Youren v. Tintic School Dist.
| Decision Date | 10 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-4131.,No. 01-4144.,01-4131.,01-4144. |
| Citation | 343 F.3d 1296 |
| Parties | Debra YOUREN, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. TINTIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, Patricia Hunter-Rowse, and Ed Alder, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Loren M. Lambert, Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC, Midvale, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General, Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Before HENRY, McWILLIAMS and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
These appeals arise from a case in which the plaintiff was Debra Youren and the defendants were the Tintic School District and two of its employees, superintendent Patricia Hunter-Rowse and teacher Ed Alder. Ms. Youren, a teacher formerly employed by Tintic, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims for violation of her due process, free speech, and privacy rights, and state-law claims for wrongful termination and violation of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (the "Whistleblower Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to 67-21-9. Following a trial, a jury found that Tintic and Ms. Rowse1 violated Ms. Youren's rights under the Whistleblower Act, and awarded compensatory damages. The jury also found in favor of Ms. Youren on the federal civil rights claims and awarded compensatory damages against both Tintic and Ms. Rowse for those violations as well.
In a post-trial order, the district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Youren's whistleblower claim, holding that Ms. Youren met the 180-day statute of limitations for bringing claims under the Whistleblower Act by filing a timely notice of claim, even though the complaint was not filed until after the 180-day deadline. The district court also denied the defendants' request to vacate the jury's holding against Ms. Rowse, ruling that the Whistleblower Act allowed Ms. Rowse to be sued in her official capacity. The defendants now appeal those rulings, and they also assert on appeal that the district court erred by allowing recovery against both Tintic and Ms. Rowse.
Ms. Youren cross-appeals and challenges the district court's grant of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict dismissing Ms. Youren's claims for punitive damages, as well as the district court's determination of the hourly rate used to calculate the award of attorneys' fees to Ms. Youren.
We affirm the district court in all respects except for its denial of punitive damages. On that issue, we reverse and remand for a trial limited to determining the amount, if any, of punitive damages to be assessed against Ms. Rowse on Ms. Youren's federal civil rights claim.
Debra Youren was employed by the Tintic School District as a teacher at West Desert High School in rural Utah. In 1997, Ms. Youren began to express concerns to her colleagues and superiors about the conduct of various teachers in her school. She alleged that a teacher was favoring his polygamist family members and dating one of his students, that another teacher dated and attempted to initiate a sexual relationship with Ms. Youren's daughter and with several male students, that Mr. Alder condoned student absences and indeed encouraged students to work at his ranch rather than attending school, that polygamist influence at the school had resulted in the adoption of discriminatory practices, as well as a number of other allegations.
Ms. Youren further alleged that, as a result of her whistleblowing activities, Ms. Rowse (the superintendent) and other school district employees retaliated against her with threats, adverse employment reports, requirements that Ms. Youren subject herself to a psychological examination, attempts to use the results of that psychological examination to discredit Ms. Youren, successful efforts to induce Ms. Youren's daughter to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse against her step-father (accusations that were later recanted), and other inappropriate responses.
On March 12, 1998, Tintic sent Ms. Youren a letter notifying her that her employment contract would not be renewed and informing her that she could request an informal conference before the Tintic School Board. Ms. Youren requested a hearing. The hearing was scheduled for April 8, 1998 and then rescheduled to April 23, 1998. The hearing was convened on April 23 but was suspended before it was completed and was never reconvened, for reasons that are not entirely clear from the appellate record. On May 8, 1998, Tintic's attorney informed Ms. Youren that the hearing would not be completed and that no further hearing to challenge the non-renewal of the contract would be held.
Ms. Youren filed a Notice of Claim with the Utah Attorney General and with Tintic on July 23, 1998. She filed her complaint in federal district court on October 5, 1998, naming as defendants Tintic, Ms. Rowse and Mr. Alder. Ms. Youren asserted a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her federal rights to due process, free speech, and privacy. She also asserted state law claims under the Whistleblower Act, as well as common law tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with economic relations.
The district court dismissed the tort claims before trial. During the trial, the district court granted the defendants' request that punitive damages not be argued to the jury. The jury found in Ms. Youren's favor on the whistleblower claim, awarding damages against Tintic for $65,000 and against Ms. Rowse for $65,000. The jury also found in favor of Ms. Youren on her federal civil rights claims and awarded damages of $55,500 and $32,500 against Tintic and Ms. Rowse, respectively. Mr. Alder was not held liable.
After trial, the defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Youren's claims under the Whistleblower Act, claiming that the suit was not timely filed and that Ms. Rowse could not be included as a defendant. Aplts' App. at 82 (). In denying the defendants' motion, the district court observed that the structure of the Whistleblower Act Aplts' App. at 122 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated June 4, 2001) ("Post-Trial Order"). Echoing the policy rationale behind notice pleading, the court concluded: "Once the State receives a notice of claim it has all of the information regarding the claims against it as a party who has received a Complaint." Id. The district court further held that because Ms. Rowse was being sued in her official capacity, the verdict and damages awarded against her separately were not void as a matter of law. Id. at 120.
Ruling on Ms. Youren's motions, the district court awarded attorneys' fees and costs totaling $64,783.41. Id. at 124. In reaching this result, the district court noted that the contingency fee contract between Ms. Youren and her attorney specified a "default rate" of $105 per hour. Id. After explaining why this rate was reasonable (based on counsel's experience, the matter involved, and comparable market rates), the district court adopted $105 as the hourly rate for its calculations.
The defendants' appeal and Ms. Youren's cross-appeal raise five issues. First, did the district court err in denying the defendants' motion asserting that the lawsuit had been filed after the 180-day statute of limitations? Second, did the district court err by exercising jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim against Ms. Rowse in her official capacity, even though Ms. Youren did not file a separate notice of claim against Ms. Rowse? Third, did the district court violate the rule against double recovery in permitting the jury to assess compensatory damages against both Ms. Rowse and Tintic? Fourth, did the district court err in dismissing Ms. Youren's claims for punitive damages? Finally, did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Youren attorneys' fees based on an hourly rate of $105.00 per hour?
We review the denial of a motion for a directed verdict "de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court." Bielicki v. Terminix Int'l Co., 225 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.2000). A directed verdict is only appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the non-moving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we are reviewing a federal court's adjudication of an ancillary state law claim, Utah law controls the substantive analysis of the Whistleblower Act claim — even though federal law controls the ultimate procedural question of whether a directed verdict was warranted. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1997).
The Whistleblower Act sets forth the applicable statute of limitations: "[A]n employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2). The parties agree that the statutory filing period started to run on March 12, 1998, when Ms. Youren received notification by letter that she would be terminated. The parties also agree that Ms. Youren's Notice of Claim was filed on July 23, 1998, less than 180 days after the March 12 letter; and that the October 5 filing date of the actual Complaint is more than 180 days...
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