Application of Hughes
Decision Date | 20 May 1965 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 7312. |
Citation | 52 CCPA 1355,345 F.2d 184 |
Parties | Application of Arthur V. HUGHES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
John A. Blair, Detroit, Mich., C. Willard Hayes, Washington, D. C., Everett R. Casey, Detroit, Mich., for appellant.
Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D. C., (S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges.
Claims 1-16 of appellant's application1 stand rejected, and the threshold question is, on what ground? Neither the examiner nor the Board of Appeals specified the statutory basis for the rejection.
In concluding its opinion, the board stated: "we deem claims 1 through 16 to be unpatentable over Link2 and accordingly, the rejection of the claims will be sustained." The solicitor takes the position that this holding constitutes reliance upon 35 U.S.C. § 103, and in this connection states:
Even though the statute was not named, scrutiny of the examiner's answer makes it clear that the examiner's action was based on section 102:
Our appellate jurisdiction is restricted by 35 U.S.C. § 144 to hearing and determining the appeal "on the evidence produced before the Patent Office." It seems basic to the concept of procedural due process that an applicant at least be informed of the broad statutory basis for rejecting his claims, so that he may determine what the issues are on which he can or should produce evidence. In order to insure that an applicant be so informed, 35 U.S.C. § 132 requires that whenever a rejection is made, the Commissioner "shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his application * * *."
We are here confronted with a situation wherein the examiner, although not in so many words, relied on section 102 as the statutory basis for his rejection, while the board, if the solicitor's interpretation of its opinion is correct, relied upon section 103 as well. We think that consideration by this court of the merits of the board's alternative position would deprive appellant of important procedural rights.
We do not mean by this to imply that the Board of Appeals may not, if it sees fit, enter new or alternative grounds for rejection of claims in an appealed application. Such practice is not uncommon and is often of great value in clarifying the examiner's position or in correcting errors and oversights. And if the new ground of rejection is properly identified as such, the applicant is in no way prejudiced, for he has the benefit of the adequate procedural safeguards of Rule 196 (b).
Here, however, the board's opinion did not provide adequate notice that a new statutory ground of rejection was being relied on. For all that appellant knew, from the vague language used by the board, the only rejection being passed upon was the one made by the examiner under section 102. Thus, if we were to consider, on this appeal, issues which arise under section 103, we would be doing so without affording appellant an opportunity to be heard in the administrative tribunal of the Patent Office.
We cannot agree with the solicitor that there is no material difference between sections 102 and 103 with respect to an applicant's right to a day in court. A rejection under section 102 involves a comparison between the subject matter disclosed by the reference and the claimed invention, in order to determine whether the claimed invention is "described" in the reference. See, e. g., In re Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238, 52 CCPA 859. Section 103, on the other hand, requires consideration of the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, for the purpose of determining whether the claimed subject matter as a whole would have been "obvious" to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the issues arising under the two sections may be vastly different, and may call for the production and introduction of quite different types of evidence.
Accordingly, to the extent the board's decision goes beyond the examiner's rejection, which we have found to be for want of novelty under section 102, it will not be considered, since appellant never received adequate notice of any other ground of rejection which may or may not have been relied upon by the Board of Appeals.
Basically, the issue under section 102 turns upon the interpretation of the Link disclosure. As the examiner pointed out, if Link discloses pieced, interleaved-spiral core strips, the claims are anticipated. If, however, Link discloses a series of concentric closed loops to form the laminated core, the claims are not anticipated.
In electromagnetic induction apparatus of the general type shown in Link, a core is assembled about preformed conductive windings. The appealed claims3 specify the structure of the core element in such apparatus as consisting of a plurality of wound, pieced, interleaved-spiral magnetic strips. Such a core is made by concurrently winding a plurality of face-abutting strips of magnetic material upon an arbor to form interleaved spirals. The wound structure is heat-treated to improve its magnetic characteristics. The strips are unwound without destroying their permanent set, and are cut at predetermined intervals. The severed pieces are then assembled on the preformed conductive windings. The issue as to what Link discloses arises at this point. It is clear that appellant assembles the several pieces in their original interleaved-spiral relationship, with the ends of one segment abutting the ends of adjacent segments.
Link, however, after winding two magnetic strips about a trapezoidal mandrel to the form in which the strips are annealed, drills an indexing hole through one end of the core, after which he separates the core into the separate spiral strips and inserts indexing pins through the respective holes in the strips. The two strips are then separately clamped and one is cut on the left side of its indexing pin and the other on the right side of its indexing pin. The cut pieces are reassembled around the preformed windings to provide the completed core.
The rejection is predicated upon Link's mode of reassembly and the nature of his final core structure. The examiner viewed Link as teaching but one embodiment, i. e., an anticipatory "interleaved-spiral" structure in which the ends of each piece abut the ends of other pieces. The examiner's position is based on language in the Link specification to the effect that the severed pieces are reassembled in the "identical position" or "relationship" which they assumed in the initial wound core.
However, we find Link's description of the reassembly operation to be vague and uncertain. In fact, the board recognized this defect in the use of Link as an anticipating disclosure in stating:
Emphasis added. * * *"
We do not agree that such an ambiguous disclosure "describes" appellant's claimed invention within the meaning of section 102. Our view is further supported by Link's description of the reassembly process as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Application of Wiechert
...isomer was first pointed out and relied upon by the board. As we had occasion to state, in a different factual situation in In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 52 CCPA 1355: It seems basic to the concept of procedural due process that an applicant at least be informed of the broad statutory basis f......
-
Mitsubishi Chem. Corp.. v. Barr Laboratories Inc. .
...(1962) (“It is well established that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated on an ambiguous reference.”); In re Hughes, 52 C.C.P.A. 1355, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (1965) (“[A]n ambiguous reference ... will not support an anticipation rejection.”). 179. A finding of anticipation “is not sup......
-
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm.
...(1962) ("It is well established that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated on an ambiguous reference."); In re Hughes, 52 C.C.P.A. 1355, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (1965) ("[A]n ambiguous reference ... will not support an anticipation 41. To hold that Schauzu anticipates the '382 patent wou......
-
Application of Hengehold
...Accordingly, we will treat the rejection as it was stated by the board, i. e., as being under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Cf., In re Hughes, 345, F.2d 184, 52 CCPA 1355 (1965). Appellant contended below, as he does here, that Haxton does not respond to the recitation of the compound gears as set out i......
-
Chapter §11.05 Patent Term Adjustment
...(Fed. Cir. 2016) (O'Malley, J.).[178] 906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Michel, J.).[179] Chester, 906 F.2d at 1578. See also In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 185 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (stating that Section 132 merely ensures that an applicant "at least be informed of the broad statutory basis for [the ......