Donald v. Uarco Business Forms

• Citation: 344 F. Supp. 338
• Decision Date: 09 June 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. FS-70-C-84.
• Parties: O. W. DONALD, Plaintiff, v. UARCO BUSINESS FORMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

344 F. Supp. 338

O. W. DONALD, Plaintiff, v. UARCO BUSINESS FORMS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. FS-70-C-84.

United States District Court, W. D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division.

June 9, 1972.

Gean, Gean, & Gean by Roy Gean, Jr., Fort Smith, Ark., for plaintiff.

Hardin, Jesson & Dawson by P. H. Hardin, Fort Smith, Ark., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAUL X WILLIAMS, District Judge.

The plaintiff, O. W. Donald, brought this action under the Copyright Laws of the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338. The complaint further states that there is diversity of citizenship and that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00. In this action, the plaintiff alleged infringement of his copyright, and sought damages and injunctive relief for the alleged infringement. Plaintiff also alleged unfair trade practices and unfair competition. The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and specifically that the plaintiff had a valid copyright or that he had suffered any damages.

The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the plaintiff had a valid copyright, which had been infringed, and fixed the amount of plaintiff's damages at $7,000.00.

The defendant timely filed a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(b), for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. The plaintiff filed a response to the motion and the matter is now pending before the court on this motion.

The defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reads as follows:

"Comes now defendant, Uarco, Incorporated, and moves the Court to set aside the verdict entered in the above entitled cause on May 15, 1972, and to enter judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with the Motion for Directed Verdict made by defendant at the close of all the testimony herein, on the grounds as stated in the Motion for Directed Verdict, namely, that plaintiff's claimed copyright was invalid for lack of originality; that the subject matter which it purported to cover is in the public domain; that plaintiff's purported work did not contribute a distinguishing variation; that there was an absence of original research by plaintiff resulting in significant addition to works in existence; that there was not a meaningful variation from works in existence; that changes, if any, were trivial in nature; that the claimed work merely combined from public domain existing words and forms with no original piece added and that plaintiff had simply paraphrased from the public domain existing works; that plaintiff had merely combined from the public domain existing words and forms with nor original piece added; and that the evidence and law in the case required a verdict to be directed in favor of the defendant."

It is now proper for the Court to consider the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, even though the case was first sent to the jury. In the case of Wright v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 254 F.Supp. 308 (W.D.Mo.1966) the Court said:

"The fact that we sent these cases to the jury is immaterial. The practice of sending doubtful cases to the jury is commended in Green v. Reynolds Metals Company, 5th Cir. 1964, 328 F.2d 372."

See also the case of Greer v. United States, 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969) wherein the Court held that:

"The trial judge having denied defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence properly reconsidered the question on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (Rule 50(b) F.R.Civ.P.)"

In determining the test to be applied as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury verdict, a good discussion is presented in the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1965). In that case the Court pointed out that both the Federal standard and the standard under the Arkansas law for testing the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, requires that there be substantial evidence to support the verdict. Federal Rules Civil Procedure Rule 50(b) 28 U.S.C.A.

The Court also stated that:

"When the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned, the Arkansas and Federal courts will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Superior Forwarding Co. v. Garner, 236 Ark. 340, 366 S.W.2d 290; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 8th Cir., 115 F.2d 369; Stofer v. Montgomery Ward, 8th Cir., 249 F.2d 285."

In this case, however, even when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot find any substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.

At the time of trial the "Agreement in question was introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and it reads as follows:

"AGREEMENT"

"I hereby acknowledge receipt of the above described merchandise, with itemized repairs completed thereto. I promise to pay to the servicer, or order, in full, the amount listed as "total", on, or before the date listed as "terms". Title to said chattel, described hereon by model, make, and serial number, is hereby transferred to the servicer, for service, and or, materials used to repair said chattel. I offer this chattel in lieu of cash for services rendered, and agree not to misuse, secrete, sell, encumber, remove, or otherwise dispose of, or lose possession of said chattel, nor permit nor suffer any lien, encumbrance or charge against said chattel. There is no outstanding indebtedness, lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance against said chattel. I agree that should I fail to pay this indebtedness when due, or breach this contract, the entire unpaid balance shall at once become due and payable, and servicer may without notice, or demand, by law or otherwise, take possession of said chattel wherever located and retain all monies paid thereon for use of said chattel."

O. W. Donald, the plaintiff herein, testified at the trial that he drew up the "Agreement", and that he "authored and arranged the words" in his own manner. He testified that there were no other forms exactly like his and that he had shaped it to meet the needs of his customers; and that he had received a Certificate of Registration from the Copyright office. This was introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit "B". Plaintiff also introduced a copy of the Defendant's alleged infringing "Agreement" with the name "Uarco Business Forms" thereon. He testified that in devising his "Agreement" he used Black's Law Dictionary, consulted with his Attorney and had various other legal forms available; and that Defendant had copied his "Agreement."

In response to questions directed to the plaintiff during the trial the following was reflected:

Q. Do you know that various form books have been published by various legal publicators of publications?

A. It was brought to my attention in the Zack Meyers¹ case that you mentioned earlier.

Q. You had brought to your attention the Am Jur Forms?

A. Yes, in the Zack Meyers case that you mentioned.

Q. You also had brought to your attention Modern Legal Forms?

A. I do not remember that. I remember the Am.Jur's. I am not saying that I did not have it brought to my attention but if it was I just do not remember it.

* * * * * *

Q. Did you have any other forms of other agreements that had been in general circulation that you looked and analyzed the language?

A. Yes, I did.

* * * * * *

Q. So of the words you have used then you admit are in the public domain; in other words they are in public use by the population at large, is that correct?

Q. Would you answer the question, sir?

A. I said I think all the words I used have been in public use because I got them from Black's Law Dictionary that Mr. Gean secured for me.

Defendant introduced several forms from well known legal publications and on cross examination presented them to the plaintiff, requesting that he point out any material variations between them and his "Agreement." Plaintiff continued to respond that his agreement was a service contract and not a sales contract.

Regardless of the type of form or agreement, the test to be applied in determining whether the author's creation is subject to copyright depends upon the degree of originality incorporated therein.

The law is basically clear, and the parties herein agree, that in order for the applicant to obtain a valid copyright it must be shown that the material in question is original. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); Gelles-Widmer Co., v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 1303, 10 L.Ed.2d 414 (1963); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).

Lack of originality is fatal to the copyright registration: Donald v. Zack Meyer's T. V. Sales and Service, 426 F.2d 1027 at 1031 (5th Cir. 1970) Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 459, 27 L.Ed.2d 441; Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104 at 106 (3rd Cir. 1951).

The "Agreement" at issue in the Zack Meyer's case was as follows:

"Agreement"

"For value received, the undersigned jointly and severally promises to pay to the Dealer, or order, the unpaid balance shown on this invoice according to the agreed terms. Title to said Chattel, described hereon by model, make and serial number, is hereby retained, or transferred to Dealer until Customer has paid in cash all amounts owing said Dealer. Customer shall not misuse, secrete, sell, encumber, remove or otherwise dispose of or lose possession of said Chattel. There is no outstanding lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance against said Chattel. Should Customer fail to pay its indebtedness when due, or breach this contract, the entire unpaid balance shall at once become due and payable, and Dealer may without notice or demand, by process of law, or otherwise, take possession of said Chattel wherever located and retain all monies paid thereon for use of said Chattel. This

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