Adoption of Reinius, In re
| Decision Date | 19 November 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 34589,34589 |
| Citation | 55 Wn.2d 117,346 P.2d 672 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Adoption of Janette REINIUS and Nanette Reinius, Minors. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Arthur G. Barnett, Seattle, Hugo Metzler, Jr., Tacoma, for appellant.
Metzger, Blair & Gardner, Tacoma, for respondent.
In this appeal the appellant, Washington Children's Home Society, challenges the validity of a decree of adoption.
The two minors in question are twins, born in September 1956 to an unmarried mother. She requested aid from the Pierce county welfare department in caring for the two minor children. It was anticipated that the mother would promptly sign a relinquishment and consent to adoption; the children were placed in separate foster homes pending such action. However, the mother did not consent to adoption until July 1957.
In September 1957, the juvenile court, by an appropriate order, placed the twins in the custody of the Washington Children's Home Society (hereafter referred to as the Society) for the purpose of adoption. The effect of this order was to make the Society the 'custodial guardian' of the children. In October 1957, the respondents herein, Howard Pelland and Edythe Pelland, husband and wife, who, by appropriate administrative action, had become foster parents for one of the twins and were being paid for such services at public expense, petitioned to adopt both of the twins. They did not request the Society to consent to the contemplated adoption. Actually, in becoming foster parents, they orally agreed that they would not attempt to adopt the minor placed in their care. 1 When the Society learned about the action of the foster parents in breach of the oral agreement and in violation of approved standards respecting foster home care, it intervened to oppose the petition for adoption.
After a hearing on the petition for adoption (filed by the foster parents), the trial court approved the petition and entered a decree of adoption and an order dispensing with the Society's consent.
Basically, it is the position of the Society that the adoption statutes, as amended, permit dispensing with the requirement of its consent respecting a proposed adoption, only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion; that the action of the trial court in the instant case was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion rather than a proper exercise of sound judicial discretion.
For a proper understanding of the issue presented, it is necessary to examine carefully and in proper context the purposes of the adoption statutes, earlier adoption statutes, and cases construing the earlier statutes.
We believe that the purpose of our modern adoption statute, Laws of 1955, ch. 291, p. 1299 [cf. RCW 26.32], is the threefold protection of: (1) the adoptive child--from unnecessary separation from his natural parents and from adoption by persons unfit, unsuited, or unqualified to have the responsibility of the particular child; (2) the natural parents--from hurried and abrupt decisions to relinquish custody of their children; and (3) the adopting parents--from unhappiness, embarrassment and heartache, by providing them with information about the particular child and his background, and by protecting them and the child from subsequent disturbance of family relationships by the natural parents. See The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vanderbilt Law Review 743 (1955-56).
It is the function and responsibility of the courts to see that the adoption statute is so administered that it works in practice in a manner that recognizes and implements the above indicated purposes of this modern and socially desirable legislative enactment. The extent to which this is accomplished, generally speaking, determines whether sound judicial discretion has been exercised in particular adoption cases.
The Child Welfare League of America has promulgated a code of approved standards or procedures for use in the adoption placement of children. (Pamphlet entitled, Child Welfare League of America Standards for Adoption Service, published 1958.) These standards are not the notions of any one individual. They are a composite of the experience, research and study of many people working over a period of many years with many private and public agencies handling adoptions throughout the country. The standards offer general information and some specifics to which a judge may turn for guidance in his effort to exercise sound judicial discretion in handling a particular adoption.
The problem of an appellate court in reviewing adoption cases such as the case at bar is not a simple one. It would be most helpful--and, perhaps, in some cases decisive respecting affirmance or reversal--to have detailed findings of fact made by the trial judge, indicating those factors he considered significant or determinative; among other things, whether approved adoption standards were referred to, and the extent to which the trial court recognized and attempted to follow and effectuate these standards.
The contentions advanced herein by appellant Society were presented to the court in State ex rel. Van Cleave v. Frater, 1944, 21 Wash.2d 231, 150 P.2d 391. However, in the Van Cleave case the court was interpreting and applying the adoption statutes (Laws of 1943, ch. 268, § 3, p. 828) as then enacted. In the Van Cleave case the court merely held that under the existing statutes written consent need be filed prior to a hearing on the merits of the petition only (1) by the children, if fourteen years of age, or over; (2) by the parents of legitimate children; (3) by the mother of illegitimate children; and (4) by the legal guardian, if any. Since the approved adoption agency was not within the above categories, its written consent was held to be unnecessary.
Thereafter, the legislature amended the adoption laws by adding a fifth subsection to § 3, ch. 268, Laws of 1943 (see Laws of 1947, ch. 251, § 1, p. 1038). In 1955, the legislature enacted a new adoption law: Laws of 1955, ch. 291, p. 1299. The pertinent language in § 3 of that statute reads as follows:
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'(5) If the person to be adopted is a minor and has been permanently committed upon due notice to his parents by any court of general jurisdiction to an approved agency, then by such approved agency, in which event neither notice to nor consent by its parents in the adoption proceeding shall be necessary: Provided, That if the approved agency refuses to consent to the adoption, the court, in its discretion, may order that such consent be dispensed with.' (Emphasis supplied.)
An 'approved agency' means 'any public or private association, corporation or individual who has custody of a minor child with lawful authority to place such child for adoption.' Laws of 1955, ch. 291, § 1, p. 1299. In the case at bar, the Society meets the indicated qualifications.
Section 7(1) of the 1955 act, supra, reads:
'(1) The written consent shall be acknowledged before a notary public and filed with the petition or at all events before any action is taken by the court in such proceeding. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 5 of the 1955 act, supra, provides for a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the consent of a parent shall be dispensed with; upon proper notice and hearing, the court may order that such consent shall not be required prior to adoption.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe the legislature intended that, normally, where custody has been given to an approved agency, the written consent of the approved agency should be on file before action is taken granting a petition for adoption. In fact, from our examination of the statutory provisions, as emphasized above, it would seem that when a child is placed with an 'approved agency' for adoption, thereupon, the agency, as custodial guardian, in effect stands in loco parentis and takes the place of the natural parents or legal guardian of the child in regard to the matter of consent to an adoption, in order to safeguard the interests of the child. 2 When an approved agency, as the custodial guardian, refuses to file its written consent in an adoption proceeding, the statute contemplates a full hearing on the reasonableness of its action. If the custodial guardian is unreasonable in the withholding of its consent,--if it is not looking out for the best interests of the child--the court, of course, in the proper exercise of judicial discretion, may enter an order dispensing with the necessity of consent. See 39 Minn.L.Rev. 567, Adoption--Consent of Guardian Where Custodial Guardian is a Charitable Child Placing Agency. But the matter of consent of an approved agency cannot be dispensed with or ignored arbitrarily any more than it could be in the case of natural parents who refuse to consent to adoption of their offspring. In both instances, the welfare of the minor is the prime and controlling consideration--in fact, the only consideration. In that respect, the court 'is the ultimate protector of helpless children.' State ex rel. Van Cleave v. Frater, supra [21 Wash.2d 231, 150 P.2d 393].
In re Blake's Adoption, 1944, 21 Wash.2d 547, 151 P.2d 825, 827.
In passing, it may be well to observe that there is no absolute necessity for a separate hearing on the issue of dispensing with the Society's consent. In other words, that matter and the petition for adoption may be determined in the same hearing. Whether there is a single hearing or separate hearings, however, there is an essential requirement of adequate notice and an opportunity for...
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