Miller v. Personal-Touch of Virginia, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 2:04CV110.,CIV.A. 2:04CV110.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Yolanda MILLER, Plaintiff, v. PERSONAL-TOUCH OF VIRGINIA, INC., Defendant.

342 F.Supp.2d 499

Yolanda MILLER, Plaintiff, v. PERSONAL-TOUCH OF VIRGINIA, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 2:04CV110.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

November 2, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John M. Loeschen, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff.

Thomas M. Lucas, Troutman, Sanders LLP, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court has reviewed the briefs and other materials submitted by the parties and has determined that a hearing is unnecessary for the resolution of this matter. For the reasons set out fully herein, the court GRANTS the defendant's motion.

I. Procedural History

On February 24, 2004, the plaintiff, Yolanda Miller, filed a two-count complaint against her former employer, Personal-Touch of Virginia, Inc. ("Personal Touch"). In Count One, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654, by terminating her prior to the conclusion of her entitled leave under the FMLA. In Count Two, the plaintiff contends that the defendant intentionally retaliated against her due to her exercise of rights under the FMLA.

The defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on October 1, 2004, and submitted various exhibits to its motion, including affidavits, documents and portions of deposition transcripts. The plaintiff filed her response on October 12, 2004, and provided similar exhibits. Finally the defendant replied on October 15, 2004. Subsequent to the filing of its motion, the defendant indicated to the court that it did not desire oral argument and requested that the court consider the matter on the submitted briefs. This matter was scheduled for trial on October 26, 2004, which did not permit time for oral argument and left little more than a week for the court to consider the issues raised. In spite of this brief period of time, the court has given this matter thorough and deliberate attention and finds that the matter is properly decided on the materials submitted and that a hearing would add little to the decisional process. On October 22, 2004, following its review of the defendant's motion, the court notified the parties of its intent to grant summary judgment and its intent to produce a written Opinion and Order explaining the decision.

For future reference, the court directs the parties attention to Local Civil Rule 56, which dictates that a motion for summary judgment must be submitted "within a reasonable time before the date of trial, thus permitting a reasonable time for the Court to ... consider the merits." E.D.V.A. Loc. Civ. R. 56. Submitting motions for summary judgment in this fashion fosters judicial economy, avoiding both the considerable expense of trial and the sincere difficulty for the court in having to forgo other matters in order to give late-filed motions their due. The court notes that the depositions relevant to this matter appear to have been completed by mid-August, such that all materials necessary for the submission of a motion for summary judgment were available some two months before trial. The court urges the parties, in the interests of all involved, to make more timely submissions.

II. Factual Background

Prior to her termination, the plaintiff was employed by Personal Touch as a Private Duty Nurse Supervisor. As part of her employment orientation, the plaintiff was provided with information concerning Personal Touch's policy in compliance with the FMLA. At the time of the events at issue in this case, the plaintiff was eligible for unpaid leave under the FMLA and had accrued some 144 hours of paid leave in the form of vacation, sick leave, floating holidays and personal days.

In March 2002, the plaintiff learned that she was pregnant with an expected due date of November 27, 2002. On or about August 1, 2002, the plaintiff informed her employer of this news. She contends that she told Personal Touch that she would be needing FMLA leave, but that the specifics of the leave were not discussed, nor were the dates of the expected leave. On or about September 12, 2002, following the results of a routine checkup, the plaintiff was hospitalized for two days and subsequently restricted by her doctor to working no more than six hours per day. On September 19, 2002, the plaintiff informed her employer of her need to work this reduced schedule. On September 24, 2002, the plaintiff further informed Personal Touch that she might be placed on full time bed rest, due to her progressing pregnancy and in compliance with the instructions of her doctor. Personal Touch requested that she confirm this status with her doctor.

As a result of this notice, and Personal Touch's determination that the plaintiff might soon be experiencing an FMLA qualifying event, Personal Touch provided the plaintiff with a packet of information relating to the FMLA. This packet included the Personal Touch Family & Medical Leave of Absence policy, a Request for Family / Medical Leave form ("the FMLA Request") and a Certification of Health Care Provider form ("the Provider Certification"). On September 24, 2002, the plaintiff filled out the FMLA Request in a meeting with Personal Touch employee Cayla Garcia. The completed FMLA Request reflected that the plaintiff had informed Personal Touch, on August 1, 2002, of her need to take leave due to her pregnancy and the birth of her child.

Here is where the facts alleged by the parties diverge. The plaintiff contends that during her meeting with Garcia, as well in the course of other meetings and conversations with Personal Touch employee Sheila Walton, both Garcia and Walton advised her that she could elect to substitute her accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, but that Personal Touch would not require that she do so. The plaintiff came away from these meetings with the belief that she could decline to substitute accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave and instead run the two forms of leave consecutively.

The defendant disputes this version of events. The defendant claims that Garcia and Watson, in the course of several conversations that occurred before, on and after September 24, 2002, instructed the plaintiff that the FMLA entitled her to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for her condition. If she so chose, however, she could utilize a portion of her accrued paid leave during this time. The defendant contends that Garcia and Watson explained to the plaintiff that if she so elected to use her paid leave, this usage of paid leave would run concurrent with the twelve weeks of leave provided under the FMLA.

The plaintiff signed the FMLA Request on September 24, 2002. The start and end dates on the form were not filled in at this time as the plaintiff was not certain as to when she would be starting her leave. Two days later, however, on September 26, 2002, the plaintiff informed Personal Touch that she was to be placed on bed rest for the last two months of her pregnancy. At this point, the start and end dates were filled in on the FMLA Request. The plaintiff maintains that she never received a copy of the FMLA Request that contained these dates. The defendant claims that the plaintiff was given a copy of the completed FMLA Request by Sheila Walton, who stated as much in an affidavit. The FMLA Request, with the dates filled in, indicated that leave under the FMLA would begin on September 26, 2002 and end December 19, 2002. The plaintiff insists, however, that in her discussions with Sheila Walton, Walton advised her that she could first use her accrued paid leave and then, and only then, would her FMLA leave begin. The plaintiff alleges that no one ever advised her as to when her FMLA leave would begin, nor did anyone ever discuss how it would be calculated in conjunction with her paid leave.

On September 27, 2002, the plaintiff returned the Provider Certification to Personal Touch, having been signed by her health care provider and confirming that the plaintiff was to be placed on bed rest for the remainder of her pregnancy. The plaintiff remained on full bed rest until she delivered her son on November 25, 2002. On December 11, 2002, Sheila Walton telephoned the plaintiff to inform her that her FMLA leave would end on December 19, 2002 and that if she could not return to work, Personal Touch could not guarantee that her position would remain open. The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff was unable to return to work on December 19, 2002, only three weeks after the delivery of her son by caesarean section.

On December 12, 2002, Personal Touch sent the plaintiff a letter confirming that her FMLA leave would end on December 19, 2002, and notifying her that if she did not return to work on this date, Personal Touch would assume that she had abandoned her position. The letter further explained that if the plaintiff had any interest in future employment with Personal Touch, she should inquire as to open positions. The plaintiff claims that she was released to return to work by her doctor on January 6, 2003, but had already had been terminated by Personal Touch at that time. According to the plaintiff, her first documented attempt to secure new employment occurred on January 22, 2003. The plaintiff contends that had her paid leave been used in addition to, and not in place of, her unpaid FMLA leave, she could have remained on leave until January 20, 2003.

III. Issues

The issues presented by the defendant's motion are not overly complex but do require some sorting through. The defendant claims that there is no issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff received all the time due to her under the FMLA. To this end, the court notes that there is no dispute as to whether the plaintiff received twelve weeks of some form of leave; rather the issue is the characterization of this leave. The plaintiff contends that the crucial...