Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines

• Decision Date: 10 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-21236.,01-21236.
• Parties: Eugenia T. HOSKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEKINS VAN LINES, aka Bekins Van Lines Co., aka Geologistics Americas, Inc.; Geologistics Americas, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

343 F.3d 769

Eugenia T. HOSKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEKINS VAN LINES, aka Bekins Van Lines Co., aka Geologistics Americas, Inc.; Geologistics Americas, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-21236.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

September 10, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael A. Maness (argued), Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Vic Houston Henry (argued), Henry, Oddo, Austin & Fletcher, Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Eugenia T. Hoskins ("Hoskins") sued Bekins Van Lines ("Bekins"), a common carrier, for damages stemming from the loss or damage to her personal belongings as a result of a move from Texas to Virginia. The district court granted summary judgment to Bekins. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 25, 1998, Hoskins contracted with Bekins to move and temporarily store her personal belongings in a storage facility in Houston, Texas, then later to ship her belongings to her new residence in Keswick, Virginia. At the time of delivery in Virginia, Hoskins noticed that many items were damaged or missing, including furniture and antique silverware. Hoskins filed claims with Bekins for the missing or damaged items. Bekins paid Hoskins $70,000 on her claims.

Hoskins contended that she was not fully compensated.¹ She filed suit in Texas state court. Hoskins' state court petition alleged negligence, breach of contract, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Among other things, Hoskins sought damages, including exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Hoskins' state court petition asserted no federal claims.

On March 9, 2001, Bekins removed the case to federal district court based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 and 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the "Carmack Amendment" to the Interstate Commerce Act). The same day, Bekins filed a motion to dismiss Hoskins' state law claims based on federal preemption. On July 9, 2001, the district court ordered that Hoskins' state law claims were pre-empted by the Carmack Amendment. The district court further ordered that "Hoskins may not amend her complaint to add the Carmack Amendment expressly because the facts she has pleaded suffice." Bekins then filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 30, 2001, the district court issued a take nothing judgment. Hoskins appeals, arguing that (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because this case does not arise under the Carmack Amendment, or any other provision of federal law, and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Bekins because Hoskins did not sign or otherwise assent to the provisions in the bill of lading before the carriage of her property, Hoskins was not provided a meaningful opportunity to choose between liability limits, and a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether the loss was attributable to theft by Bekins' employees or agents. For the following reasons, we find that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, and we AFFIRM its grant of summary judgment to Bekins.

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

"We exercise plenary, de novo review of a district court's assumption of subject matter jurisdiction." Local 1351 Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 214 F.3d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 2000).

Hoskins argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy because her claim does not arise under the Carmack Amendment, or any other provision of federal law. Bekins contends that Hoskins' state court petition gives rise to federal question jurisdiction. Bekins removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and the Carmack Amendment, because Hoskins "seeks to impose liability arising out [of] the interstate transportation of goods by a common carrier."²

To determine whether a cause of action presents a federal question we examine the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) ("[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution."). Generally, the plaintiff is the master of her complaint. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Ind. School Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir.1995). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). "As a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 2062, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003).

"A defendant may not remove on the basis of an anticipated or even inevitable federal defense, but instead must show that a federal right is an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action." Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, a defense that relies on "the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute will not provide a basis for removal." Beneficial, 123 S.Ct. at 2062 (citation omitted). As we have explained, "[a] plaintiff with a choice between federal — and state — law claims may elect to proceed in state court on the exclusive basis of state law, thus defeating the defendant's opportunity to remove, but taking the risk that his federal claims will one day be precluded." Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366.

The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is not without its exceptions. In certain situations, Congress has created the exceptions. See Beneficial, 123 S.Ct. at 2062 (describing the unusual pre-emption provision in the Price-Anderson Act which expressly provides for removal of actions brought in state court "even when they assert only state-law claims"). In other contexts, the Supreme Court has construed certain federal statutes as "not only preempting state law but also authorizing removal of actions that sought relief only under state law." Id. (determining that §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act provide for complete pre-emption); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (finding complete pre-emption in § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968) (construing § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, to provide complete pre-emption). In these contexts, the federal statute "so forcibly and completely displace[s] state law that the plaintiff's cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all." Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366.

In her original state court petition, Hoskins alleged that she entered into agreements whereby Bekins would first store, then transport her belongings from Texas to Virginia. Hoskins alleged that at the time of delivery, she noticed that many of her belongings were missing or damaged. She further alleged that Bekins acted as the initial, connecting, and delivering carrier for her shipment of goods. Hoskins asserted claims against Bekins for negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. She sought damages, including punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees. Hoskins' original state court petition does not affirmatively present a federal claim. This, of course, does not end our inquiry.

As the Supreme Court recently expounded, "a state claim may be removed to federal court in only two circumstances — when Congress expressly so provides..., or when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption." Beneficial, 123 S.Ct. at 2063 (emphasis added). Because the Carmack Amendment does not expressly provide for removal of state law claims, Bekins properly removed this case only if the Carmack Amendment completely pre-empts state law claims for loss or damage to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier. "When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law." Id.

In Beers v. North American Van Lines, Inc., this Court found that removal was improper where the plaintiffs' state law complaint "was based entirely on state law." 836 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir.1988). The plaintiffs in Beers paid a common carrier an additional sum of money to obtain full replacement value for any items lost or damaged during their interstate move, with a maximum liability of $3.00 per pound shipped. Id. Numerous items were lost or damaged during the move and a dispute arose over the extent of the carrier's liability because the two bills of lading issued were inconsistent — one reflected the extra coverage, while the other did not. Id. The plaintiff brought suit in state court, alleging tortious loss of goods, tortious breach of the insurance contract, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud in the inducement to contract, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. This Court found that removal was improper because neither the state court complaint, nor the defendants' defense of federal pre-emption, conferred federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 913. In reaching this conclusion, we noted the existence of the complete pre-emption doctrine and explained the following:

[T]he [Supreme] Court, while extending Avco to ERISA cases, emphasized the limited nature of this exception....