Whelchel v. Donald
| Decision Date | 04 December 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 109,109 |
| Citation | 340 U.S. 122,95 L.Ed. 141,71 S.Ct. 146 |
| Parties | WHELCHEL v. McDONALD |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 340 U.S. 923, 71 S.Ct. 356.
Mr. Hugh Carney, Atlanta, Tex., for petitioner.
Mr. John F. Davis, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Petitioner, while on active duty with the Army in Germany, was convicted by a general court-martial of rape on a German girl. The sentence of death, originally imposed, was reduced to a term of years. This case arises on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the District Court, challenging the legality of petitioner's detention under that sentence. That court denied the petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 260; 178 F.2d 760. The main point presented by the petition for certiorari is whether the military tribunal that tried petitioner was deprived of Jurisdiction by reason of the treatment of the insanity issue tendered by petitioner. We hold that it was not.
The charges against petitioner were referred to an investigating officer in accordance with Article 70 of the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 1542, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1542. The investigating officer reported that he had no reasonable ground for believing petitioner was deranged. A neuropsychiatrist attached to petitioner's division reported, after examining petitioner, that he was legally sane. The Division Staff Judge Advocate recommended a general court-martial trial, stating there was no reason to believe petitioner to be temporarily or permanently deranged. The defense of insanity was not raised, however, either at the pretrial investigation or the trial itself. After the trial petitioner's trial counsel wrote the Division Commanding General requesting that the case be reopened and petitioner be given a neuropsychiatric examination on the ground that counsel had received information that petitioner might have been in an epileptic fit at the time of the offense. This request received the concurrence of five of the six members of the court-martial and was accompanied by similar letters from two officers and a sergeant of petitioner's division. The record was in this condition when it was reviewed by General Eisenhower of the European Theatre of Operations, by the Board of Review of that Theatre, and by the Assistant Judge Advocate General.
There was evidence in the hearing before the District Court that petitioner may have been either insane or drunk at the time of the crime.
We put to one side the due process issue which respondent presses, for we think it plain from the law governing court-martial procedure that there must be afforded a defendant at some point of time an opportunity to tender the issue of insanity. It is only a denial of that opportunity which goes to the question of jurisdiction. That opportunity was afforded here. Any error that may be committed in evaluating the evidence tendered is beyond the reach of review by the civil courts.
The Manual prescribes the ordinary test of criminal responsibility, viz., whether the accused was able to tell right from wrong.1 Insanity is a defense.2 The pretrial procedure prescribed in Article 70 offers the accused an opportunity to present the defense of insanity. Petitioner had that opportunity. The Manual provides that the reviewing authority (here the Commanding General of the Division) 'will take appropriate action where it appears from the record or otherwise that the accused may have been insane' at the time of the crime, whether or not such question was raised at the trial. 3 That is also a provision which is applicable to the confirming authority4 (here the General in charge of the European Theatre of Operations). The confirming authority had before it the request of the defense counsel and the other letters and recommendations submitted to it. The Manual does not require either the reviewing authority or the confirming authority to halt the proceedings, make a further investigation, or start over again. It entrusts the matter to the discretion of those authorities.
Petitioner had a further consideration by the military authorities of the insanity is sue which he tenders. By Article 53 of the revised Articles of War, Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 639, 642, 10 U.S.C. § 1525, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1525, which was effective February 1, 1949, the Judge Advocate General is authorized 'upon application of an accused person, and upon good cause shown, in his discretion to grant a new trial' in any court-martial case on application within the prescribed time limits. That Article became effective after the petition for habeas corpus was filed. But while the case was pending on appeal the Court of Appeals delayed final action while petitioner made application under Article 53. The Judge Advocate General reviewed all the evidence on the insanity issue which petitioner had tendered both to the military authorities and to the District Court in the habeas corpus proceeding and concluded 'I entertain no doubt that Whelchel was so far free from mental defect, disease, and derangement as to be able concerning the particular acts charged both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right. * * *'
Any error by the military in evaluating the evidence on the question of insanity would not go to jurisdiction, the only issue before the court in habeas corpus proceedings.
The law member of the court-martial was not named from the Judge Advocate General's Department. But since no showing was made of the availability of such a member, a case of gross abuse of discretion has not been established. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 109—110, 70 S.Ct. 495, 498.
Under Article 4 of the revised Articles of War an accused may now request that enlisted men be included on the court-martial that tries him.5 There was no such provision of the law when petitioner was tried.6 But the fact that he was tried by a court-martial...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hurst v. People of State of California
...on appeal. Habeas corpus was looked upon solely as a device for attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court (Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L. Ed. 141; and Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. 308). The Mapp case, however, has......
-
U.S. ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld
... 350 F.Supp.2d 80 ... The UNITED STATES ex rel. Michael G. NEW, Petitioner, ... Donald H. RUMSFELD, Secretary of Defense, and Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, 1 Respondents ... No. CIV.A.96-0033(PLF) ... United States ... ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955); see also Whelchel v. McDonald, ... 340 U.S. 122, 127, 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L.Ed. 141 (1950) (right to trial by jury guaranteed by Sixth Amendment not applicable to ... ...
-
Burns v. Lovett
...Supreme Court have expanded the concept of "jurisdiction" for purposes of determining the right to habeas corpus. That is correct. In Whelchel v. McDonald9 the Court clearly intimated, if it did not expressly say, that a denial to an accused of an opportunity to tender an issue of insanity ......
-
Levy v. Parker
...application, it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 , 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L.Ed. 141 (1950). 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S.Ct. at The government would have us interpret Burns to stand for the proposition that colla......
-
Trials
...trial rights of a jury . . . do not apply [in probation revocation proceedings]”); or (3) military trials, see Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) (“The right to trial by jury . . . is not applicable to trials by courts-martial or military commissions.”). RIALS T III. 51 Geo. L.J......
-
War Criminal or Just Plain Felon? Whether Providing Material Support for Terrorism Violates the Laws of War and Is Thus Punishable by Military Commission
...may not legitimately classify material support of 31. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C § 949a (2006); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 32; MuhammedAlly, supra note 2 ("The military commission rules, unlike those in federal civilian ......
-
Achieving Transparency in the Military Panel Selection Process with the Preselection Method
...be at issue in collaterally attacking panel selection, is not applicable to trial by courts-martial. See, e.g. , Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial . . . .”); United Stat......