United States v. Echeles

• Decision Date: 01 December 1965
• Docket Number: No. 14774.,14774.
• Citation: 352 F.2d 892
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julius L. ECHELES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

352 F.2d 892 (1965)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julius L. ECHELES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14774.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

September 2, 1965.

Rehearing Denied December 1, 1965.

Rehearing Denied December 1, 1965.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Thomas P. Sullivan, John C. Tucker, Kenneth S. Broun, Chicago, Ill., Raymond, Mayer, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., of counsel for appellant.

Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., John Peter Lulinski, John Powers Crossby, Raymond F. Zvetina, Asst. U. S. Attys., for appellee.

Before CASTLE and KILEY, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, District Judge.

(En Banc).

GRANT, District Judge.

This is an appeal by Julius L. Echeles, a member of the bar of Illinois and of this Court, from a verdict and a judgment thereon finding him guilty of suborning perjury, impeding administration of justice and conspiracy in violation of Sections 1622, 1503 and 371, Title 18, of the United States Code.¹ The respective violations allegedly occurred during the trial of United States v. Isaac Hill and Broadway Arrington,² a narcotics case, in which appellant Echeles served as attorney for one of the defendants, Broadway Arrington. In this appeal, appellant asserts three general assignments of error and places principal reliance on the contention that the Government did not establish a prima facie case against him for the reason that there was no evidence introduced at the trial from which it could reasonably be inferred that appellant knew of the perjury, or knew the witnesses involved intended to commit perjury or had falsified the record, such knowledge constituting an essential ingredient of the offense charged. Our review of the record, however indicates that the evidence on this issue was of such substance to warrant its submission to the jury and that the inferences drawn therefrom by the jury cannot be said to be unreasonable. Yet, we do find error in the denial by the trial court of appellant's motion for separate trial to be of sufficient gravity to compel reversal of appellant's conviction and remandment to the court below for new trial on all the issues.

The facts most relevant to disposition of this case on the ground stated are as follows: Broadway Arrington was indicted with others for conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws, it being alleged that in late April, 1961, Arrington sold narcotics to Marvin Moses at Chicago, Illinois. Moses was the only government witness to the alleged sale. As already noted, Julius Echeles was counsel for defendant Arrington.

Broadway Arrington's defense was an alibi. He asserted that he was in Hot Springs, Arkansas, at the time of the alleged transaction with Moses; specifically, that he was a guest in Pat Carr's Motel in Hot Springs from April 6 to April 29, 1961.

Two witnesses, Pat Carr, the owner of the motel in Hot Springs, and Lucille Smith, a former clerk at the motel, testified, in support of Arrington's defense, that Arrington was in fact a guest at Carr's Motel from April 6 to 29, 1961. They identified a corroborating motel registration card as the one that had been prepared by Mrs. Smith in the regular course of business during Arrington's stay. Arrington took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had signed the motel registration card on April 6, 1961, and that he stayed at the motel until April 29. Both Carr and Arrington testified that they had an independent recollection that Arrington and a man named Holmes had been in Hot Springs at the end of March, 1961, at which time they signed a contract to purchase a parcel of realty from a man named Cain, and that Carr had acted as broker in the transaction. Carr testified that Arrington had returned to Hot Springs in April to make arrangements with regard to the property which Arrington and Holmes had contracted to buy.

Three days after Carr and Smith had testified in support of Arrington's alibi, they were recalled to testify as Government rebuttal witnesses. They confessed that their prior testimony relating to Arrington's stay at Carr's Motel in Hot Springs in April, 1961, was false, and that the registration card was spurious, it having been prepared at Arrington's home in Chicago on May 24, 1963, the day they testified on Arrington's behalf. The card was filled out by Mrs. Smith in the presence of Carr, Arrington and Arrington's daughter Barbara O'Neil, before Arrington took them to Echeles' office, where they reviewed their testimony before they went to court. When asked, "Who told you to identify that card there as being a record of your motel?", Carr answered, "The lawyer."

Arrington then took the stand again in surrebuttal. He admitted that the registration card was not authentic, that he had not signed it in April, 1961, as he had testified, and that it had been prepared at his home, as Carr and Smith testified. He persisted, however, in his testimony that he had been in Hot Springs from April 6 to 29, 1961. Arrington also testified at that time that Echeles had nothing to do with falsifying the motel record. The colloquy in this respect was as follows:

Question: Showing you Defendant\'s Exhibit 4, Defendant Arrington\'s Exhibit 4, did your lawyer, Mr. Echeles have anything to do with the preparation of that card?

Answer: No, sir, he didn\'t.

The day after giving the foregoing testimony, May 29, 1963, and before the case went to the jury, Arrington entered a plea of guilty. At the time he entered the plea, Arrington again stated that Echeles had nothing to do with the preparation of the false registration card or with the perjured testimony:

The Court: Mr. Arrington, the law gives you the right to speak in your own behalf. I give you the privilege of saying anything you would like to say.

* * * * * *

Defendant Arrington: I have never been in prison before and I am ashamed. I would appreciate if you would do the best you can for me. I want to say one other thing, Judge, Mr. Carr didn\'t tell the truth on Mr. Echeles when he testified from the stand. Mr. Echeles didn\'t tell him to say anything. He asked him a few questions, how long he had been in Hot Springs, things like that. That didn\'t tell him no testimony in this trial. That\'s all I have to say.

Thereafter, on June 27, 1963, upon his plea of guilty Arrington was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. At the time of his sentencing, Arrington made the following statements in open court:

The Court: And you — I want to test your intelligence here. When you took the witness stand in the case where you were tried and in which you pleaded guilty after the trial had progressed, you took the witness stand and said that you — you admitted that the testimony you had given in respect to your Hot Springs visit was not true, didn\'t you?

Defendant Arrington: Yes, but I mean about the card —

The Court: And you said then that Mr. Echeles did not tell you to do that, isn\'t that right?

Defendant Arrington: He didn\'t tell the clients what to do.

The Court: He didn\'t tell you what to do about that, did he? You said that from the witness stand and you said it right at the same lectern at which you stand now, isn\'t that right?

Defendant Arrington: Yes, sir.

The Court: That is right, isn\'t it?

Defendant Arrington: Yes, sir.

The Government submitted this matter to the September, 1963 federal grand jury in Chicago. The grand jury eventually returned an indictment against Echeles, Arrington and Mrs. O'Neil in five counts. Count One involved Arrington only. It charged a violation of Title 18, Section 1621, in that Arrington committed perjury on May 27, 1963, during his narcotics trial, by testifying that on April 6, 1961, he signed a registration card of Carr's Motel, Hot Springs, Arkansas, and that he had not signed the card on or about May 24, 1963.

Count Two charged that on or about May 24, 1963, Julius L. Echeles and Broadway Arrington knowingly procured Pat Carr to testify falsely at the Arrington trial that (a) Arrington was in Hot Springs from April 6, 1961, to April 29, 1961, to purchase some property from Pat Carr; (b) on April 6, 1961, Arrington signed a registration card of Carr's Motel; (c) the registration card had been in the care and control of Carr's Motel from April 6, 1961, until produced on the trial in the Arrington narcotics case; and (d) the card was an authentic record of the motel — all in violation of Title 18, Section 1622 of the United States Code.

Count Three charged that on or about May 24, 1963, Echeles and Arrington knowingly procured Lucille Smith to give the same false testimony at the Arrington narcotics trial as specified in Count Two, with the exception of (a). Such also constituted a violation of Title 18, Section 1622.

Count Four, charging a violation of Title 18, Section 1503, alleged that on or about May 24, 1963, Echeles and Arrington knowingly endeavored to induce Pat Carr and Lucille Smith to testify falsely at the Arrington trial.

Count Five charged that from on or about May 13, 1963, to on or about May 29, 1963, Echeles, Arrington and Barbara O'Neil knowingly conspired to commit the crimes alleged in Counts Two, Three and Four.

The only overt act charged to have been committed by Echeles was a conversation on or about May 24, 1963, among Echeles, Arrington, O'Neil, Carr and Smith (in Echeles' office), at Chicago, Illinois. Such act was alleged to have constituted a violation of Section 371 of Title 18, prohibiting conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States.

All three defendants named in the indictment thereafter entered pleas of not guilty. Then, on November 15, 1963, appellant individually filed a motion for separate trial, basing said motion on three grounds: (1) that he, Echeles, would be prejudiced by the admission in evidence of statements of co-defendant Arrington which may constitute admissions under Count One of the indictment; (2) that a joint trial would deprive him of his right to call his co-defendants as...