Norton Co v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois
| Decision Date | 26 February 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 133,133 |
| Citation | 95 L.Ed. 517,71 S.Ct. 377,340 U.S. 534 |
| Parties | NORTON CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 99 N.E.2d 346.
Mr. Joseph B. Brennan, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mr. William C. Wines, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Petitioner, a Massachusetts corporation, manufactures and sells abrasive machines and supplies. Under consent from the State of Illinois to do business therein, it operates a branch office and warehouse in Chicago from which it makes local sales at retail. These sales admittedly subject it to an Illinois Occupation Tax 'upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this State'. Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, c. 120, § 441. The base for computation of the tax is gross receipts.
Not all of petitioner's sales to Illinois customers are over-the-counter, but the State has collected, under protest, the tax on the entire gross income of this company from sales to its inhabitants. The statute specifically exempts 'business in interstate commerce' as required by the Constitution, and the question is whether the State has exceeded the constitutional range of its taxing power by taxing all of petitioner's Illinois derived income.
In Worcester, Massachusetts, petitioner manufactures some 225,000 items, 18,000 of which it usually carries in stock. There are its general management, accounting, and credit offices, where it accepts or rejects all direct mail orders and orders forwarded by its Chicago office. If an order calls for specially built machines, it is there studied and accepted or rejected. Orders are filled by shipment f.o.b. Worcester either directly to the customer or via the Chicago office.
The Chicago place of business performs several functions. It carries an inventory of about 3,000 most frequently purchased items. From these it serves cash customers and those whose credit the home office has approved, by consummating direct sales. Income from these sales petitioner admits to be constitutionally taxable. But this office also performs useful functions for other classes of customers. For those of no established credit, those who order items not in local stock, and those who want special equipment, it receives their order and forwards it to the home office for action there. For many of these Illinois customers it also acts as an intermediary to reduce freight charges. Worcester packages and marks each customer's goods but accumulates them until a carload lot can be consigned to the Chicago office. Chicago breaks the carload and reconsigns the separate orders in their original package to customers. The Chicago office thus intervenes between vendor and Illinois vendees and performs service helpful to petitioner's competition for that trade in all Illinois sales except when the buyer orders directly from Worcester, and the goods are shipped from there directly to the buyer.
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that it was dealing with interstate commerce. It reiterated its former holdings 'that there could be no tax on solicitation of orders only' in the State.1 But no solicitors work the territory out of either the home office or the Chicago branch, although petitioner will supply engineering and technical advice. The Illinois court held that the presence of petitioner's local retail outlet, in the circumstances of this case, was sufficient to attribute all income derived from Illinois sales to that outlet and render it all taxable.
Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance, filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer has no local grip on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct. 1023, 88 L.Ed. 1304. Of course, a state imposing a sales or use tax can more easily meet this burden, because the impact of those taxes is one the local buyer or user. Cases involving them are not controlling here, for this tax falls on the vendor.2
But when, as here, the corporation has gone into the State to do local business by state permission and has submitted itself to the taxing power of the State, it can avoid taxation on some Illinois sales only by showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature. The general rule, applicable here, is that a taxpayer claiming immunity from a tax has the burden of establishing his exemption.3
This burden is never met merely by showing a fair difference of opinion which as an original matter might be decided differently. This corporation, by submitting itself to the taxing power of Illinois, likewise submitted itself to its judicial power to construe and apply its taxing statute insofar as it keeps within constitutional bounds. Of course, in constitutional cases, we have power to examine the whole record to arrive at an independent judgment as to whether constitutional rights have been invaded, but that does not mean that we will re-examine, as a court of first instance, findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.4
This corporation has so mingled taxable business with that which it contends is not taxable that it requires administrative and judicial judgment to separate the two. We conclude that, in the light of all the evidence, the judgment attributing to the Chicago branch income from all sales that utilized it either in receiving the orders or distributing the goods was within the realm of permissible judgment. Petitioner has not established that such services as were rendered by the Chicago office were not decisive factors in establishing and holding this market. On this record, no other source of the customer relationship is shown.
This corporation could have approached the Illinois market through solicitors only and it would have been entitled to the immunity of interstate commerce as set out in the Dilworth case. But, from a competitive point of view, that system has disadvantages. The trade may view the seller as remote and inaccessible. He cannot be reached with process of local courts for breach of contract, or for service if the goods are defective or in need of replacement. Petitioner elected to localize itself in the Illinois market with the advantages of a retail outlet in the State, to keep close to the trade, to supply locally many items and take orders for others, and to reduce freight costs to local consumers. Although the concern does not, by engaging in business within the State, lose its right to do interstate business with tax immunity, Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384, 55 S.Ct. 477, 79 L.Ed. 934, it cannot channel business through a local outlet to gain the advantage of a local business and also hold the immunities of an interstate business.
The only items that are so clearly interstate in character that ...
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