State v. Eliasen

• Citation: 348 P.3d 157,158 Idaho 542
• Decision Date: 08 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 42486.,42486.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Desiree B. ELIASEN, Defendant–Appellant.

158 Idaho 542

348 P.3d 157

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Desiree B. ELIASEN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 42486.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2015 Term.

April 8, 2015.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 2015.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

This case comes to the Idaho Supreme Court from a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision. This case arose after a jury found Desiree Eliasen guilty of misdemeanor stalking. Following the jury's verdict, Eliasen moved the magistrate court for a judgment of acquittal, which the magistrate court denied. Eliasen subsequently appealed to the Bannock County district court, asserting the State failed to prove the misdemeanor stalking elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Eliasen argued the State failed to prove she engaged in "repeated acts" constituting a "course of conduct" under the statute. The district court upheld the jury's verdict and Eliasen appealed.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, and Eliasen then petitioned this Court for review. On review, Eliasen argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that she was guilty of misdemeanor stalking because she did not engage in separate instances of stalking. Instead, Eliasen asserts that her conduct was one continuous act and therefore insufficient to satisfy the "course of conduct" element under the misdemeanor stalking statute. We affirm the district court's decision upholding the jury's verdict.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2008, Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking under Idaho Code section 18–7906. The victim was a Pocatello police officer's wife. On Friday, September 26, 2008, the victim left her home with her three-year-old daughter to run errands, including dropping off a donation at the Pocatello Goodwill store and stopping at Fred Meyer. As the victim pulled out of her driveway, she noticed a brown Chevy Blazer stopped in the middle of the road, pointing east. The victim stopped in the driveway momentarily to wait for the Blazer to proceed down the street. When the Blazer did not move, the victim backed out of her driveway and headed west.

The victim then noticed that the Blazer made a U-turn and started to head west, back towards the victim's home. Once the victim realized that the Blazer went past her home without stopping, the victim stopped paying attention to the Blazer's location. The victim traveled several blocks and made four turns before reaching the Goodwill store. As the victim pulled into the Goodwill parking lot, she noticed the Blazer turn in behind her. The victim parked, exited the vehicle, and carried her donations to the door where a Goodwill employee took the donations from her. During this time, the Blazer parked in the Goodwill parking lot but no one exited the vehicle.

The victim got back into her vehicle and proceeded to exit the Goodwill parking lot, stopping at a traffic light. At that point, the victim became concerned because she noticed that the Blazer was directly behind her at the light. When the light changed, the victim turned and the Blazer followed her. Instead of proceeding to Fred Meyer as intended, the victim made a right hand turn and the Blazer followed. At this time the victim became frightened and attempted to call her husband. The first call was unsuccessful, but the victim successfully contacted her husband on the second try and they decided she should meet him at the police station. The victim also communicated the Blazer's license plate number to her husband, who discovered that the vehicle was registered to Eliasen. The victim made three more turns and the Blazer followed her through each turn. It was not until the victim turned in front of the police station that the Blazer ceased following her.

Eliasen was subsequently charged with second degree stalking. On December 12, 2008, Eliasen moved to dismiss, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the stalking charge because she only engaged in a single incident of following the victim that did not rise to a "course of conduct" as required under Idaho Code section 18–7906. The magistrate court denied the motion, concluding that the conduct in the police report could be interpreted as two separate events constituting a course of conduct. Eliasen filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which the magistrate court also denied.

The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 10, 2009. After the State rested its case, Eliasen moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the State's presentation of evidence. Eliasen argued that the State failed to establish multiple events to make a prima facie case for stalking. The magistrate court denied the motion, determining that a prima facie case had been made, and that the jury would need to decide whether there were multiple acts to constitute a course of conduct. The magistrate court noted: "I believe the definition of course of conduct that's underneath the [stalking] statute can be as little as two acts until the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals straightens me out on that view, that's the view of this Court."

The jury convicted Eliasen of second degree stalking and on April 28, 2008, the magistrate court imposed a jail sentence and a fine, suspended a portion of the jail time, and placed Eliasen on two years of probation.

Eliasen appealed to the district court. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to prove every element of stalking beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court framed the issue as an appeal of Eliasen's I.C.R. 29 motion for acquittal. On August 6, 2013, the district court concluded that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the guilty verdict. The district court reasoned that under the terms of the statute, a minimum of two prohibited contacts must occur for the conduct to be considered stalking. At issue then, was the factual question of whether there was more than one instance of contact in this case.

The district court concluded "that a change in the nature of the conduct that a defendant in a stalking case engages in creates a sufficient break in the events to demonstrate a course of conduct through repeated acts of nonconsensual contact with the victim." Based on that reasoning, the district court found that there were four instances of prohibited conduct: (1) appearing at the victim's residence; (2) following the victim to Goodwill; (3) conducting surveillance at Goodwill; and (4) following the victim nearly the entire way to the police station. Consequently, the district court concluded substantial and competent evidence supported the verdict and therefore affirmed Eliasen's conviction.

Eliasen appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that substantial and competent evidence supported the conclusion that Eliasen's actions constituted a course of conduct under the statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Eliasen's conduct constituted at least two instances of nonconsensual contact: (1) appearing at the victim's residence; and (2) conducting a U-turn and following the victim. Eliasen petitioned this Court for review.

II. ISSUE ON APPEAL

1. Whether substantial and competent evidence supports the jury's verdict.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a petition for review, this Court gives serious consideration to the Court of Appeals' views, but directly reviews the lower court's decision. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). When a defendant appeals a decision the district court made while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision. State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009).

Under I.C.R. 29, the district court may set aside a jury verdict and enter judgment of acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." That is because the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that due process, "no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense." State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5, 333 P.3d 112, 116 (2014). However, "[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope." Id.

The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) ) (emphasis in original).

Thus, "the only inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements" of the charged crimes "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. In other words, this Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for acquittal for substantial evidence. Goggin, 157 Idaho at 4, 333 P.3d at 115. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009). In conducting its analysis, "the Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State," but will not substitute its "judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or...