Force v. Squier

• Decision Date: 10 March 1896
• Citation: 133 Mo. 306,34 S.W. 574
• Parties: FORCE et al. v. SQUIER.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

34 S.W. 574

133 Mo. 306

FORCE et al. v. SQUIER.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 10, 1896.

PRACTICE IN JUSTICE COURT — PROOF OF CONVERSION UNDER COMPLAINT ON ACCOUNT.

In an action in justice court on a paper in the words and figures: "J. J. S. in Acc't with C. E. F. and E. S. S., Dr. Nov. 4. To 45 loads screenings, at $1.75,—$78.75," — recovery could be had on proof of a conversion of the screenings by defendant.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; James Gibson, Judge.

Action by Force & Fruitt against J. J. Squier. From a judgment for plaintiffs in the circuit court on appeal from a justice, defendant appealed to the Kansas City court of appeals, where the judgment was reversed, and the case was then certified to the supreme court. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.

Henry Wollman and Alex. New, for appellant. Teasdale, Ingraham & Cowherd, for respondents.

MACFARLANE, J.

This suit was commenced before a justice of the peace upon a cause of action stated as follows: "J. J. Squier in Acc't with Chas. E. Force and E. S. Stewart, Dr. Nov. 4. To 45 loads screenings, at $1.75,—$78.75." The case was appealed to the circuit court, where it was tried upon the same account. On the trial in the circuit court the evidence showed that plaintiffs were the owners of certain screenings from crushing rock for macadam, which were taken by defendant, and converted to his own use, without their knowledge or consent. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence defendant demurred to its sufficiency, on the ground that it "tended to prove a cause of action other than the one sued upon." The demurrer was overruled by the court, and judgment was given for plaintiffs, and defendant appealed to the Kansas City court of appeals. Upon a hearing before that court the judgment was reversed upon authority of Sandeen v. Railway Co., 79 Mo. 278, by which the court considered itself bound, as being the last decision of the supreme court on the question. The case was certified to this court, the opinion being deemed to be in conflict with other decisions of this court and of decisions of the St. Louis court of appeals. The question is whether, upon the account filed as a cause of action, a recovery was authorized on proof of a wrongful conversion of the screenings.

Justice courts are established for the convenience of the people, in order that petty disputes may be settled without delay, and with the least possible expense. Forms and formal pleadings are dispensed with, in order that litigants may prepare their own statements and conduct their own trials. No more should be required in pleading than that the statement should be sufficiently specific to advise the opposite party of the nature of the claim made, and to bar a subsequent action for the same cause. It seems to us that the account sued upon here possesses all the definiteness necessary for these purposes. It apprises defendant that pay is demanded for 45 loads of screenings. What additional enlightenment would defendant receive from the further statement that they had been wrongfully taken and converted by him? The distinction would seem absurd to one unacquainted with the technical pleadings required in courts of record. If defendant conducted his own trial before the justice, a variance between the statement and the proof probably never occurred to him. But the exact question was settled nearly 40 years ago by this court in the case of Coughlin v. Lyons, 24 Mo. 536. That suit was commenced before a justice upon this account: "James Lyons and Edward Sullivan, partners as Lyons and Sullivan, to Peter J. Coughlin, Dr. 1855, Feby. 20. To 41 hams, 464½ lbs., at 10 cents, $46.45; 2 bbls. whiskey, 77½ gals., at 28 cents, $21.70; total, $68.15." The proof showed that defendant caused a constable under process against another to take the property from the possession of plaintiff, and remove the same. The question of variance was directly raised and passed upon by the court, and a judgment for plaintiff approved. The court say: "We consider that there is nothing in this objection. The action may be considered as trespass or trover, according to the nature of the real transaction, and the plaintiff may waive the tort, and sue for so much money had and received." But it was objected that the constable had never sold the property and received the money. To this the court replied: "In courts of common-law jurisdiction, where actions were separated into separate kinds, this doctrine was recognized; but here there was no necessity for it, for this action itself may be considered as trover or as trespass, and there is no necessity of the application of the...