Barral v. State
Decision Date | 23 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 64135.,64135. |
Citation | 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 52,353 P.3d 1197 |
Parties | Dustin James BARRAL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Las Vegas Defense Group, LLC, and Michael L. Becker and Michael V. Castillo, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Michelle Y. Jobe, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
BEFORE PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.
In this opinion, we address whether a district court commits structural error when it fails to administer an oath to the jury panel, pursuant to NRS 16.030(5), prior to commencing voir dire. We hold that it does.
Dustin Barral was charged with sexually assaulting a child. His case proceeded to a jury trial. At the beginning of voir dire, both the prosecution and defense explained to the potential jurors the importance of answering their questions honestly. After questioning the first potential juror, the following bench conference took place:
The court then proceeded with voir dire. The district court clerk swore in the petit jury at the beginning of the second day of trial. After both parties rested and presented closing arguments, the jury deliberated for approximately three hours and returned guilty verdicts on both charges. Following a post-trial motion for acquittal that the court denied, Barral appealed.
Barral claims that the district court committed structural error requiring reversal when it failed to comply with NRS 16.030(5)1 and administer the oath to the jury venire before voir dire. He argues that the court's error compromised his right to trial by an impartial jury because potential jurors may not have felt obligated to respond truthfully during voir dire, as the court did not place them under oath. The State contends that the potential jurors understood that they were required to answer truthfully because the court and counsel for both sides repeatedly stressed to the venire the importance of answering their questions honestly. The State also argues that the court's error did not undermine the framework of the trial.
Whether the district court's actions in this case constituted structural error is a question of law that we review de novo. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ( ; see also NRCP 61 ().
NRS 16.030(5) does not give the district courts discretion; “the judge or the judge's clerk shall administer an oath or affirmation.” Id. (emphasis added); see also NRS 0.025(1)(d) ( ). Thus, we conclude that the district court violated NRS 16.030(5) in the instant case when, according to its apparent general preference, it failed to administer the oath to the venire. Neither party disputes that the district court erred by violating NRS 16.030(5). However, a district court's error will not always entitle a convicted defendant to a new trial. The type of relief, if any, to which a criminal defendant is entitled following a trial court's violation of NRS 16.030(5) is an issue of first impression for this court.
Structural error
Structural errors compromise “the framework of a trial.” Brass v. State, ––– Nev. ––––, ––––, 291 P.3d 145, 148 (2012). Such errors mandate routine reversal because they are “ ‘intrinsically harmful.’ ” Id. (quoting Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1024, 195 P.3d 315, 322 (2008) ). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that trial court errors which violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury are structural errors that create the probability of prejudice and preclude the need for showing actual prejudice to warrant relief. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972) ( ); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) ( ); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467–73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) ( ); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 133–34, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) ( ); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531, 535, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) ( ). In Peters, the Court reasoned that due process demands not only the absence of bias but the appearance of bias as well:
These principles [that fairness requires not only the absence of actual bias but also preventing even a possibility of bias] compel the conclusion that a State cannot, consistent with due process, subject a defendant to ... trial by a jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process. They create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases, and they increase the risk of actual bias as well.
407 U.S. at 502–03, 92 S.Ct. 2163.
The Peters Court considered whether the arbitrary exclusion of African Americans from the grand jury invalidated the indictment and subsequent conviction of a Caucasian criminal defendant. Id. at 496–97, 92 S.Ct. 2163. Peters claimed that (1) the juries that indicted and convicted him were created through constitutional and statutorily prohibited means, (2) the consequence of this error on a single prosecution is indeterminable, and (3) any indictment or conviction returned by a jury selected in violation of the Constitution or federal law must be...
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