Gomez v. Rodriguez

Decision Date18 September 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-2076.,No. 02-1838.,No. 02-1529.,No. 02-2077.,02-1529.,02-1838.,02-2076.,02-2077.
Citation344 F.3d 103
PartiesMaria E. GOMEZ, A/K/A Maria E. Gomez Candelaria, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Jose A. RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Ismael Rodríguez-Izquierdo for Municipality of Gurabo and official capacity appellants.

Jorge Martinez Luciano, with whom Johanna M. Emmanuelli Huertas and Law Offices of Pedro E. Ortiz Alvarez, PSC were on brief, for Victor Rivera Hernández, Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources, amicus curiae.

Pablo Landrau Pirazzi, with whom Eliezer Aldarondo Ortiz, Claudio Aliff Ortiz, Ivan Castro Ortiz, Simone Cataldi Malpica and Aldarondo & Lopez Bras were on brief, for appellees.

Before SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and PONSOR,* District Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

These appeals involve claims of politically motivated discharges. The twenty-four plaintiffs, all former employees of the Municipality of Gurabo (the Municipality), are members of the New Progressive Party (NPP). They sued three defendants — the Municipality, its mayor, José A. Rivera Rodríguez (the Mayor), and its human resources director, Luz E. Rivera-Oyola — under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a politically discriminatory animus accounted for their sudden unemployment.

The plaintiffs convinced both a jury and the district court of the accuracy of this claim; the jury awarded them substantial compensatory and punitive damages (enumerated in an appendix to this opinion), and the court ordered their reinstatement. The defendants appeal, assigning error in a number of discrete respects. After a painstaking review of the voluminous record, we conclude that the combined effect of two errors requires a new trial. We also conclude that, as to Rivera-Oyola, the district court erred in failing to grant judgment as a matter of law. The tale follows.

I. BACKGROUND

This case has a lengthy history, chronicled in a pair of lucid opinions. See Gómez Candelaria v. Rivera Rodríguez, 218 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.P.R.2002) (Gómez I) (denying defendants' motions for summary judgment); Gómez Candelaria v. Rivera Rodríguez, 218 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.P.R.2002) (Gómez II) (denying defendants' motions for post-trial relief). We rehearse here only those details that help to frame the issues on appeal.

More than a quarter-century ago, the Puerto Rico legislature created "a special fund, separate and distinct from all other moneys or funds of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 711c(a) (1995) (Law 52). This fund was to be

continually at the disposition of the Secretary [of the Treasury] solely and exclusively for activities coordinated by the Employment Service of the Department of Labor and Human Resources directed to: (1) Promoting employment opportunities with future possibilities as thus identified officially by the Department of Labor and Human Resources; (2) promoting jobs that are in demand in the present market; (3) and promoting the creation of high productivity employment opportunities.

Id. § 711c(b). In practice, Law 52 soon became a vehicle through which the Commonwealth subsidized locally managed programs to ameliorate unemployment.

Despite this local emphasis, municipalities have no automatic entitlement to Law 52 grants. To obtain funding, a municipality must submit a proposal describing how it intends to use the money. Because such proposals must be approved by the Commonwealth's Department of Labor and Human Resources (DLHR) from year to year, jobs subsidized by Law 52 funds are transitory in nature, typically lasting for one year only.

Prior to the 2000 general election, the plaintiffs held municipal positions that had been created and funded under Law 52. Most of them had been so employed, under serial one-year contracts, for periods ranging from two to seven years. The latest contracts were due to expire on December 31, 2000.

The general election in November of 2000 included a race for the mayor's office. Rivera Rodríguez stood for election as the candidate of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). The plaintiffs openly opposed his candidacy, participating unabashedly in partisan marches, meetings, fundraisers, leaflet drops, and other political activities. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' efforts, Rivera Rodríguez defeated the incumbent NPP mayor, Victor Rivera Acevedo.

Prior to the inauguration, the outgoing administration submitted an updated Law 52 proposal to DLHR. It also extended the plaintiffs' employment contracts through January 31, 2001. The changing of the guard took place on January 9, 2001, and the Mayor appointed Rivera-Oyola (a fellow PDP member) to the position of human resources director. Soon thereafter, the Municipality received word that DLHR would not approve the Law 52 proposal previously submitted by the lameduck administration.1 In lieu thereof, DLHR requested a reworked proposal based on the needs perceived by the new administration. As of the expiration date of the plaintiffs' contracts, no further Law 52 funds had been made available to the Municipality. After discussing the lack of money with Rivera-Oyola, the Mayor, by letter dated January 30, 2001, notified the plaintiffs that their employment would cease the next day.2

Shortly thereafter, the Municipality submitted a revamped Law 52 proposal to DLHR. The agency approved that proposal on February 14, 2001. The job descriptions had changed and, prior to filling the newly sanctioned positions, the Mayor met with Luis Piñot Arecco (Piñot), DLHR's deputy secretary for legal affairs and norms. The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to discuss the ground rules for the hiring of Law 52 employees. When the Municipality eventually filled the new positions, the plaintiffs were left out in the cold.

Dismayed by these developments, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. They alleged, inter alia, that the Mayor and Rivera-Oyola (who were sued in both their individual and representative capacities) had violated their freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment in failing to renew their Law 52 employment contracts.3 The defendants denied that they had violated the plaintiffs' rights, asserting that the disputed employment decisions were the upshot of the new administration's differing policies as to how best to serve the needs of the community.

On January 22, 2002, the individual defendants moved for summary judgment. They asserted, inter alia, that the complaint should be dismissed as to five of the plaintiffs because they had not sought renewal of their contracts; that the complaint should be dismissed as to Rivera-Oyola because of the parties' stipulation that she had not participated in the decision to let the plaintiffs' contracts expire see supra note 2; and that the complaint should be dismissed as to the Mayor on the ground of qualified immunity because, given the guidance he had received from DLHR, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not offend clearly established law.

The district court rejected the defendants' motion as to the five plaintiffs who did not seek reappointment, finding that each of them had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment. In this regard, the court declared that:

[W]hen there are funds available for renewal of Law 52 positions, transitory employees who have been continuously re-employed with previous Law 52 grants and who have been for all practical purposes refused re-employment, have at that point a property interest in their continued employment and therefore must be allowed and are entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Under these circumstances, if the contract of a Law 52 transitory employee is not renewed and another person who is affiliated with a rival political party is employed in his stead, the Law 52 transitory employees (Plaintiffs in this case) have a cause of action under the law not only for political discrimination but also for due process.

Gómez I, 218 F.Supp.2d at 79. The court also refused to dismiss the complaint as to Rivera-Oyola, concluding that the record contained facts that contradicted the stipulation and that her position inherently "has more influence with decision-making matters than that of a general employee who merely follows orders." Id. at 75. The Mayor fared no better. In eschewing a grant of brevis disposition in the Mayor's favor on the ground of qualified immunity, the court noted that factual disputes as to his motivation remained to be resolved. Id. at 77.

The case proceeded to trial. The plaintiffs' case in chief was largely circumstantial. However, one plaintiff, Shirley Morales Rivera (Morales), testified over objection as to the substance of a conversation with the Mayor's wife, Mayra Pinero. According to this witness, Pinero stated (or, at least, intimated) that party affiliation would play a part in the Municipality's hiring practices.

At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved unsuccessfully for the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Just before the opening of the defense case, the plaintiffs moved in limine seeking to preclude Piñot's testimony. The district court granted this motion, and the defense proceeded without the benefit of its star witness.

At the close of all the evidence, the defendants again moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court rejected the motion. The jury found for the plaintiffs; its verdict rested on a finding that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision not to renew the...

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