Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, Inc. v. Doe

• Decision Date: 28 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 62840.,62840.
• Citation: 349 P.3d 518,131 Nev. Adv. Op. 29
• Parties: CATHOLIC DIOCESE of GREEN BAY, Inc., Appellant, v. JOHN DOE 119, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

349 P.3d 518
131 Nev. Adv. Op. 29

CATHOLIC DIOCESE of GREEN BAY, Inc., Appellant
v.
JOHN DOE 119, Respondent.

No. 62840.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

May 28, 2015.
Rehearing Denied July 23, 2015.

349 P.3d 519

Mazzeo Law LLC and Peter A. Mazzeo, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Matthew L. Sharp, Reno; Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., and Michael G. Finnegan and Jeffrey R. Anderson, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

Here we consider whether Nevada courts have personal jurisdiction over a foreign Catholic diocese. The Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin, employed Father John Feeney as a priest. Feeney later served as a priest in California before coming to the Diocese of Reno–Las Vegas. It was alleged that, during Feeney's time in Las Vegas, Feeney sexually assaulted John Doe 119. Doe sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney, asserting that the Diocese is responsible for the injuries caused by the sexual abuse.

We conclude that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese of Green Bay in this case. The Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. The Catholic doctrine of incardination, whereby Feeney promised obedience to the Diocese of Green Bay, is insufficient to establish a legal employment or agency relationship between Feeney and the Diocese. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against the Diocese.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Doe filed this negligence suit against the Diocese of Green Bay in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Doe alleged that Feeney molested him in 1984, but that it was not until around 2008 that he discovered that his psychological injuries were the result of Feeney's acts of abuse. Doe alleged that Feeney was an agent of the Diocese of Green Bay at the time that he molested Doe in Las Vegas. Doe further alleged that, at the time of the abuse, the Diocese was aware that Feeney had molested other children in Wisconsin. He claimed that the Diocese negligently retained and supervised Feeney and failed to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children.

349 P.3d 520

After an evidentiary hearing held during the trial, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese. The district court found that Feeney served both the Reno–Las Vegas and the Green Bay Dioceses: While the Diocese of Reno–Las Vegas oversaw Feeney's daily activities, the court found that Feeney was originally incardinated in the Diocese of Green Bay and, therefore, had made a promise of obedience to the Diocese of Green Bay. The court further found that the Diocese of Green Bay had the ability to restrict Feeney's ministry, could recall him to Green Bay, and maintained his pension.

Besides any employment relationship, the district court also found that the Diocese of Green Bay had two other contacts with Nevada. It found that the Diocese of Green Bay gave Feeney a positive recommendation via a letter of good standing. And it further found that the Vicar–General of the Diocese of Green Bay spoke to the Bishop of Reno–Las Vegas about Feeney's placement.

After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Diocese of Green Bay appealed, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Diocese.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing a district court's exercise of jurisdiction, we review legal issues de novo but defer to the district court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Baker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 527, 531, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023 (2000) (stating standard of review for personal jurisdiction).

For a court to have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, is satisfied; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend due process. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 509, 512, 134 P.3d 710, 712 (2006) ; Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 693, 857 P.2d 740, 744 (1993). Because Nevada's long-arm statute is coterminous with the limits of constitutional due process, Arbella Mut. Ins., 122 Nev. at 512, 134 P.3d at 712 ; see NRS 14.065, these two requirements are the same.

The United States Supreme Court analyzes the constitutionality of an exercise of jurisdiction in two distinct ways: general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). With respect to general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court typically looks at a corporation's place of incorporation or its principal place of business in ascertaining whether jurisdiction exists. Id . at ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 760. The parties here do not dispute that the Diocese of Green Bay is incorporated in Wisconsin and that its principal place of business is also in Wisconsin. Doe does not present any argument that the Diocese is essentially at home in Nevada. See id. at ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 761. Therefore, general jurisdiction does not apply to this case.

A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state and an exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 754. This court follows a three-part test to determine whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction. First, the defendant must “purposefully avail[ ] himself of the privilege of serving the market in the forum or of enjoying the protection of the laws of the forum,” or the defendant must “purposefully establish [ ] contacts with the forum state and affirmatively direct[ ] conduct toward the forum state.” Arbella, 122 Nev. at 513, 134 P.3d at 712–13 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the cause of action must arise “from that purposeful contact with the forum or conduct targeting the forum.” Id. at 513, 134 P.3d at 713 (internal quotations omitted). Third, “a court must consider whether requiring the defendant to appear in the action would be reasonable” or, in the United States Supreme Court's terminology, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 512–13, 134 P.3d at 712–13.

349 P.3d 521

Our inquiry is focused on the first part of the test: Did the Diocese purposefully avail itself of Nevada law or otherwise establish contacts with or direct conduct toward Nevada? We conclude that it did not.

Purposeful availment

Purposeful availment occurs when one “purposefully directs her conduct towards Nevada.” Dogra v. Liles, ––– Nev. ––––, 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013). “Thus, ‘the mere unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.’ ” Id. (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ). Furthermore, “ ‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” World–Wide Volkswagen, 444...