350 U.S. 551 (1956), 23, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City

Docket Nº:No. 23
Citation:350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692
Party Name:Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City
Case Date:April 09, 1956
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 551

350 U.S. 551 (1956)

76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692

Slochower

v.

Board of Higher Education of New York City

No. 23

United States Supreme Court

April 9, 1956

        Argued October 18-19, 1955

        APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

        Syllabus

        Section 903 of the New York City Charter provides that, whenever a city employee utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering before a legislative committee, a question relating to his official conduct, his employment shall terminate. A teacher in a college operated by the City was summarily discharged under this section, without notice or hearing, because, while testifying before a federal legislative committee, he refused to answer questions concerning his membership in the Communist Party in 1940 and 1941 on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. Under the New York Education Law, he was entitled to tenure, and could be discharged only for cause and after notice, hearing and appeal.

        Held: in the circumstances of this case, his summary dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 552-559.

        (a) The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. Pp. 556-558.

        (b) On the record in this case, it cannot be claimed that the Board's action in dismissing the teacher was part of a bona fide attempt to gain needed and relevant information regarding his qualifications for his position. Pp. 558-559.

        (c) Since no inference of guilt was possible from the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination before the federal committee, the discharge falls of its own weight as wholly without support. P. 559.

        (d) Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, and Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, distinguished. Pp. 555-556.

        (e) Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, followed. Pp. 556-558.

        306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373, 307 N.Y. 806, 121 N.E.2d 629, reversed and remanded.

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        CLARK, J., lead opinion

        MR. JUSTICE CLARK.

        This appeal brings into question the constitutionality of § 903 of the Charter of the City of New York. That section provides that whenever an employee of the City utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct,

his term or tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any agency.1

        Appellant Slochower invoked the privilege against self-incrimination

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under the Fifth Amendment before an investigating committee of the United States Senate, and was summarily discharged from his position as associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New York. He now claims that the charter provision, as applied to him, violates both the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

        On September 24, 1952, the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate held open hearings in New York City. The investigation, conducted on a national scale, related to subversive influences in the American educational system. At the beginning of the hearings, the Chairman stated that education was primarily a state and local function, and therefore the inquiry would be limited to "considerations affecting national security, which are directly within the purview and authority of the subcommittee." Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 1. Professor Slochower, when called to testify, stated that he was not a member of the Communist Party, and indicated complete willingness to answer all questions about his associations or political beliefs since 1941. But he refused to answer questions concerning his membership during 1940 and 1941 on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee accepted Slochower's claim as a valid assertion of an admitted constitutional right.

        It had been alleged that Slochower was a Communist in 1941 in the testimony of one Bernard Grebanier before the Rapp-Coudert Committee of the New York Legislature. See Report of the Subcommittee of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Procedures and Methods of

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Allocating State Moneys for Public School Purposes and Subversive Activities, Legislative Document (1942), [76 S.Ct. 639] No. 49, State of New York at 318. Slochower testified that he had appeared twice before the Rapp-Coudert Committee, and had subsequently testified before the Board of Faculty relating to this charge. He also testified that he had answered questions at these hearings relating to his Communist affiliations in 1940 and 1941.

        Shortly after testifying before the Internal Security Subcommittee, Slochower was notified that he was suspended from his position at the College; three days later, his position was declared vacant "pursuant to the provisions of Section 903 of the New York City charter." *

        Slochower had 27 years' experience as a college teacher, and was entitled to tenure under state law. McKinney's New York Laws, c. 16, Education Law, § 6206(2). Under this statute, appellant may be discharged only for cause, and after notice, hearing, and appeal. § 6206(10). The Court of Appeals of New York, however, has authoritatively interpreted § 903 to mean that "The assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is equivalent to a resignation." Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 377. Dismissal under this provision is therefore automatic, and there is no right to charges, notice, hearing, or opportunity to explain.

        The Supreme Court of New York, County of Kings, concluded that appellant's behavior fell within the scope of § 903, and upheld its application here. 202 Misc. 915, 118 N.Y.S.2d 487. The Appellate Division, 282 A.D. 718, 122 N.Y.S.2d 286, reported sub nom. Shlakman v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, and the Court of Appeals, reported

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sub nom. Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York, supra, each by a divided court, affirmed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 348 U.S. 935, because of the importance of the question presented.2

        Slochower argues that § 903 abridges a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States, since it, in effect, imposes a penalty on the exercise of a federally guaranteed right in a federal proceeding. It also violates due process, he argues, because the mere claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment does not provide a reasonable basis for the State to terminate his employment. Appellee insists that no question of "privileges or immunities" was raised or passed on below, and therefore directs its argument solely to the proposition that § 903 does not operate in an arbitrary or capricious manner. We do not decide whether a claim under the "privileges or immunities" clause was considered below, since we conclude the summary dismissal of appellant in the circumstances of this case violates due process of law.

       The problem of balancing the State's interest in the loyalty of those in its service with the traditional safeguards of individual rights is a continuing one. To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say that he [76 S.Ct. 640] must comply with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, upheld the New York Feinberg Law which authorized the public school authorities to

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dismiss employees who, after notice and hearing, were found to advocate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means, or who were unable to explain satisfactorily membership in certain organizations found to have that aim.3 Likewise, Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 720, upheld the right of the city to inquire of its employees as to "matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service," including their membership, past and present, in the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. There, it was held that the city had power to discharge employees who refused to file an affidavit disclosing such information to the school authorities.4

        But, in each of these cases, it was emphasized that the State must conform to the requirements of due process. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, we struck down a so-called "loyalty oath" because it based employability solely on the fact of membership in certain organizations. We pointed out that membership itself may be innocent, and held that the classification of innocent and guilty together was arbitrary.5 This case rests squarely on the proposition that

constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.

        344 U.S. at 192.

        Here, the Board, in support of its position, contends that only two possible inferences flow from appellant's claim

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of self-incrimination: (1) that the answering of the question would tend to prove him guilty of a crime in some way connected with his official conduct; or (2) that, in order to avoid answering the question, he falsely invoked the privilege by stating that the answer would tend to incriminate him,...

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