State v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 06 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 615A84,615A84
• Citation: 316 N.C. 594,342 S.E.2d 823
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Floyd Edward RICHARDSON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 823

342 S.E.2d 823

316 N.C. 594

STATE of North Carolina v. Floyd Edward RICHARDSON.

No. 615A84.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 6, 1986.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Archie W. Anders, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Nora Henry Hargrove, Atty., Wilson, and J. Robert Hufstader, Public Defender for the 28th Judicial Dist., Asheville, for defendant-appellee.

BRANCH, Chief Justice.

Initially, we consider defendant's motion praying that the transcript of the Kentucky hearing to determine whether his wife should be compelled to attend and testify in his case in North Carolina be stricken from the record of this case. We so order.

The two issues presented in this appeal are whether defendant can be convicted and punished for both breaking or entering and felonious larceny pursuant to a breaking or entering and whether the confession on which his convictions were based was involuntary and thereby obtained in violation of his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Since the first issue has already been decided adversely to defendant in State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986), we turn to the issue of the voluntariness of his confession.

Defendant argues that his confession to the crimes he committed in North Carolina was involuntary because it was obtained through threats and promises giving him hope of benefit. Defendant also contends that several of Judge Ferrell's findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, are incomplete, or are actually conclusions of law, and that Judge Ferrell failed to include in his findings uncontroverted evidence material to the questions this Court ordered answered.

We now turn to the findings of fact to which defendant has objected.

Finding of Fact (4):

The defendant initiated an inquiry as to whether he would be charged with anything else, and was told that at present he would be charged with attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools; and, that he might be charged with being an habitual offender, but that that wasn't up to Collins but was up to the District Attorney. The defendant was told that it was up to the District Attorney to determine what would happen when someone cooperated, and that he usually responds accordingly, but that the officers could make no promises, it was up to the District Attorney.

Defendant argues that this finding inaccurately characterizes the evidence because he merely asked if he would be charged with anything other than the crimes for which he was arrested.

"Findings of fact made by the trial judge following a voir dire hearing on the voluntariness of a defendant's confession are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence in the record." State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 39, 320 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1984). We fail to see how it matters whether defendant "asked" Detective Collins about what additional crimes he might be charged with or "initiated an inquiry." Judge Ferrell's findings on this point are supported by competent evidence and are conclusive on appeal.

Finding of Fact (11):

Frank McCoy was a detective with the Hendersonville, Tennessee, Police Department, and presently is a Lieutenant with that department. McCoy first met the defendant the night the Tennessee crimes were committed. Discussions were conducted with the defendant regarding the specifics of the charges against him, the range of punishment, and the effect of his cooperation. The defendant was told that the officers had no authority to make any arrangements.

Defendant argues that this finding is inaccurate and incomplete because Judge Ferrell failed to find that part of the range of punishment discussed was defendant's possible prosecution as an habitual criminal. We hold that this finding is supported by the evidence and is, therefore, binding on appeal.

Finding of Fact (13):

The defendant lived in Kentucky and was on bond; he met with McCoy and officers from other jurisdictions in Tennessee, after he and McCoy had talked on numerous occasions. They had discussed some twenty-six crimes committed in eleven states. The defendant voluntarily appeared at the meeting in Tennessee with officers from other jurisdictions, including North Carolina. The defendant was free to attend or not, at his option.

According to defendant this finding is inaccurate because Judge Ferrell used the term "numerous times" and did not specify that, in accord with the testimony at trial, Detective McCoy had talked with defendant "twenty or fifty times." We hold that Judge Ferrell's finding that McCoy talked with defendant on "numerous" occasions accurately characterizes the facts and is supported by competent evidence in the record. This argument is without merit.

We next consider defendant's contention that Judge Ferrell failed to include in his findings uncontroverted evidence bearing on the voluntariness of his confession.

The presiding judge at a voir dire hearing to determine the admissibility of a defendant's confession must make findings of fact resolving any material conflict in the evidence. State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 520, 308 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1983) (trial judge failed to resolve dispute in testimony as to whether the defendant or the police initiated the conversation in which defendant confessed where defendant had earlier asserted his right to silence). When there is no conflict in the evidence on voir dire or only immaterial conflicts the presiding judge may admit a confession without making specific findings of fact. Id. It follows that when making findings of fact on the voluntariness of a defendant's confession the presiding judge need not make findings other than those which are necessary to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Thus, Judge Ferrell was not compelled to make findings since the evidence was uncontradicted. However, we emphasize that it is the better practice for the presiding judge to make findings concerning all evidence material to the issue of the voluntariness of a confession even when such evidence is uncontradicted.

Defendant has also challenged Judge Ferrell's findings that the investigating officers and the assistant district attorney in Tennessee made no threats or promises to him and that he voluntarily attended the meeting in Tennessee with officers from other jurisdictions. Defendant contends that whether the conduct and language of the investigating officers and the assistant district attorney amounted to threats and promises or influenced him to confess by inducing hope or fear is a question of law, not of fact.

In determining whether a confession is voluntary it is the trial judge's duty to make findings of fact resolving all material conflicts in the evidence as to what the defendant and the investigating officers said and did during the relevant time period preceding the defendant's confession. State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 520, 308 S.E.2d 317, 321; State v. Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 226-27, 152 S.E.2d 68, 70-71 (1967). These findings are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence in the record. State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 320 S.E.2d 670; Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 152 S.E.2d 68. "[W]hether the conduct and language of the investigating officers amounted to such threats or promises or influenced the defendant by hope and fear as to render the subsequent confession involuntary is a question of law, ... reviewable on appeal." State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 216, 283 S.E.2d 732, 742 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 102 S.Ct. 1741, 72 L.Ed.2d 155 (1982). Accord Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 226-27, 152 S.E.2d 68, 71.

Judge Ferrell denominated as a finding of fact his conclusion of law that defendant's confession was voluntary and that no threats or promises had been made to him to secure his confession. This mislabeling was a technical error probably due to our order on remand that "findings of fact" be made as to whether any threats or promises were made to defendant in Tennessee which induced him to confess by fear or by hope of reward. Defendant has not shown that he has been prejudiced by the fact that Judge Ferrell's conclusions of law were incorrectly denominated as findings of fact. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 580-81, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983).

We now turn to the central issue in this case which is whether Judge Ferrell's findings of fact support his conclusion of law that defendant's confession was voluntary and was not the product of threats or promises.

The North Carolina rule and the federal rule for determining the admissibility of a confession is the same. It is a rule or test of voluntariness in which the court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.

State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152. Where the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), have been met and "the defendant has not asserted the right to have counsel present during questioning, no single circumstance may be viewed in isolation as rendering a confession the product of improperly induced hope or fear and, therefore, involuntary." State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 48, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984). In such cases the court must determine whether the statements made by the defendant were voluntarily and understandingly made. Id. In making this determination "the court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and may not rely upon any one circumstance standing alone and in isolation." Id.

Defendant contends that his confession was involuntary because it was the product of fear induced by...