Ray v. Blair
Decision Date | 15 April 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 649,649 |
Citation | 343 U.S. 214,96 L.Ed. 894,72 S.Ct. 654 |
Parties | RAY v. BLAIR |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Marx Leva, Washington, D.C., Harold M. Cook, Birmingham, Ala., for petitioner.
Mr. Horace C. Wilkinson, Birmingham, Ala., for respondent.
The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the petitioner, the chairman of that state's Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, to certify respondent Edmund Blair, a member of that party, to the Secretary of State of Alabama as a candidate for Presidential Elector in the Democratic Primary to be held May 6, 1952. Respondent Blair was admittedly qualified as a candidate except that he refused to include the following quoted words in the pledge required of party candidates a pledge to aid and support 'the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President of the United States.' The chairman's refusal of certification was based on that omission.
The mandamus was approved on the sole ground that the above requirement restricted the freedom of a federal elector to vote in his Electoral College for his choice for President. Ala.Sup., 57 So.2d 395. The pledge was held void as unconstitutional under the Twelfth Amend- ment of the Constitution of the United States.1 Because the mandamus was based on this federal right specially claimed by respondent, we granted certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(3); 343 U.S. 901, 72 S.Ct. 637.
On account of the limited time before the primary election date, this Court ordered prompt argument on March 31, 1952, after granting certiorari and handed down a per curiam decision on April 3, 343 U.S. 154, 72 S.Ct. 598, stating summarily our conclusion on the federal constitutional issue that determined the Alabama judgment. This opinion is to supplement that statement. Our mandate issued forthwith.
The controversy arose under the Alabama laws permitting party primaries. Title 17 of the Code of Alabama, 1940, as amended, provides for regular optional primary elections in that state on the first Tuesday in May of even years by any political party, as defined in the chapter, at state cost. §§ 336, 337, 340, 343. They are subject to the same penalties and punishment provisions as regular state elections. § 339. Parties may select their own committee in such manner as the governing authority of the party may desire. § 341. Section 344 provides that the chairman of the state executive committee shall certify the candidates other than those who are candidates for county offices to the Secretary of State of Alabama. That official, within not less than 30 days prior to the time of holding the primary elections, shall certify these names to the probate judge of any county holding an election.
Every state executive committee is given the power to fix political or other qualifications of its own members. It may determine who shall be entitled and qualified to vote in the primary election or to be a candidate therein. The qualifications of voters and candidates may vary.2
Section 348 requires a candidate to file his declaration of candidacy with the executive committee in the form prescribed by the governing body of the party. There is a provision, § 350, which reads as follows:
'At the bottom of the ballot and after the name of the last candidate shall be printed the following, viz: 'By casting this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this primary election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing general election."
On consideration of these sections in other cases the Supreme Court of Alabama has reached conclusions generally conformable to the current of authority. Section 347 has been said by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ray v. Garner, 57 So.2d 824, 826, to give full power to the state executive committee to determine 'who shall be entitled and qualified to vote in primary elections or be candidates or otherwise participate therein * * * just so such Committee action does not run afoul of some statutory or constitutional provision.'
The Garner case involved a pledge adopted by the State Democratic Executive Committee for printing on the primary ballot, reading as follows:
This is substantially the same pledge that created the controversy in this present case. The court also called attention approvingly to Lett v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 433, 129 So. 33, 34, a case that required a candidate in the primary to follow a party requirement and make a public oath as to his vote in the past general election, where it was declared 'a test by a political organization of party affiliation and party fealty is reasonable and proper to be prescribed for those participating in its primary elections for nomination of candidates for office'.3 As to the power to prescribe tests for participation in primary elections, it was added in the Garner case (57 So.2d 826) that 4 57 So.2d 826. The McQueen case involved the selection of delegates to a national political convention. It was also said in Ray v. Garner concerning the voter's pledge that:
5 57 So.2d 826.
As is well known political parties in the modern sense were not born with the Republic. They were created by necessity, by the need to organize the rapidly increasing population, scattered over our Land, so as to coordinate efforts to secure needed legislation and oppose that deemed undesirable. Compare Bryce, Modern Democracies, p. 546. The party conventions of locally chosen delegates, from the county to the national level, succeeded the caucuses of self-appointed legislators or other interested individuals. Dissatisfaction with the manipulation of conventions caused that system to be largely superseded by the direct primary. This was particularly true in the South because, with the predominance of the Democratic Party in that section, the nomination was more important than the election. There primaries are generally, as in Alabama, optional.6 Various tests of party allegiance for candidates in direct primaries are found in a number of states.7 The requirement of a pledge from the candidate participating in primaries to support the nominee is not unusual.8 Such a provision protects a party from in- trusion by those with adverse political principles.9 It was under the authority of § 347 of the Alabama Code, note 2, supra, that the State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama adopted a resolution on January 26, 1952, requiring candidates in its primary to pledge support to the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President. It is this provision in the qualifications required by the party under § 347 which the Supreme Court of Alabama held unconstitutional in this case.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that the Executive Committee requirement violated the Twelfth Amendment, note 1, supra. It said:
10 57 So.2d 398.
In urging a contrary view the dissenting Alabama justices, in supporting the right of the Committee to require this candidate to pledge support to the party nominees, said:
The applicable constitutional provisions on their face furnish no definite answer to the query whether a state may permit a party to require party regularity from its primary candidates for national electors.11 The presidential electors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice-President but they are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes for congressmen. They act by authority of the state that in turn receives its authority from the federal constitution.12 Neither the language of Art. II, § 1, nor that of the Twelfth Amendment forbids a party to require from candidates in its primary a pledge of political conformity with the...
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