Williams v. United States

Citation353 F. Supp. 1226
Decision Date07 February 1973
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 70-2496.
PartiesEdwina Arnold WILLIAMS, Individually as Administrator of the Estates of Her Minor Children, et al. v. UNITED STATES of America.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen B. Murray, Murray & Alford, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Gerald J. Gallinghouse, U. S. Atty., John R. Schupp, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for defendant and third-party plaintiff, the United States.

Emile C. Rolfs, III, Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants and third-party defendants, Louis A. Heyd, Jr., and Interstate Fire and Casualty Co.

HEEBE, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff originally filed this action on September 3, 1970, as a suit against the United States under the Tort Claims Act. On April 18, 1972, the United States joined Sheriff Louis A. Heyd, Jr., several of his deputies, his insuror, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, and Sheriff Buster Kern of Harris County, Texas, as third-party defendants. On August 31, 1972, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition making Sheriff Heyd, Interstate Fire and Casualty and Sheriff Kern defendants in the original cause. It is now agreed that the actions against Sheriff Kern should be dismissed, since he is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court. Jurisdiction against Sheriff Heyd and his insuror is asserted under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This cause is now before the Court on motions of defendants Heyd and Interstate Fire and Casualty to dismiss the third-party complaint and the amended complaint.

FACTS

Plaintiff's decedent, Calvin Williams, was arrested on January 16, 1970, and incarcerated in the Harris County Rehabilitation Center, a Texas institution which houses federal prisoners pursuant to contract. At that time, according to the deposition of George C. Ransom, then Assistant Director of the Rehabilitation Center, Williams was acting in an unusual manner. When his picture was to be taken, he attempted to run from the camera. He refused to provide basic information, such as his address, to his jailors, and once "jumped down on his hands and started doing pushups on his hand." Relying on his impressions of these actions, coupled with the recommendation of the arresting FBI agents that the prisoner was dangerous, Assistant Director Ransom decided to place Williams in solitary confinement.

Ransom states that Williams was removed from his padded "isolation" cell only for the purpose of allowing the cell to be cleaned. This was necessary because Williams would repeatedly remove his clothes, urinate and defecate in the cell, and then spread his waste on the floor and walls.

On Monday, January 19, Deputy U.S. Marshal John Laetsch, who had been informed that he would transport Williams to New Orleans, visited the Rehabilitation Center on other business. He looked into Williams' cell. The prisoner was covered with human waste, was uncommunicative, and because he went limp, had to be carried to the shower. Once in the shower, he stood up and bathed himself.

Later that same day, a hearing was held in front of the prisoner's cell, with the cell door open. Present were Williams, Laetsch, Ransom, United States Commissioner Ralph Fowler, and according to Laetsch, an assistant United States attorney, a special agent of the FBI and a sergeant of the Harris County Sheriff's Department. Williams was completely naked in his cell. At the hearing, Williams was advised of his rights and, Laetsch believes, bond was set. The only communication by the prisoner was to acknowledge that he was Calvin Williams.

During the next few days, the prisoner conducted at least a partial hunger strike and was, it appears, checked in his cell once or twice daily by a doctor or male nurse.

On January 22, another hearing was held in the Rehabilitation Center for the purpose of identifying the prisoner. Williams' mother, father and sister identified him in the presence of the United States Commissioner. At that time Williams was rational, visited with his family, and took some soup.

On January 24, Deputy Marshals Laetsch and J. W. Walker picked the prisoner up at the Rehabilitation Center in order to transport him to New Orleans. Both Deputy Marshals agree that Williams seemed extremely weak, both at this time and during the automobile trip to New Orleans. En route, in fact, Laetsch says that he contacted Deputy Marshal Sedgebeer of New Orleans by telephone and informed him that a doctor should be provided for Williams upon his arrival.

On arrival at the Orleans Parish Prison Annex at approximately 2:30 p. m. of the 24th, a sergeant and a deputy sheriff helped carry Williams into the Annex. At this time, Deputy Marshal Laetsch, according to his deposition, told the sergeant that the prisoner was in a weakened condition, that a doctor had been examining him at the Harris County jail, and that, in Laetsch's opinion, the Parish Prison authorities should have a doctor examine Williams. The sergeant allegedly agreed to provide a doctor for this purpose.

Approximately one and one half hours later, at about 4:00 p. m. of the 24th, Calvin Williams died in his cell. At that time he had a wound on his forehead which both deputy marshals agree did not exist when he was put into the cell. It is alleged that Williams' death was caused by subdural hematoma and/or emaciation. According to plaintiff, the deputy United States marshals and the officials of the Parish Prison Annex were negligent in failing to provide obviously indicated medical treatment.

MOTION TO DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

The United States third-partied Sheriff Heyd, his deputies and his insuror on the grounds that the sheriff contracted with the United States to confine and care for federal prisoners in the Orleans Parish Prison. On the other hand, third-party defendants contend that Sheriff Heyd signed the contract only on behalf of Orleans Parish, not in his personal capacity. Therefore, they reason, neither the sheriff, his deputies nor his insuror are parties to the contract, and so have no obligation under it.

The Court does not find it necessary to decide this contract question. It should be noted, however, that the Fifth Circuit has held that the United States cannot be held liable under the Tort Claims Act for the negligent acts or omissions of employees of non-federal prisons which contract to care for federal prisoners. Logue v. United States, 459 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 93 S.Ct. 908, 34 L.Ed.2d 685 (1973). Thus, the contract alone does not create a third-party right against the sheriff and his deputies since they could not be secondarily liable to the United States.

Nevertheless, in this case there is ample reason to allow the third-party complaint to stand. Whenever the governing substantive law recognizes a right of contribution, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the use of impleader to seek relief from joint tortfeasors. 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1448 (1971). In Louisiana joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. LSA-C.C. art. 2103; Rouley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 235 F.Supp. 786 (W.D.La.1964). The complaint in this case alleges that the negligence of both the federal deputies and the prison personnel contributed to Williams' death. That is sufficient to make the prison officials possible joint tortfeasors, and hence contributors under Louisiana law. LSA-C.C. art. 2324; see, Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App.1942). The sheriff also contends that since no negligent act is alleged against him personally, but only against his deputies, he has no liability in this case and therefore cannot be a possible contributor. The Court disagrees with this point for the reasons discussed at length below.

MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
a) Prescription

The amended complaint making Sheriff Heyd and his insuror principal defendants was filed more than one year after Calvin Williams' death. It is undisputed that the Louisiana one-year prescriptive period for tort actions is applicable to this § 1983 action. Knowles v. Carson, 419 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff urges, however, that the Louisiana tolling rule, as well as the barebones prescriptive time period, should apply.

In Louisiana, a suit against one person tolls prescription against all persons solidarily obligated with him, even if they are not named in the original complaint. LSA-C.C. art. 2097. Obligors are liable in solido "when they are all obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor." LSA-C.C. art. 2091. Joint tortfeasors, as well as their liability insurors, are considered solidary obligors since each is liable to the plaintiff for damages. LSA-C.C. art. 2324; Shaw v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., 252 La. 653, 212 So.2d 416 (1968); Saxon v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 224 So.2d 560 (La. App.1969). It does not matter that the liabilities of the respective obligors arise by different reasons of law. LSA-C.C. arts. 2091, 2093; Saxon v. Fireman's Ins. Co., supra. A sheriff's liability is limited by Louisiana statute to the amount of his deputy's bond. LSA-R.S. § 33:1433 as amended by Act 722 of 1972. Since this limitation does not affect the sheriff's status as a solidary obligor however, it does not vary our determination of the present motions. Melancon v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 209 F. Supp. 68 (W.D.La.1962); George Moroy Cigar & Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Henriques, et al., 184 So. 403 (La.App.1938).1 As noted above, the sheriff, his deputies and his insurors are all prospective contributors in this case. Thus, if the Louisiana tolling provision applies, the original suit against the United States has interrupted prescription against the defendants named...

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