Chavis v. Chavis

Citation35 S.E. 507,57 S.C. 173
PartiesCHAVIS v. CHAVIS et al.
Decision Date04 April 1900
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Orangeburg county.

Action by William Chavis against William J. Chavis and others for partition of plaintiff's dower interest in certain lands. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The cause was heard before Judge J. C. Klugh, who rendered the following decree:

"The plaintiff brings this suit for the partition of the lands, which he alleges that Sarah Chavis died seised in fee and possessed of, among himself, as the husband, and the defendants William J. and Luther M. Chavis, as the sons, of the said Sarah Chavis. The complaint, after setting forth the death of Sarah Chavis, her heirs, her seisin, and descent of the lands described in the complaint, together with the proportions in which the said parties are entitled, alleges that the defendants William J. and Luther M. Chavis have ousted the plaintiff from every part of said lands, and divided them between themselves, to the exclusion of the plaintiff from the enjoyment of any right therein, or any participation in the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and that Luther M. Chavis has conveyed the lands so taken by him to the defendants Maria E. Gardner and Joshua O. Ulmer, who are in possession of, and claim to be the exclusive owners of, the portions so held by them, respectively. The plaintiff prays an accounting of the rents and for partition. The defendants all deny the claims of the plaintiff to any interest in said lands, and set up the defense of equitable estoppel against him, and the defendants Gardner and Ulmer also allege that they are purchasers for value without notice. No testimony was offered in support of these affirmative defenses, and they may be therefore dismissed from further consideration. The cause was heard upon the pleadings, the testimony taken and reported by a referee, and argument of counsel.
It appears that Rachel Patterson, the mother of Sarah Chavis, conveyed to her said daughter the lands which are the subject of this litigation by a deed dated August 2 1864. This deed was recorded on July 10, 1869, by the register of mesne conveyance for Orangeburg county. The decision of this controversy depends upon the construction of the said deed. It is manifest, from an analysis of this deed that first of all a life estate by implication or construction of law is granted to Sarah Chavis. The language of the grantor is: 'I do grant, bargain, sell, and release unto my daughter, Sarah Chavis, three tracts of land.' At common law a conveyance to a grantee, without a limitation to his heirs, creates a life estate. 2 Minor Inst. (2d Ed.) 89. And this is the well-established doctrine in South Carolina. McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S.C 557, 29 S.E. 403, and cases cited. In the second place, the deed (in the 'condition') expressly bestows upon Sarah Chavis a life estate: 'I give the said tracts of land to my said daughter, Sarah Chavis, upon the following conditions: That my said daughter shall hold and enjoy said lands during her lifetime.' This is the exact quantum of the estate already bestowed upon her by the granting clause. The deed, in the third place (in the same 'condition'), gives to the children of Sarah Chavis an estate in the following language: 'And after her [Sarah's] death, to go to all her children.' This is also a life estate by implication, there being no word of inheritance to indicate an intention in the grantor to confer a greater estate. The language here used cannot be construed to create a fee conditional in Sarah Chavis. The words 'all her children' are co-extensive with the primary signification of the words 'heirs of her body,' and might be so construed if it were necessary to do so in order to effectuate the intention of the grantor. Archer v Ellison, 28 S.C. 242, 5 S.E. 713. But no such necessity exists, and such a construction is forbidden by the terms of the deed. The intention, as expressed by the language of the grantor, is that the children of Sarah Chavis shall take a life estate in succession to, and not in conjunction with her. The case falls within the third resolution in Wild's Case, 6 Coke, 17. Reeder v. Spearman, 6 Rich. Eq. 92. If the deed had stopped here, there would have been a reversion, by implication, after the termination of the two life estates, to the grantor or her heirs. But the deed goes on, after setting forth the condition prohibiting control of the husband and the further condition for the grantor's support, which last constitutes the valuable consideration for the deed, to confer upon the grantee the largest possible enjoyment of the estate so granted, as if the grant were of the fee, 'together with all and singular the rights, members, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said premises belonging or in any wise incident.' Then comes the habendum, 'to have and to hold all the premises heretofore mentioned unto the said Sarah Chavis, her heirs and assigns, forever,' completely sweeping away any idea of reversion in the grantor; and, as if to make the intention more certain and absolute, she binds herself and her heirs against all persons lawfully claiming or to claim the same or
any part thereof,--a warranty imperfectly expressed, but effectual to estop herself and her heirs from asserting any manner of claim to the premises. The effect of this habendum is to enlarge the estate conveyed by the granting clause in the premises into a fee simple, in accordance with the third principle deduced by the chief justice, and laid down in his dissenting opinion in the case of McLeod v. Tarrant, 39 S.C. 280, 17 S.E. 776, 20 L. R. A. 846, which is approved in the case of McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S.C. 558, 29 S.E. 403: 'Where there are no words of inheritance in the premises, in which case the grantee would take only a life estate by implication, then resort may be had to the terms of the habendum to ascertain the quantity of the estate intended to be conveyed, and those terms may, if sufficient, rebut such implication.' The deed then vests a fee-simple estate in Sarah Chavis. Apparently the grantor attempted, by way of a condition, to exclude the husband from any interest in the land by declaring that the daughter should enjoy said lands for her lifetime, and after her death they should go to all her children, and should be in no wise subject to the debts, contracts, or engagements of her present or any future husband; but she also had in mind the intention, and it was her uppermost thought,--the very purpose for which the deed was made,--to convey away from herself the fee simple, and to vest it in her daughter. This is manifest from the terms used, construing all parts of the deed together, and from the circumstances surrounding the parties,--a mother desirous to confer a benefit upon her daughter, and at the same time to make provision for being herself supported and cared for in her old age by that daughter. The attempt to exclude the husband, therefore, only resulted in creating a separate estate in the wife, over which the husband had no control during her lifetime. Franklin v. Creyon, Harp. Eq. 250. It did not limit the fee, nor prevent its descent according to the established rules of law.
The purpose expressed by the condition is secondary to the main intention of the grantor, which is to be gathered from the entire deed, and, so far as the condition is inconsistent with or repugnant to such intention, it must be disregarded. Moore v. Sanders, 15 S.C. 440. This is true, no matter in what portion of the deed the condition occurs. If the condition in this deed be transposed to its orderly place among the parts of the deed, after the habendum, it becomes apparent how irreconcilable it is with the main purpose of the grantor. Such transposition is permissible in searching for the intention of the grantor. McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 235. With such change, the deed reads as follows: 'I do grant,' etc., 'unto my daughter, Sarah Chavis, three tracts of land, *** together with all and singular the rights, members, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said premises belonging or in any wise incident; *** to have and to hold all the premises heretofore mentioned unto the said Sarah Chavis, her heirs and assigns, forever. I give the said tracts of land to my said daughter. Sarah Chavis, upon the following conditions: That my said daughter shall hold and enjoy said lands during her lifetime, and after her death to go to all her children; the same to be in no wise subject to the debts, contracts, or engagements of her present husband, or any husband she may hereafter marry,' etc.
With respect for the
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT