Hudson v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 14 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-1653.,01-1653. |
| Parties | Margo HUDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bryan COLEMAN; Eric Rodgers, Defendants-Appellees, City of Flint, Garnishee-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
David J. Nickola, NICKOLA & NICKOLA, Flint, Michigan, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Rose, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
David J. Nickola, NICKOLA & NICKOLA, Flint, Michigan, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Rose, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, Chief District Judge.*
MOORE, J. (pp. 146-150), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order granting the City of Flint's ("City") motion to quash Plaintiff's garnishment action against the City. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Plaintiff filed an action in state court asserting state and federal causes of action against Officers Bryan Coleman, Eric Rodgers, and the City of Flint arising from the Officers' theft of Hudson's Cocker Spaniel, "Brandy." The City removed the action to the Eastern District of Michigan based on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims.
The facts giving rise to this dispute are undisputed and merit only a brief discussion before turning to the determinative legal issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Hudson reported that her car had been stolen with her dog inside the car. Officers Coleman and Rodgers responded to a radio call to investigate Hudson's missing vehicle and dog. The Officers located the stolen vehicle and proceeded to take the dog from the car and ultimately to Officer Coleman's house. The Officers then lied by reporting that they did not find a dog inside the car. The truth concerning the theft of the would-be "$300,000 Cocker Spaniel1" finally surfaced five months later during an internal police department investigation in which the Officers admitted to stealing the dog. The Cocker Spaniel was returned to Hudson and the Officers faced discipline by the Police Department.
After the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing it from the case, Hudson and the Officers entered into a consent judgment whereby Coleman would pay $200,000 and Rodgers would pay $100,000 in settlement of Hudson's claims. In an effort to collect upon the consent judgment against Coleman and Rodgers, Hudson filed writs of garnishment against the City. Hudson asserted that the City would be liable to pay the consent judgment because of an indemnity agreement between the City and the Police Officers Union.
The indemnification agreement under which Hudson attempts to collect the consent judgment from the City provides:
Whenever any claim is made or any civil action is commenced against an Employee for injuries to persons or property caused by negligence or other acts of the Employee while in the course of his employment, and while acting within the scope of his authority, the Employer will pay for or engage in or furnish the services of an Attorney to advise the Employee as to the claim and to appear for and represent the Employee in the action.
The Employer may compromise, settle and pay such claim before or after the commencement of any civil action. Whenever any judgment for damages, excluding punitive damages, is awarded against an Employee as the result of any civil action for personal injuries or property damage caused by the Employee while in the course of his employment, and while acting within the scope of his authority, the Employer will indemnify the employee or will pay, settle, or compromise the judgment. The Chief Legal Officer will make the selection of the attorney or attorneys to represent the Employee in any particular case, and allow the Employee to object to the selection if he has cause to do so.
Pursuant to the above indemnity agreement, the City provided the Officers with legal counsel during the course of the proceedings. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the City's liability under the indemnification agreement has been established, or, more specifically, whether the Officers were acting within the scope of their employment and authority when they stole the dog. By the time Hudson instituted the garnishment proceeding against the City, the Officers each had paid $12,500 to Hudson in partial satisfaction of their debts.
The City filed a motion to quash the garnishment on the basis of several theories, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After the Magistrate Judge2 filed a report and recommendation concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction, the district court adopted the report and recommendation and granted the City's motion to quash. Hudson timely filed a notice of appeal.
We review de novo a district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority v. EPA, 916 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir.1990). As an initial observation, it is well established that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986), which is not to be expanded by judicial decree, American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). Accordingly, "[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Id .
The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the garnishment, primarily because the action attempts to hold the City, a third party, liable for payment of a judgment on an independent legal theory, the indemnity agreement, which would require separate analysis and possible discovery concerning the City's defenses to liability. As set forth above, the City was dismissed from the action on September 30, 1998. The Officers then settled with the Plaintiff and a consent judgment was entered on February 29, 2000. It was not until June 30, 2000, that the Plaintiff served writs of garnishment on the City relying upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 69.
The jurisdictional analysis in this garnishment action begins with a consideration of Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996), and its discussion of ancillary subject matter jurisdiction. As a starting point, it is necessary to understand that there are two situations in which a court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a claim otherwise not within the jurisdiction of the court: "`(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.'" Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 862 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted)). The first category of ancillary jurisdiction identified above has largely been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The second category of ancillary jurisdiction is generally referred to as "ancillary enforcement jurisdiction."
In Peacock, the plaintiff obtained a federal court judgment against a corporation pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. After efforts to collect on the judgment failed, the plaintiff filed a second suit seeking to hold Peacock, an officer and shareholder of the corporation, personally liable under a piercing of the corporate veil theory. The Supreme Court determined that it was without an independent jurisdictional basis for the suit because ERISA does not authorize a veil-piercing action. In addition, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the federal courts had ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over the second suit.
The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that it has "reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court's inherent power to enforce its judgments." Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356, 116 S.Ct. 862. The Court further explained that, "[i]n defining that power, we have approved the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of federal judgments including attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances." Id. (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, Peacock concluded that it was without ancillary jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's second suit. The Court cautioned that the recognition of ancillary supplementary proceedings has not extended beyond attempts to execute, or guarantee the eventual executability of a federal judgment. More specifically, the Court has "never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment." Id. at 357, 116 S.Ct. 862. The Court further explained that
[i]n determining the reach of the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, we have cautioned against the exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are "`entirely new and original,'" or where "the relief [sought is] of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Earnestine Hill v. Windows
-
Ifc Interconsult v. Safeguard Intern. Partners
...but not for a contested indemnification like in the present case. As support for this reading, the Fund points to Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 146 (6th Cir.2003), in which the Sixth Circuit held that there was no ancillary federal jurisdiction over a garnishment action based on an indem......
-
Felts v. Cleveland Hous. Auth.
...possess “only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir.2003) (internal citations omitted). See also, Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.2005). Accordingly, ......
-
Ernst v. Roberts
...a limitation on jurisdiction."). Generally, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it. E.g., Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir.2003). The difference between Eleventh Amendment immunity and other jurisdictional issues, in this respect, supports the view o......