State v. Kombol

• Decision Date: 01 December 1959
• Docket Number: No. 8790,8790
• Citation: 81 Idaho 530,347 P.2d 117
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John (Jack) KOMBOL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 117

347 P.2d 117

81 Idaho 530

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John (Jack) KOMBOL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8790.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 1, 1959.

D. K. Worden, Jr., Lewiston, for appellant.

Frank L. Benson, Atty. Gen., Wm. Swope, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jedd G. Owens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Owen L. Knowlton, Pros. Atty., Lewiston, for respondent.

KNUDSON, Justice.

Appellant is charged by the information with the crime of grand larceny committed on the 12th day of December, 1958, in Nez Perce County, by intentionally and feloniously taking, stealing and carrying away certain personal property of C. C. Anderson Company store in Lewiston.

The arresting officer first observed appellant in front of the C. C. Anderson store in Lewiston at about nine P.M. on December 12, 1958, at which time appellant appeared to be intoxicated. The officer followed him for some distance, then placed him under arrest for being intoxicated. At the time of his arrest appellant was carrying a paper sack containing twenty-one pairs of nylon hose and he had a transistor radio concealed in an inner leg with a drawstring, sewed to the inside of the trousers he was wearing. Following his arrest the officers learned that he had been living at the Lewiston Hotel where they then called. The manager of the hotel informed the officers that appellant had on that day left with him for storage three men's shirts and three women's sweaters which were on that occasion turned over to the officers by the manager. Appellant had registered at the hotel under an assumed name. Appellant was charged with the crime of grand larceny for the theft of the nylon hose, shirts and sweaters heretofore mentioned. The case was tried to a jury and appellant neither offered nor introduced any evidence in his behalf. A verdict of guilty was returned and judgment entered thereon, from which this appeal is taken.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict in that the state failed to prove the two essential elements of the corpus delicti of the offense charged. If sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence has been introduced to satisfy the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged has been committed, the corpus delicti has been established. State v. Brassfield, 40 Idaho 203, 232 P. 1. Some of the facts tending to establish the corpus delicti in this case are that when defendant was first observed by the arresting officer, at approximately nine P.M. on the date it is alleged the offense was committed, he was in front of the C. C. Anderson store. A short time prior on the same date the defendant, who at that time was a guest at the Lewiston Hotel registered under an assumed name, handed the shirts and sweaters here involved to the hotel manager requesting that they be put in the hotel storeroom for him. Mr. Ken Cunnington as manager of the C. C. Anderson store at Lewiston testified that said shirts and sweaters came from the C. C. Anderson store of which he was the manager and that their combined value exceeded $60. He further testified that there is no record of said shirts, sweaters or nylon hose being sold on the day they were picked up by the officers. When appellant was arrested he was wearing trousers inside of which had been sewed an inner-leg which could be closed with an attached drawstring in which he had concealed a transistor radio positively identified as having been taken from a local business place on that date. Such evidence coupled with the unexplained possession of said articles by appellant is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. In State v. Brassfield, supra, this Court stated [40 Idaho 203, 232 P. at page 4]:

'It has been said, and we think correctly, that the presumption arising from the possession of the fruits of the crime shortly after its commission, which in all cases is one of fact rather than law, is occasionally so strong as to render unnecessary any direct proof of the corpus delicti.'

The evidence tending to prove the larceny was not in any respect contradicted. Appellant offered no explanation whatever regarding his possession of the property allegedly stolen. In State v. Sanford, 8 Idaho 187, 67 P. 492, this Court first announced that the possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance from which, when unexplained, the guilt of the accused may be inferred. This pronouncement of the law has been many times reaffirmed by this Court. See State v. Bogris, 26 Idaho 587, 144 P. 789; State v. Davis, 57 Idaho 413, 65 P.2d 1385. In State v. Gilbert, 65 Idaho 210, 142 P.2d 584, 588, this Court said:

'In the absence of satisfactory explanation by appellant as to the fact and circumstance of possession, this raised a presumption that he committed the larceny.'

In State v. Haynes, 64 Idaho 627, 135 P.2d 300, this Court said:

'* * * that possession of recently stolen property, unexplained, prima facie proves larceny.'

In State v. Hewitt, 73 Idaho 452, 254 P.2d 677, it is stated:

'Unless possession of recently stolen property is satisfactorily explained, there arises a presumption of guilt.'

Appellant assigns as error the ruling of the trial court admitting evidence of the larceny of an article not mentioned in the information. The uncontradicted evidence complained of established that the defendant, only a few minutes before he was arrested, staggered through the doorway of another business house known as Tollenaar's and fell into the display window. He appeared to be intoxicated and left the store after a brief stay. Shortly after his departure, it was discovered that a Royal 300 Zenith alltransistor radio, which had been in said display window, was missing. Said radio, positively identified, was found on the person of the defendant at...