Henry v. Edmisten, 550PA84
| Decision Date | 18 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 550PA84,550PA84 |
| Citation | 340 S.E.2d 720,315 N.C. 474 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Gary Raymond HENRY v. Rufus L. EDMISTEN, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of North Carolina; J. Russell Nipper, In His Official Capacity as Clerk of Superior Court of Wake County; Maude P. Hocutt, In Her Official Capacity as a Magistrate in Wake County; and R.W. Wilkins, In His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles. Steve Herrod BARBEE v. Rufus L. EDMISTEN, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of North Carolina; J. Russell Nipper, In His Official Capacity as Clerk of Superior Court of Wake County; and R.W. Wilkins, In His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles. |
Van Camp, Gill and Crumpler, P.A. by William B. Crumpler and Sally H. Scherer, Raleigh, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Isaac T. Avery, III, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for defendants-appellants.
The Safe Roads Act of 1983, 1983 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 435, provides for a mandatory, prehearing ten-day license revocation for drivers charged with an impaired driving offense who fail a breath analysis test. Id. at § 14 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 20-16.5 (1983)). The questions presented by this appeal are whether this statute violates (1) the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and (2) the corresponding Law of the Land and Equal Protection Clauses of Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Because we conclude that the state's compelling interest in public safety justifies the state's immediate suspension of a person's driver's license pending the outcome of prompt postsuspension review, we hold the statute does not violate the Due Process Clause. The statute also does not violate the Law of the Land Clause because a detached and impartial judicial officer must scrutinize every condition of revocation to determine if there is probable cause to believe each condition has been met before revocation can occur. Concluding that the revocation statute does not unreasonably single out for different treatment drivers who are charged with impaired driving offenses from drivers who are charged with other traffic offenses, we also hold the statute does not infringe equal protection rights.
The Safe Roads Act (the "Act") provides:
A person's driver's license is subject to revocation under this section if:
(1) A law-enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offense subject to the implied-consent provisions of G.S. 20-16.2;
(2) The person is charged with that offense as provided in G.S. 20-16.2(a);
(3) The charging officer and the chemical analyst comply with the procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-139.1 in requiring the person's submission to or procuring a chemical analysis; and
(4) The person:
* * *
b. Has an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more within a relevant time after the driving.
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.5(b) (1983). 1
Other provisions of the Act provide as follows: If a person has an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more within a relevant time after driving, the charging officer and a chemical analyst must execute a revocation report. § 16.5(c). The revocation report must contain a written statement of facts indicating each condition of revocation stated above has been met. § 16.5(a)(4). This revocation report must be filed with a judicial officer. § 16.5(d)(1).
After the revocation report is filed, the judicial officer upon the licensee's request must hold a hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the conditions for revocation have been met. If the judicial officer determines that such probable cause exists, the judicial officer must enter an order revoking the person's driver's license. § 16.5(e). The revocation period begins at the time the revocation order is issued and continues until the person's license has been surrendered for ten days and the person has paid a $25 restoration fee unless the person is not currently licensed. In that case the revocation continues until ten days from the date the revocation order is issued and the person has paid the $25 fee. Id.
A person whose license has been revoked may request in writing a hearing to contest the validity of the revocation. The request for the hearing must specify the grounds upon which the validity of the revocation is challenged. A person specifically may request that the hearing be conducted by a district court judge. If the person does not request that the hearing be conducted by a district court judge, a magistrate conducts the hearing. The revocation remains in effect pending the hearing but the hearing must be held and completed within three working days following the request if the hearing is before a magistrate, or within five working days if the hearing is before a district court judge. § 16.5(g).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding judicial officer must enter an order sustaining or rescinding the revocation. The decision of the judicial officer is final and may not be appealed in the General Court of Justice. Id. Although appeal is prohibited, the presiding judicial officer may issue a modified order if he determines that an order has been issued improvidently. § 16.5(n).
License revocation proceedings are civil actions and must be identified by the caption "In the Matter of _____." § 16.5(o ).
On 23 December 1983 plaintiff Gary Raymond Henry was arrested in Wake County and charged with impaired driving. On 25 January 1984 plaintiff Steven Herrod Barbee was likewise arrested and charged. Plaintiffs Henry and Barbee submitted to having their breath analyzed by a breath-testing machine known as the Intoxilyzer. Breath analysis showed that both men had an alcohol concentration of 0.10. Pursuant to the Act a revocation report on each man was properly filed and an order revoking each man's license was entered. Plaintiff Henry surrendered his license on 23 December 1980. Because plaintiff Barbee's license was expired at the time he was arrested, the arresting officer seized his license as evidence. Neither plaintiff requested a hearing to contest the validity of revocation.
On 30 December 1983 plaintiff Henry obtained a temporary restraining order requiring the clerk of superior court to return his license to him. At the hearing on the issuance of the restraining order it was stipulated that if Henry were present he would testify he was a traveling salesman who depended upon his driving privileges to maintain his livelihood. He would have testified further he had already suffered inconvenience and expense because of the revocation and would continue to suffer harm if the revocation was not suspended. On 9 April 1984 Henry filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the order revoking his license was unconstitutional.
Although Barbee never paid the $25 restoration cost, in March 1984 he applied for and, due apparently to clerical error, received a new driver's license. After learning he was required to pay a restoration fee in order to have his driving privileges reinstated, Barbee appeared before the clerk on 25 May 1984 to pay the $25 fee. The clerk seized Barbee's newly acquired license and informed him the new license would remain revoked for ten days. Barbee obtained a temporary restraining order staying revocation. At the hearing on the issuance of the restraining order, it was stipulated that if Barbee were present, he would testify he needed his license to get to and from work and to accomplish matters essential to his health and welfare. On 25 May 1984 Barbee also filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of the order revoking his license.
The two actions were consolidated for hearing before Superior Court Judge Henry V. Barnette, Jr. The superior court concluded that the ten-day pretrial revocation provision of § 16.5 deprived plaintiffs of an interest in property in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Law of the Land Clause of Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. The superior court entered an order enjoining the state from revoking the plaintiffs' drivers' licenses.
The superior court employed a three-factor balancing test used in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to resolve the due process issue. These factors are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 53. The superior court concluded that plaintiffs had a substantial interest in continued possession of their driving privileges pending the outcome of the hearing due them. It also determined there was a substantial risk of error under the challenged procedures. It found that breath-testing machines have a margin of error of 10 percent and "there are means by which a defendant can challenge the validity" of test results. The superior court concluded as to the third factor that the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedures would entail were minimal. And although the state has a substantial interest in highway safety, this interest could be served by less drastic means than revoking a person's driver's license for ten days. For example, a 24-hour revocation would be sufficient to insure highway safety.
Because the superior court struck down the revocation provision of § 16.5 on constitutional grounds, ...
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