Wilko v. Swan
| Decision Date | 07 December 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 39,39 |
| Citation | 346 U.S. 427,98 L.Ed. 168,74 S.Ct. 182 |
| Parties | WILKO v. SWAN et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Richard H. Wels, New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. William H. Timbers, New York City, for S.E.C amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
Mr. Horace G. Hitchcock, New York City, for respondents.
This action by petitioner,* a customer, against respondents, partners in a securities brokerage firm, was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to recover damages under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.1 The complaint alleged that on or about January 17, 1951, through the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, petitioner was induced by Hayden, Stone and Company to purchase 1,600 shares of the common stock of Air Associates, Incorporated, by false representations that pursuant to a merger contract with the Borg Warner Corporation, Air Associates' stock would be valued at $6.00 per share over the then current market price, and that financial interests were buying up the stock for the speculative profit. It was alleged that he was not told that Haven B. Page (also named as a defendant but not involved in this review2), a director of, and counsel for, Air Associates was then selling his own Air Associates' stock, including some or all that petitioner purchased. Two weeks after the purchase, petitioner disposed of the stock at a loss. Claiming that the loss was due to the firm's misrepresentations and omission of information concerning Mr. Page, he sought damages.
Without answering the complaint, the respondent moved to stay the trial of the action pursuant to § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act3 until an arbitration in accordance with the terms of identical margin agreements was had. An affidavit accompanied the motion stating that the parties' relationship was controlled by the terms of the agreements and that while the firm was willing to arbitrate petitioner had failed to seek or proceed with any arbitration of the controversy.
Finding that the margin agreements provide that arbitration should be the method of settling all future controversies, the District Court held that the agreement to arbitrate deprived petitioner of the advantageous court remedy afforded by the Securities Act, and denied the stay.4 A divided Court of Appeals concluded that the Act did not prohibit the agreement to refer future controversies to arbitration, and reversed.5
The question is whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision' of the Securities Act which § 146 declares 'void.' We granted certiorari, 345 U.S. 969, 73 S.Ct. 73 S.Ct. 1112, to review this important and novel federal question affecting both the Securities Act and the United States Arbitration Act. Cf. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40, 61 S.Ct. 414, 415, 85 L.Ed. 500.
As the margin agreement in the light of the complaint evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce, no issue arises as to the applicability of the provisions of the United States Arbitration Act to this suit, based upon the Securities Act. 9 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) § 2, 9 U.S.C.A. § 2. Cf. Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 276, 278, with Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 854. See Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580.
In response to a Presidential message urging that there be added to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine of 'let the seller also beware,' 7 Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933. Designed to protect investors,8 the Act requires issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale.9 To effectuate this policy, § 12(2) created a special right to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially from the common-law action in that the seller is made to assume the burden of proving lack of scienter.10 The Act's special right is enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction—federal or state—and removal from a state court is prohibited. If suit be brought in a federal court, the purchaser has a wide choice of venue, the privilege of nation-wide service of process and the jurisdictional $3,000 requirement of diversity cases is inapplicable.11
The United States Arbitration Act establishes by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation. The reports of both Houses on that Act stress the need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation,12 and practice under its terms raises hope for its usefulness both in controversies based on statutes13 or on standards otherwise created.14 This hospitable attitude of legislatures and courts toward arbitration, however, does not solve our question as to the validity of petitioner's stipulation by the margin agreements, set out below, to submit to arbitration controversies that might arise from the transactions.15
Petitioner argues that § 14, note 6, supra, shows that the purpose of Congress was to assure that sellers could not maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken their ability to recover under the Securities Act. He contends that arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit at law under the Act to enforce his rights. He reasons that the arbitration paragraph of the margin agreement is a stipulation that waives 'compliance with' the pro- vision of the Securities Act, set out in the margin, conferring jurisdiction of suits and special powers. 16
Respondent asserts that arbitration is merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law,17 and therefore no conflict exists between the Securities Act and the United States Arbitration Act either in their language or in the congressional purposes in their enactment. Each may function within its own scope, the former to protect investors and the latter to simplify recovery for actionable violations of law by issuers or dealers in securities.
Respondent is in agreement with the Court of Appeals that the margin agreement arbitration paragraph, note 15, supra, does not relieve the seller from either liability or burden of proof, note 1, supra, imposed by the Securities Act. 18 We agree that in so far as the award in arbitra- tion may be affected by legal requirements, statutes or common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the provisions of the Securities Act control.19 This is true even though this proposed agreement has no requirement that the arbitrators follow the law. This agreement of the parties as to the effect of the Securities Act includes also acceptance of the invalidity of the paragraph of the margin agreement that relieves the respondent sellers of liability for all 'representation or advice by you or your employees or agents regarding the purchase or sale by me of any property. * * *'
The words of § 14, note 6, supra, void and 'stipulation' waiving compliance with any 'provision' of the Securities Act. This arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act. That conclusion is reached for the reasons set out above in the statement of petitioner's contention on this review. While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances, may deal at arm's length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers.
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in other business transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary.
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a commodity20 or the amount of money due under a contract is not the type of issue here involved.21 This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact,' see, note 1, supra, cannot be examined. Power to vacate an award is limited.22 While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would 'constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,' 23 that failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. 24 The United States Arbitration Act contains no provision for...
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