Shays v. Federal Election Com'n
Decision Date | 19 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 02-1984(CKK).,CIV.A. 02-1984(CKK). |
Citation | 340 F.Supp.2d 39 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Christopher SHAYS & Martin Meehan, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant. |
Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Michelle M. Umberger, Michael M. Markman, David L. Anstaett, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, L.L.P., Madison, WI, Brent N. Rushforth, Carl S. Nadler, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe LLP, Washington, DC, Roger M. Witten, David A. O'Neil, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, New York City, Randolph Moss, Stacy E. Beck, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, LLP, Donald J. Simon, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry LLP, Fred Wertheimer, Alexandra Edsall, Democracy 21, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Robert William Bonham, III, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Karl Joseph Sandstrom, Robert Felix Bauer, Perkins Coie, LLP, James P. Joseph, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC, for Movants.
Michael B. Trister, Lichtman, Trister, Singer & Ross, Trevor Potter, Caplin & Drysdale, Washington, DC, J. Gerald Hebert, Alexandria, VA, for Amicus.
Before the Court is Defendant Federal Election Commission's ("FEC" or "Commission") application for a stay pending appeal of the Court's September 18, 2004, Opinion and Order, 337 F.Supp.2d 28, in this case. That decision, which granted-in-part and denied-in-part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and granted-in-part and denied-in-part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, found that numerous regulations promulgated by the Commission in the wake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA") undermined and thwarted congressional purposes behind BCRA and either failed Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) review or violated the strictures of the APA. See Shays v. F.E.C., 337 F.Supp.2d 28, 130-31 (D.D.C.2004). In the Remedy section of that ruling, the Court explicitly denied Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and remanded the defective regulations to the FEC "for further action consistent with this opinion" without vacating them. Id. at 130.
Having filed a Notice of Appeal on September 28, 2004, to document its appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Commission filed a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal on October 1, 2004, requesting that this Court "clarify for the public the state of the law in the wake of the Court's decision." Def.'s Mot. for Stay at 2. The Commission's petition further asks that "the Court make clear that, until the Court of Appeals issues its final decision on the appeal, (1) the regulations found defective remain in effect and (2) the Commission is not required to initiate rulemaking proceedings under this Court's remand order." Id. Plaintiffs' filed a Response to the FEC's motion, which decries the "complete abdication of the Commission's responsibility" through its request that the Court clarify and/or stay its September 18, 2004, Opinion and Order, Pls.' Response at 1, and the Commission subsequently filed a Reply.
Upon a careful consideration of these filings and the relevant legal authority, the Court declines to stamp the Commission's "business-as-usual" tactics and request for delay with the judicial imprimatur of approval. Rather, the Court concludes that the FEC has failed to meet the stringent standards required to justify the extraordinary remedy of a stay pending appeal and therefore shall deny the Commission's motion. Importantly, while the Court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction to go beyond identifying the FEC's errors of law in the defective regulations, Shays, 337 F.Supp.2d 28, 130-31 (D.D.C.2004), and notes that the deficient rules technically remain "on the books," the Commission should conduct proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion and remand in order to assuage its abrogation of both congressional intent and the public interest.1
On February 13, 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2356. McConnell v. F.E.C., 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 205 (D.D.C.2003) (per curiam). The bill was then adopted by the Senate on March 18 and 20, 2002. Def.'s Stmt. of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute ("Def.'s Stmt.") ¶ 1. President George W. Bush signed H.R. 2356 into law on March 27, 2002. Id. The Act, commonly known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act or "BCRA," represents the most recent amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"). Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
The Federal Election Commission is the independent agency of the United States government with exclusive jurisdiction to administer, interpret and civilly enforce FECA. Id. ¶ 4. Section 402(c)(2) of the BCRA required the Commission to promulgate rules within 90 days of BCRA's enactment to carry out provisions found in Title I of BCRA, which added new limitations on party, candidate, and officeholder solicitations and use of nonfederal funds. Id. ¶ 6. After taking the proper steps involving notice, publication, and comment, the FEC transmitted its Title I regulations to Congress on July 16, 2002, and on July 29, 2002, the Commission promulgated its final rules and Explanation and Justification ("E & J") on "Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-federal Funds or Soft Money." Id. at ¶ 7. These regulations became effective on November 6, 2002. Pls.' Stmt. of Genuine Issues in Opp'n to Def.'s Stmt. () ¶ 4.
Section 402(c)(1) of BCRA required the FEC to promulgate within 270 days of its enactment the remaining regulations required to carry out BCRA. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 8. After taking the proper steps involving notice, publication, and comment, the FEC transmitted its Electioneering Communications regulations to Congress on October 11, 2002, and on October 23, 2002, the Commission promulgated its final rules and Explanation and Justification ("E & J") on "Electioneering Communications." Id. ¶ 9. These regulations became effective November 22, 2002. Pls.' Opp'n Stmt. ¶ 5. The Commission followed the same basic steps with its "Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions" regulations — transmitted on November 8, 2002, promulgated in the Federal Register on November 19, 2002, Def.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 10-11 — and with its "Coordinated and Independent Expenditures" regulations — transmitted on December 18, 2002, promulgated on January 3, 2003, and effective on February 3, 2003, Pls.' Opp'n Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 13.
Plaintiffs Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan are both citizens of the United States, members of Congress, candidates, voters, fundraisers, and members of political parties. Id. ¶ 11.2 Both Plaintiffs were principal sponsors in the House of Representatives of the legislation enacted as BCRA and spent many years seeking to promote its enactment. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs, along with other co-sponsors of BCRA, submitted written comments on the FEC's proposed rules implementing BCRA's provisions — some of which were not adopted by the Commission in its final rules. Id. ¶ 10. Distressed by the structure and loopholes of many of the Commission's final regulations, Plaintiffs brought this action, alleging that "[t]he FEC's new regulations, in multiple and interrelated ways, thwart and undermine the language and congressional purposes of Title I and II of BCRA." Am. Compl. ¶ 6.
Upon a review of Plaintiffs' panoply of asserted deficient regulations, this Court found that these challenged rules promulgated by the FEC survived both Chevron and APA review:
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(c)(3) (the "Grandfather" provision)
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(4) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(c)(3) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.14 ( )
Shays, 337 F.Supp.2d 28, 130 (D.D.C.2004).
However, this Court concluded that these contested regulations failed either Chevron or APA review, and required that they be remanded back to the Commission for further action consistent with the decision:
• 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c) (coordination content regulations), including 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(iv) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 109.3 (coordination definition of "agent")
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m) (definition of "solicit")
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(n) (definition of "direct")
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(b) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.64(b) ( ) • 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(3) (definition of "get-out-the-vote activity")
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(4) (definition of "voter identification")
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.25 ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(c)(2) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(c)(3) (de minimis Levin Amendment exemption)
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(6) ( )
• 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(i) ( )
Shays, 337 F.Supp.2d 28, 130 (D.D.C.2004).
As a result of the Court's ruling, the Commission filed the Motion For Stay of September 18, 2004, Order Pending Appeal currently pending before this Court.3 In many ways, the title of the FEC's motion is a bit of misnomer: in part, the Commission seeks clarification of the Court's prior ruling so "the Commission does not inadvertently violate the Court's actual intent." Def.'s Mot. for Stay at 2. According to the FEC's reasoning,
[a] stay order explicitly confirming that the regulations remain in effect pending a decision on appeal would, therefore, be consistent with the case law underlying this Court's remedial order and ... would be appropriate under the relevant legal standard for a stay pending appeal. It would also have the salutary effect of clarifying the current state of the law for...
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