Breimhorst v. Beckman

• Decision Date: 14 January 1949
• Docket Number: 34723 and 34727.
• Parties: BREIMHORST v. BECKMAN et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

35 N.W.2d 719

227 Minn. 409

BREIMHORST v. BECKMAN et al.

Nos. 34723 and 34727.

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 14, 1949

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1949. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The liability of the lessor to an employee of the lessee for injuries caused by a defective condition of the leased premises is determined by the same rules which would govern the lessor's liability to the lessee had the latter been injured under the same circumstances.

2. A lessor of land, who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to persons upon the land, is subject to liability for such harm caused thereby to the lessee and others on the land with the consent of the lessee or a sublessee after the lessee has taken possession if

(a) the lessee does not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and

(b) the lessor knows of the condition and realizes the risk involved therein and has reason to believe that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.

3. The liability of the lessor to the lessee under the above rule is not limited to those instances where the lessor has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises, but includes those instances where he has information which would lead an ordinarily reasonable man to suspect the danger exists.

4. The rule of liability of a landlord leasing premises in a dangerous condition amounting to a nuisance, which exists in favor of third persons or strangers, does not apply as between landlord and tenant and does not entitle the tenant, his servants, guests, or others entering under his title, to recover.

5. It is not primarily a question of whether the hazard is peculiar to the employment, but whether the employment is the predominant factor in peculiarly exposing the workman--in a different manner and in a greater degree than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal affairs--to a hazard which may or may not be peculiar to or exclusively associated with the employment, and which hazard, though part of the general working environment, may be in direct consequence of an injury-producing act or event produced wholly within or without the orbit of work done for the employer by the claimant or others.

6. To be an 'accident' within the meaning of M.S.A. s 176.01, subd. 9, the event causing the injury need only be 'unexpected or unforeseen' by the employe who sustains the injury.

7. The fact that an injury by accident is caused by an act which is criminal or illegal does not of itself prevent it from arising out of the employment.

8. The element of 'malicious intent' required on the part of an employer with respect to an assault on his employe, in order to give the injured employe the right or option of either suing for damages at common law or proceeding under the workmen's compensation act, is a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury, and such intent may not be inferred from mere negligence, though it be gross.

9. An employe who has sustained injuries from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, when only a part of such injuries materially affect his employability and are subject to the compensation act, may Not institute a commonlaw action against the employer for damages for the portion of the injuries which do not materially affect his employability, such as a permanent disfigurement.

10. The objective of the exercise of the policy power--which is as flexible and adaptable as the vital needs of our changing society--is the preservation of the public welfare, and the remedy adopted thereunder must be reasonably designed to accomplish its purpose without going beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion.

11. The employer-employe relation is affected with a vital public interest and may be regulated under the police power.

12. In the exercise of the police power, the vesting by the legislature in the industrial commission of quasi-judicial powers--inclusive of the power to determine facts and apply the law thereto in employment-accident controversies--is not in violation of state constitutional provisions for the division of the powers of government or for the vesting of the judicial power in the courts, as long as the commission's awards and determinations are not only subject to review by certiorari, but lack judicial finality in not being enforceable by execution or other process in the absence of a binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established court.

13. Minn. Const. art. 1, s 4, M.S.A., preserves unimpaired the right of jury trial as it existed by the laws of the territory at the time our state constitution was adopted, and such right is thereby neither extended nor limited.

14. Where new rights and remedies are created which were unknown at common law, the giving or withholding of a jury trial is a legislative privilege.

15. In substituting a new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy upon a cause of action for one for which there was originally at common law a remedy involving the right of trial by jury, the legislature may withhold the right of jury trial.

16. What constitutes an 'adequate remedy' is not determined by any inflexible rule found in the constitution, but is subject to variation and modification as the state of society changes.

17. The Minnesota compulsory workmen's compensation act provides a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe in his employment.

Appeal from District Court, Scott County; Joseph J. Moriarty, Judge.

Streissguth & Berens, of New Ulm, for appellant Harriet E. Breimhorst.

Gallagher Farrish & Sheran, of Mankato, for appellant John G. Andrist.

Moonan, Sturner, Heinen & Lindmeyer, of New Prague, for respondent William Beckman.

MATSON Justice.

In a common-law action for damages for disfigurement, we have an appeal by defendant John G. Andrist from an order denying his blended motion for judgment Non obstante or a new trial, and an appeal by plaintiff, Harriet E. Breimhorst, from an order denying her motion for a new trial as to defendant William Beckman.

At Jordan Minnesota, on the morning of December 15, 1946, plaintiff, a part-time waitress, in the course of her employment, was injured in a restaurant operated by defendant Andrist on premises rented by him from defendant Beckman. The restaurant occupied a rectangular room about 25 feet long from west to east and about 15 feet from north to south. A service bar about 18 feet long was located approximately in the middle of the room parallel to the north and south walls. Placed against the north wall and standing end to end were two cabinets or back bars. The shorter of these back bars was 7 feet long and extended from a point about 16 1/2 inches from the front or west wall of the restaurant. The larger or rear back bar was 9 feet 4 inches long by 19 1/2 inches wide, and its west end was separated from the first back bar by a distance of only 6 3/4 inches. Between the two back bars so placed against the north wall and the service counter or bar was a 25-inch aisle for use by waitresses and bartenders. The larger or rear back bar, with which we are here primarily concerned, served as a cabinet for the storage of linen and other supplies. It was divided vertically into four separate compartments equipped with sliding doors and divided horizontally into three shelves. The top inside shelf was located about 27 inches from the floor. The top of the bar itself was 34 1/4 inches above the floor. On the top inside shelf, behind the second sliding door from the east end, the daily supply of restaurant towels was stored. Plaintiff, in making preparations for the commencement of the day's business, went to this compartment for a towel. As she reached for the towel, she saw a white string lying on top of the towel bundle. In the belief that this string bound the towels together, she gave it a jerk and unwittingly tripped a burglar-alarm device--made in the form of a spring gun mounted inside the towel compartment--which discharged into her face a 12-gauge shotgun shell containing powder but no shot. The exploding shell burned her face, neck, upper chest, and arms and caused flecks of powder to be embedded in her skin and eyes. She was taken to the Shakopee hospital and given medical treatment. Her employer, defendant Andrist, and his employes were covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Although plaintiff never petitioned the industrial commission for an award of compensation, she did receive and accept disability, hospital, and medical benefits, and for these payments she regularly signed receipts, inclusive of a final receipt filed with the industrial commission. From the time of her injury on December 15, 1946, until about the middle of the following January, she was unable to perform her work. In February she again received surgical treatment. Aside from any handicap resulting from her disfigurement, plaintiff has fully recovered and is employable once more. On the theory that she has no remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the recovery of damages for permanent disfigurement, on the assumption that such disfigurement does not materially impair her employability, plaintiff brought this action at law for damages against her employer, Andrist, and also against Beckman as owner of the building. Plaintiff tendered repayment of the amount she had received as workmen's compensation benefits. The motion of Beckman, the landlord, for a directed verdict was granted. Andrist, the employer, asserting that plaintiff's sole...