People v. Robinson

Decision Date26 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 47231,47231
Citation62 Ill.2d 273,342 N.E.2d 356
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Charles ROBINSON et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Laurence J. Bolon, Edward J. Ozog, Douglas Cannon, and Robert J. Raab, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (James N. Gramenos, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellees.

WARD, Chief Justice.

The defendants, Charles Robinson and Jesse Redwood, who had been indicted for burglary in the circuit court of Cook County on April 6, 1972, moved to quash the arrest which led to their indictment and to suppress evidence seized on the ground that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest. The trial court allowed the motion, and its order was affirmed by the appellate court (23 Ill.App.3d 955, 320 N.E.2d 388). We granted the People's petition for leave to appeal.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress Edward Hobbs, a Chicago police officer, testified that on October 28, 1971, when he was off duty and in plain clothes, he observed the defendants walk from a gangway on Adams Street in Chicago. He testified the locality was a high-crime area. The defendant Robinson was walking in front of Redwood. Officer Hobbs testified that the two men stopped at the mouth of the gangway and Robinson looked up and down the street. The defendants then proceeded to cross the street at a 'very fast, brisk gait' and headed in the direction of an alley on the other side of the street. In his right hand Robinson carried a 12-gauge long-barrelled pump shotgun upside down with the trigger portion covered by a tan trench coat. About 16 to 17 inches of the barrel and butt of the weapon were protruding from the coat. In his left hand he carried a beige portable television set. Redwood followed him carrying a large white laundry bag filled with objects the officer could not identify protruding from the top of it. Hobbs approached the defendants from their rear holding his star in his left hand and his revolver in his right. He identified himself as a police officer and asked the defendants about the property they were carrying. Robinson repled that they were helping his sister to move and that they would take the officer to his sister's residence to prove it. At that the officer took the shotgun from Robinson and proceeded to follow them down the alley. On direct examination the officer testified he did not know exactly where they were going but assumed they were proceeding to Robinson's sister's home. On cross-examination the officer admitted he was walking down the alley to obtain assistance.

After walking about one block down the alley the three men reached a building in a courtyard with an adjacent gangway and garage. The officer saw three men working in a nearby backyard and he ordered the defendants to put the property they were carrying on the ground and to place their hands against the garage door. He then called to the three and asked them to phone the police to assist him. The men refused, and Hobbs, continuing to watch the defendants, then began sidestepping down the alley to seek the assistance of an elderly man who was in the alley some distance away. As he did, the defendants turned away from the garage door and ran down the adjacent gangway.

The defendants were apprehended a short time later by other officers who had received a call about a suspicious appearing man carrying a shotgun and TV set. The property in the defendants' possession was later identified as taken in a burglary. The burglary had occurred only 15 minutes before Officer Hobbs first observed the defendants.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court said it considered that an arrest took place when Officer Hobbs confronted the defendants on the street with his revolver drawn. The court observed that the officer had performed 'wonderful police work' and that he 'should (have been) fired if he didn't do what he did.' But it concluded that probable cause to arrest was lacking.

We consider the arrests were based on probable cause. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67--68, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1905, 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 937.

The constitutions (Ill.Const. (1970), art. I, sec. 6; U.S.Const., amend. IV) do not protect against all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. (People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433.) A search without a warrant is reasonable if it is incident to a lawful arrest. (People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 173, 242 N.E.2d 180.) There is probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. (People v. McCrimmon, 37 Ill.2d 40, 43, 224 N.E.2d 822.) This court observed in People v. Jones, 31 Ill.2d 42, 47, 198 N.E.2d 821, 823, that '* * * reasonable cause means something less than evidence which would result in a conviction, and it is also established that reasonable cause may be founded upon evidence that would not be admissible at trial.'

In considering whether probable cause existed, we stated in People v. Clay, 55 Ill.2d 501, 504--05, 304 N.E.2d 280, 282, 'Whether or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. (Citations.) In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable man, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill.2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606.' Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that '(p)olice officers often must act upon a quick...

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