United States v. Williams

• Decision Date: 23 April 1951
• Docket Number: No. 26,26
• Citation: 95 L.Ed. 758,341 U.S. 70,71 S.Ct. 581
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

341 U.S. 70

71 S.Ct. 581

95 L.Ed. 758

UNITED STATES

v WILLIAMS et al.

No. 26.

Argued Jan. 8, 1951.

Decided April 23, 1951.

Mr. Philip Elman, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. John D. Marsh, Miami, Fla., for respondent Charles R. Ford.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice JACKSON and Mr. Justice MINTON joined.

In 1947 a Florida corporation employed a detective agency to investigate thefts of its property. The inquiry was conducted by one Williams, the head of the agency, and among the participants were two of his employees and a member of the Miami police force detailed to assist in the investigation. Certain of the company's employees fell under suspicion; and Williams and his collaborators, without arresting the suspects, took them one by one to a shack on the company's premises. There the investigators subjected them to the familiar 'third-degree' which, after blows, kicks, threats, and prolonged exposure to a brilliant light, yielded 'confessions.'

Williams and the other three were thereupon indicted for violation of §§ 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code of the United States. 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 51 and 52, now 18 U.S.C. (1950 ed.) §§ 241 and 242, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 242. Williams was convicted under § 20, the indictment alleging that he 'wilfully, under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations and customs of the State of Florida * * * subjected * * * an inhabitant of the State of Florida, to deprivation of the rights, privileges and immunities secured to him and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment * * *.'

This conviction is reviewed in No. 365, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, infra, also decided this day. The other defendants were acquitted of the charges under § 20, and as to all defendants a mistrial was declared under § 19. This outcome of the indictment under §§ 19 and 20 was followed by a new indictment against the four defendants under § 19. The indictment alleged that 'acting under the laws of the State of Florida' the defendants 'conspired to injure * * * a citizen of the United States and of the State of Florida, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges secured to him and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment * * *.' This time all the defendants were convicted; but on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that in the conspiracy provision of § 19 'the Congress had in mind the federal rights and privileges which appertain to citizens as such and not the general rights extended to all persons by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 179 F.2d 644, 648. In the alternative, the court concluded that a broader construction of § 19 would render it void for indefiniteness, and that there was error in the judge's charge as well as in the exclusion of evidence of the prior acquittal of three of the defendants. Together with Nos. 134 and 365 of this Term, 341 U.S. 58, 71 S.Ct. 595; 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, the other two cases growing out of the same affair, we brought the case here because important questions in the administration of civil rights legislation are raised. 340 U.S. 849, 71 S.Ct. 77.

The alternative grounds for the decision of the Court of Appeals need not be considered, for we agree that § 241 (to use the current designation for what was § 19 of the Criminal Code) does not reach the conduct laid as an offense in the prosecution here. This is not because we deny the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor is it because we fully accept the course of reasoning of the court below. We base our decision on the history of § 241, its text and context, the statutory framework in which it stands, its practical and judicial application—controlling elements in construing a federal criminal provision that affects the wise adjustment between State responsibility and national control of essentially local affairs. The elements all converge in one direction. They lead us to hold that § 241 only covers conduct which interferes with rights arising from the substantive powers of the Federal Government.

What is now known as § 241 originated as § 6 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140. That statute was entitled 'An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other Purposes.' In furtherance of its chief end of assuring the right of Negroes to vote, it provided in §§ 2 and 3 that it should be a misdemeanor for any 'person or officer' wrongfully to fail in a duty imposed on him by State law to perform or permit performance of acts necessary to registering or voting. In § 4 interference with elections by private persons was made a similar offense. In the course of passage through Congress several sections were added which had a larger purpose. One of them, § 17, was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, and was designed to 'secure to all persons the equal protection of the laws.'¹ It imposed imprisonment up to one year and a fine up to one thousand dollars on 'any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by the last preceding section of this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of citizens * * *.' 16 Stat. 140, 144. Through successive revisions it has become § 242, the application of which to the facts before us is considered in No. 365, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, infra.

Another of the broader provisions is the section which is our immediate concern. This was its original form: 'Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court,—the fine not to exceed five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten years,—and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.' 16 Stat. 140, 141.

The dominant conditions of the Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of carefully considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues. The sections before us are no exception. Although enacted together, they were proposed by different sponsors and hastily adopted. They received little attention in debate. While the discussion of the bill as a whole fills about 100 pages of the Congressional Globe, only two or three related to § 6, and these are in good part a record of complaint that the section was inadequately considered or understood.²

Nevertheless some conclusions are warranted. The first is that interference with civil rights by State officers was dealt with fully by § 17 of the Act. Three years before its enactment Congress had passed the first general conspiracy statute. Act of March 2, 1867, § 30, 14 Stat. 484, R.S. § 5440, now 18 U.S.C. (1950 ed.) § 371, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. This provision, in conjunction with § 17, reached conspiracies under color of State law to deprive persons of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. No other provision of the Act of 1870 was necessary for that purpose.

The second conclusion is that if language is to carry any meaning at all it must be clear that the principal purpose of § 6, unlike § 17, was to reach private action rather than officers of a State acting under its authority. Men who 'go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another' are not likely to be acting in official capacities. The history of the times—the lawless activities of private bands, of which the Klan was the most conspicuous—explains why Congress dealt with both State disregard of the new constitutional prohibitions and private lawlessness.³ The sponsor of § 6 in the Senate made explicit that the purpose of his amendment was to control private conduct.⁴ These two conclusions strongly suggest a third: that the rights which § 6 protects are those which Congress can beyond doubt constitutionally secure against interference by private individuals. Decisions of this Court have established that this category includes rights which arise from the relationship of the individual and the Federal Government. The right of citizens to vote in congressional elections, for instance, may obviously be protected by Congress from individual as well as from State interference. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274. On the other hand, we have consistently held that the category of rights which Congress may constitutionally protect from interference by private persons excludes those rights which the Constitution merely guarantees from interference by a State. Thus we held that an individual's interest in receiving a fair trial in State courts cannot be constitutionally vindicated by federal prosecution of private persons. United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564, 29 S.Ct. 690, 53 L.Ed. 653; accord, Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41...