NEW MEXICO DEPT. OF HEALTH v. Compton
Decision Date | 16 October 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 26,419.,26,419. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Parties | NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Fred COMPTON, Respondent-Petitioner. |
Protection and Advocacy System, Inc., Michael C. Parks, V. Colleen Miller, Sandra L. Gomez, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
New Mexico Department of Health, Beth W. Schaefer, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
{1} Respondent-Petitioner Fred Compton seeks review of an opinion of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the New Mexico Department of Health (the Department) failed to provide him with a civil commitment hearing within the time limits mandated by NMSA 1978, § 43-1-11(A) (1989) and NMSA 1978, § 43-1-15(B) ( ). Compton requests that this Court hold that the statutory time periods should be strictly construed and enforced and that the petitions against him should have been dismissed. We affirm.
{2} Compton was involuntarily admitted to Las Vegas Medical Center (LVMC) on February 18, 1999, for an emergency mental health evaluation. Police initially encountered Compton as a result of threats he made to family members. The admitting psychiatrist at LVMC noted Compton's long history of mental illness, indicated that Compton suffered from a mental disorder as defined in NMSA 1978, § 43-1-3(O) (1993), and assigned a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. On February 22, the Department filed two petitions in district court, one for a thirty-day commitment for mental health evaluation and treatment pursuant to Section 43-1-11(A), and another for appointment of a treatment guardian pursuant to Section 43-1-15(B). Following a determination of indigency, the district court, on February 23, appointed counsel to represent Compton in responding to the Department's two petitions.
{3} A hearing was scheduled for February 25. On that date, the district court postponed the hearing for one week due to illness of the assigned judge. The court held a hearing on March 4, fourteen calendar days after Compton's admission to LVMC and eight court days after the filing of the treatment guardian petition. During the hearing, Compton's attorney objected, for the first time, to the failure to hold the hearing within the statutorily mandated time and moved to dismiss both petitions. Compton argued that Section 43-1-11(A) and Section 43-1-15(B) mandated that the hearing be held on February 25.
{4} The district court rejected Compton's argument and found by clear and convincing evidence that Compton presented a likelihood of serious harm to himself or to others as a result of a mental disorder. The court entered orders committing Compton to LVMC for evaluation and treatment not to exceed thirty days and appointing a treatment guardian for him. Compton was discharged on March 25, 1999, less than thirty days after the initially scheduled hearing.
{5} Compton appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole ground that the postponement of the February 25 hearing violated his statutory rights and required dismissal of the petitions. Compton did not appeal the district court's determination that he presented a likelihood of serious harm to himself or to others as a result of a mental disorder. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the district court's orders. N.M. Dep't of Health v. Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, 129 N.M. 474, 10 P.3d 153. The Court determined that the statutory time limits asserted by Compton were mandatory, but not jurisdictional, and that Compton suffered no prejudice from the seven-day postponement. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. This Court then granted Compton's petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
{6} Compton does not directly assert a violation of his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, he repeatedly refers to the "`massive curtailment of liberty'" implicated by involuntary civil commitment, relying on the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), and argues that the hearing rights at issue in this case have "constitutional underpinnings." Additionally, we note that the special concurrence in the Court of Appeals suggested that "liberty interests are implicated" by this case and expressed concern over the lack of protection "for these violated liberty interests." Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, ¶ 23,129 N.M. 474,10 P.3d 153 (Armijo, J., specially concurring). As a result, we believe it is necessary to address as a threshold matter the constitutional implications of the procedures used in this case in order to place the statutory time limitations in Section 43-1-11(A) and Section 43-1-15(B) in their proper context.
923 P.2d at 1147 ( ). Under Mathews, we rely on the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depravation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.
Section 43-1-10(F).
{9} The next stage of commitment contemplated by the Code is a thirty-day period of evaluation and treatment. Section 43-1-11. The Legislature has established a number of procedural protections to accompany this level of commitment. Unlike an emergency transport and detention, a thirty-day commitment must be authorized by a court order and only after a hearing at which "the client shall be represented by counsel and shall have the right to present evidence on [the client's] behalf, including testimony by an independent mental health professional of [the client's] own choosing, to cross-examine witnesses and to be present at the hearing." Section 43-1-11(B). The client "has the right to a hearing within seven days of admission unless waived after consultation with c...
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