaningful standard of review in each case to ensure the sentencer's broad discretion is used fairly and wisely.

¶ 2 The Oklahoma legislature has specifically granted to this Court the authority to modify sentences.⁶ When reviewing a sentence claimed to be excessive, our case law dictates the standard is whether or not the sentence "shocks the conscience" of the Court.⁷ I contend that this is no standard at all. It is far too subjective to be called a standard. Under this measure, this Court's decision of whether a sentence is excessive turns on the personal values and beliefs of the judges sitting in any given case — whether each judge's conscience is "shocked" to the point that, collectively, the Court agrees a sentence demands relief. This not only results in disagreement among the Court in particular cases,⁸ it results in wildly disparate sentences being affirmed for persons charged with the same offenses,⁹ as well as wholly disproportionate sentences for crimes of differing magnitude.¹⁰ The length of your sentence may depend, not on the seriousness of your crime, but on the county in which you were prosecuted. This result neither respects nor gives purpose to the legislature's sentencing scheme.

¶ 3 A review of our case law shows this Court has consistently used "shock the conscience" review in determining excessive sentence claims only since the mid-1960s.¹¹ Earlier cases focused on whether an "injustice" was done,¹² or whether the verdict was the result of passion and/or prejudice.¹³ This Court has long held we will modify a sentence where justice requires.¹⁴ In the early 1950s Judges Jones¹⁵ and Powell¹⁶ each authored several opinions referring to a "shock the conscience" standard of review without authority; these opinions are almost never cited for this standard in later cases. In 1962 the Court held in McCluskey v. State¹⁷ that "[w]e do not have the power to modify a sentence unless we can conscientiously say that under all facts and circumstances the sentence is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court."¹⁸McCluskey cites as authority two cases, neither of which use this language.¹⁹ In 1964 we repeated the standard without citation to authority in Clouse v. State.²⁰ Virtually all of the hundreds of cases in which we have since repeated the standard may be traced to either McCluskey or Clouse. Often we simply state the standard without resort to authority, and a handful of these cases have themselves been cited as authority. We have occasionally varied the language, stating, for example, "We will not find error unless the sentence is so greatly disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the conscience of the court."²¹ This summary shows the standard "shocks the conscience", while in common usage for the last thirty years, has no firm historical precedent in our law. The Court has never explained the nature or limits of this standard of review, and in the overwhelming majority of cases it has been used to uphold sentences of as much as a thousand years.²²

¶ 4 I once again propose that this Court abandon its subjective, standardless "shock the conscience" review and adopt a proportionality review. Taking into account the particular facts of each case and circumstances of each defendant, we should review a sentence to determine whether it is proportional to the seriousness of the crime and the sentences received by similar offenders. This review will provide a measure of objectivity, reassuring citizens that this Court's sentencing review is based on more than whim or personal belief.

¶ 5 A proportionality review also better meets the intent of the legislature in giving this Court the power to modify sentences. The legislative role is to set sentences for classifications of crimes, such as drug offenses, robbery or murder. In doing so, the legislature recognizes the principle of proportionality and determines some crimes are more serious than others: murder may be punished by a longer prison term than assault, and possession of even large amounts of marijuana may receive far less time than trafficking in cocaine. The legislature does not set sentences for individual crimes; that is the responsibility of the jury or trial court. The legislature has given this Court authority to review and modify sentences in individual cases. A proportionality review would not infringe on the legislature's right to set sentences for categories of crimes. By contrast, our standardless "shock the conscience" review for excessive sentences leaves open the real possibility that a defendant convicted of a "less serious" crime (as determined by the legislature) may receive more prison time than a defendant convicted of a "more serious" crime. This result cannot comport with the legislature's action in making some crimes punishable by more years in prison than others.

¶ 6 I recognize that we determined we need not conduct a proportionality review in Maxwell v. State.²³ Maxwell held that, given our "shock the conscience" standard, a proportionality review is not constitutionally necessary to determine whether a sentence is excessive. We relied on a ...