United States v. Nugent United States v. Packer
| Decision Date | 08 June 1953 |
| Docket Number | 573,Nos. 540,s. 540 |
| Citation | 73 S.Ct. 991,346 U.S. 1,97 L.Ed. 1417 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. NUGENT. UNITED STATES v. PACKER |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
For purposes of Selective Service Act subsection entitling claimant denied classification as conscientious objector by local draft board to further review by an appropriate appeal board and requiring appeal board to refer claim to Department of Justice for inquiry and 'hearing', quoted word would take its meaning from an analysis of precise function which Congress had imposed upon Justice Department by subsection. Selective Service Act of 1948, §§ 6(j), 12, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 456(j), 462.
Under Selective Service Act subsection entitling claimant denied classification as conscientious objector by local draft board to further review by an appropriate appeal board and requiring appeal board to refer claim to Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing, neither Department investigation nor its hearing is determinative, and it is not function of such auxiliary procedure to provide full scale trial for each appealing registrant; standards of procedure to which Department must adhere being simply standards which will enable it to discharge its duty to forward sound advice, as expeditiously as possible, to appeal board. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 456(j).
The Selective Service Act is a comprehensive statute designed to provide orderly, efficient and fair procedure for marshalling available manpower of country and to impose a common obligation of military service on all physically fit young men; and since it is calculated to function in times of peril, it is desirable that procedure be free from litigious interruption. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 456(j).
Page 1-Continued.
Selective Service Act is valid exercise of war power. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 456(j).
There is no violation of Fifth Amendment by Selective Service Act subsection entitling claimant denied classification as conscientious objector by local draft board to further review by an appropriate appeal board and requiring appeal board to refer claim to Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing, even though there is no requirement that registrant be permitted to see investigator's report or be informed of names of persons interviewed by investigators. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 456(j); U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
Mr. Robert W. Ginnane, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mr. Hayden C. Covington, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondents.
Section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act1 provides exemption from military service—partial or full, depending upon the circumstances—for any person 'who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.' If the conscientious objector's claim for relief under this section is denied by his local draft board, he is entitled to further review by an 'appropriate appeal board.' All such appeals are referred to the Department of Justice for an 'appropriate inquiry' and a 'hearing.' The Department of Justice then makes a recommendation to the appeal board, which may or may not follow it in reviewing the local board's classification.
These two cases are concerned with the procedure, established by regulation and practice,2 which is followed when a conscientious objector's appeal is referred to the Department of Justice. The Department has regularly used the FBI to investigate each appealing registrant's background and reputation for sincerity. A hearing is then held before a designated 'hearing officer.' The registrant is allowed to appear in person, and, if he chooses, he may bring with him an advisor and witnesses to testify in his behalf.3 Upon request, he is entitled to be instructed 'as to the general nature and character' of any 'unfavorable' evidence developed by the Depart- ment's investigation.4 But he is not permitted to see the FBI report, nor is he informed of the names of persons interviewed by the investigators.
It is the Department's refusal to disclose the entire FBI reports which precipitates the issues now before us. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that this procedure violates a registrant's rights under the Selective Service Act.5 We granted certiorari, 345 U.S. 915, 73 S.Ct. 728, because that determination seemed in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals6 and because it dealt with an important problem in the administration of the Selective Service Act.
Each of the respondents claims to be a conscientious objector entitled to total exemption from military service. Each has been convicted of wilfully refusing to submit to induction in the armed forces of the United States.7 At their trials, respondents challenged the validity of their selective service classifications, claiming that they were fixed without basis in fact8 and without adherence to the procedures prescribed by § 6(j) of the Act;9 each claimed that the Department of Justice's failure to show him the FBI reports rendered his classification illegal. The Court of Appeals, reversing each respondent's conviction, sustained the claims.
We think that the Court of Appeals erred. We think that the statutory scheme for review, within the selective service system, of exemptions claimed by conscientious objectors entitles them to no guarantee that the FBI reports must be produced for their inspection. We think the Department of Justice satisfies its duties under § 6(j) when it accords a fair opportunity to the registrant to speak his piece before an impartial hearing officer; when it permits him to produce all relevant evidence in his own behalf and at the same time supplies him with a fair re sume of any adverse evidence in the investigator's report. 10
Respondents urge that this is not enough. The argument rides hard upon the word 'hearing' in § 6(j). It is suggested that the 'hearing' prescribed by Congress was purposely designed to allow the registrant to refute—item by item, if necessary—the matters discussed in the investigator's report.11 In sum, respondents assimilate the 'hearing' in § 6(j) to a trial and insist that it imports a right to confront every informant who may have rendered adverse comment to the FBI.
The statute does entitle the registrant to a 'hearing,' and of course no sham substitute will meet this requirement; but we do not think that the word 'hearing'—when put in the context of the whole scheme for review set forth in § 6(j)—comprehends the formal and litigious procedures which respondents' interpretation would attribute to it. Instead, the word takes its meaning in this instance from an analysis of the precise function which Congress has imposed upon the Department of Justice in § 6(j).12
The duty to classify—to grant or deny exemptions to conscientious objectors—rests upon the draft boards, local and appellate, and not upon the Department of Justice. The registrant must first look to his local board for the relief he claims; he must convince this body—composed of representatives of his own community—of the depth and sincerity of his convictions. He must fill out forms, calculated to put him to the test;13 he must supply any additional detailed information which may be necessary for a searching investigation of his claim; and, if he or his local board demands it, he may appear in person to explain his position to the persons charged with determining its validity. 14
If the local board denies the claim, the responsibility for review, if sought, falls upon the appeal board. The Department of Justice takes no action which is decisive. Its duty is to advise, to render an auxiliary service to the appeal board in this difficult class of cases. Congress was under no compulsion to supply this auxiliary service—to provide for a more exhaustive processing of the conscientious objector's appeal. Registrants who claim exemption for some reason other than conscientious objection, and whose claims are denied, are entitled to no 'hearing' before the Department. Yet in this special class of cases, involving as it does difficult analyses of facts and individ- ualized judgments, Congress directed that the assistance of the Department be made available whenever a registrant insists that his conscientious objection claim has been misjudged by his local board. Observes sympathetic to the problems of the conscientious objector have recognized that this provision in the statute improves the system of review by helping the appeal boards to reach a more informed judgment on the appealing registrant's claims,15 But it has long been recognized that neither the Department's 'appropriate investigation' nor its 'hearing' is the determinative investigation and the determinative hearing in each case. It has regularly been assumed that it is not the function of this auxiliary procedure to provide a full-scale trial for each appealing registrant.
Accordingly, the standards of procedure to which the Department must adhere are simply standards which will enable it to discharge its duty to forward sound advice, as expeditiously as possible, to the appeal board. Certainly, this is an important and delicate responsibility, but we do not think the statute requires the Department to entertain an all-out collateral attack at the hearing on the testimony obtained in its prehearing investigation.
Respondents urge that they have a right to such a procedure under the Fifth Amendment. We cannot agree.
The Selective Service Act is a comprehensive statute designed to provide an marshal the available manpower of the country, to impose a common obligation of military service on all physically fit young men. It is a valid exercise of the war power. It is calculated to function—it functions today—in times of peril. Even so, Con...
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