Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad Co

Decision Date25 February 1957
Docket NumberNo. 42,42
Citation77 S.Ct. 451,352 U.S. 512,1 L.Ed.2d 503
PartiesJohn W. WEBB, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Robert J. Rafferty, Chicago, Ill., for the petitioner.

Mr. Herbert J. Deany, Chicago, Ill., for the respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,1 in which certiorari was granted to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in reversing a judgment for damages awarded to the petitioner in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.2 The ground for the reversal was that the evidence was insufficient to allow a jury determination of the respondent's alleged negligence, so that respondent's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.3

The petitioner, working as a brakeman on July 12, 1952, injured his kneecap in a fall on a cinder roadbed at a point some 15 feet from a house track switch at Mount Olive, Illinois. He was alongside a track connecting to the switch and slipped on an unnoticed and partially covered cinder 'about the size of (his) fist' embedded in the level but soft roadbed.

It is conceded that the clinker in the roadbed created a hazardous condition giving rise to respondent's liability under the Act if the proofs raised a jury question of respondent's alleged negligence in causing or permitting the clinker to be there. The Court of Appeals viewed the evidence as insufficient to raise a jury question because the petitioner did not adduce proofs showing what standard procedures were followed to prevent large clinkers from being used in road ballast and in inspecting roadbeds for hazards to firm footing. We do not think that the petitioner's evidence was lacking in such proofs even if we assume, and we question, that he had that burden. On the contrary, we think there were probative facts in the evidence to justify with reason a jury finding of the negligence alleged.

'(I)n passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to sup- port the case of a litigant against whom a peremptory instruction has been given.'4 We think the jury could have found from the proofs that, 3 weeks before the mishap, respondent elevated the house switch and the connecting tracks some 5 inches, using 15 cubic yards of cinder and chat ballast. Petitioner testified without objection, based on his knowledge and experience gleaned from 27 years of railroading, that the railroad's custom and practice was to take precautions to prevent the presence of large clinkers in a railroad bed, both because 'it doesn't give good footing; and it cannot be tamped in under the ties for support.' Moreover, the respondent's evidence supplied additional facts. The section foreman in charge of the repair work testified that he did not screen the ballast for large clinkers but merely visually inspected the ballast as it was shoveled by four laborers onto 'the pushcart' before being taken to the site. His testimony was that the largest cinder he saw would be 'say two inches in diameter. * * * Of course, I have no way of knowing exactly, but about.' In this posture of the proofs, there is ample evidence for a jury to determine whether the procedure followed satisfied the standard to be expected from a prudent man in light of the hazard to be prevented.

We also think that a jury question was presented by the evidence bearing on the adequacy of respondent's roadbed inspection practices used to discover hazards to firm footing. As the jury might find that the clinker was in the ballast used in the repair work, so also the jury might find, from the fact that it was in the roadbed for three weeks, that inspection was not properly made. There was evidence from which it could have been found that the clinker was not discovered either by the foreman in semiweekly inspections of the location, made in part to discover and remove hazards to workmen, or by a track inspector and a track supervisor making less frequent inspections. It was for the jury to weigh the evidence and to decide whether or not the inspections satisfied respondent's duty to provide the petitioner with a safe place to work.

The Court of Appeals said: 'That defendant placed the clinker in its roadbed as a part of the ballast used in the repair operation is merely one of several possibilities present. A finding that it did so can rest on nothing but speculation.'5 In this connection the Court of Appeals mentioned two other possible sources of the clinker. One was the L. & N....

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