State of California v. Taylor

Citation77 S.Ct. 1037,1 L.Ed.2d 1034,353 U.S. 553
Decision Date03 June 1957
Docket NumberNo. 385,385
PartiesSTATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. Harry TAYLOR, Peter A. Calus, James W. Brewster, et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr Herbert E. Wenig, Asst. Atty. Gen. of California, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Mr. Burke Williamson, Chicago, Ill., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented here is whether the Railway Labor Act of May 20, 1926, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., applies to the State Belt Railroad, a common carrier owned and operated by the State of California and engaged in interstate commerce. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does.

The operations of the State Belt Railroad have been described by this Court in Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 41, 75 L.Ed. 143; United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567; and State of California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 59 S.Ct. 166, 83 L.Ed. 159. It parallels the San Francisco waterfront, serves wharves and industrial plants, and connects with car ferries, steamship docks and three interstate railroads. It is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and files tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission.

For over 65 years, the Belt Railroad has been owned by the State of California. It is operated by the Board of State Harbor Commissioners for San Francisco Harbor, composed of three Commissioners appointed by the Gover- nor. Its employees number from 125 to 255 and are appointed in accordance with the civil service laws of the State. These laws prescribe procedures for hirings, promotions, layoffs and dismissals, and authorize the State Personnel Board to fix rates of pay and overtime.1

On September 1, 1942, the Board of State Harbor Commissioners entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as the representatives of the Belt Railroad's operating employees. This agreement established procedures for promotions, layoffs and dismissals. It also fixed rates of pay and overtime. Those procedures and rates differed from their counterparts under the state civil service laws.

The collective-bargaining agreement conformed to the Railway Labor Act and was observed by the parties at least until January 1948. At that time, a successor Harbor Board instituted litigation in the state courts of California in which it contended that the Railway Labor Act had no application to the Belt Railroad, and that the wages and working conditions of the Railroad's employees were governed by the State's civil service laws rather than by the agreement. This contention was rejected by a local trial court and by the California District Court of Appeal. State of California v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Cal.App., 222 P.2d 27. It was, however, accepted by the Supreme Court of California, with one justice dissenting, 37 Cal.2d 412, 422, 232 P.2d 857, 864, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 876, 72 S.Ct. 166, 96 L.Ed. 658.

Shortly thereafter, five employees of the Belt Railroad instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the ten members of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, and its executive secretary. The employees alleged that they had filed with the First Division, pursuant to § 3, First (i), of the Railway Labor Act, claims relating to their classifications, extra pay and seniority rights under the agreement. They charged that the five carrier members of the Division had refused to consider these claims on the ground that the Board was without jurisdiction, because, under the above decision of the Supreme Court of California, the Belt Railroad was not subject to the Railway Labor Act. The employees alleged that this refusal created an impasse in the ten-member Division and they sought a court order requiring action on their claims. The United States, answering on behalf of the First Division and its executive secretary, supported the complaint and prayer for relief. The carrier members, answering through their own attorneys, opposed the complaint, as did the present petitioner, the State of California, which intervened as a party defendant.

The District Court granted California's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. 132 F.Supp. 356. The Court of Appeals reversed. 233 F.2d 251. It held that the Railway Labor Act applied to the Belt Railroad, and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to enter a decree granting the relief sought. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the United States Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court as to the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to a railroad owned and operated by a State. 352 U.S. 940, 77 S.Ct. 261, 1 L.Ed. 236.2 We invited the Solicitor General to file a brief as amicus curiae and, in doing so, he urged that the Railway Labor Act was applicable to the State Belt Railroad.

The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, evolved from legislative experimentation beginning in 1888.3 The evolution of this railroad labor code was marked by a continuing attempt to bring about self-adjustment of disputes between rail carriers and their employees To this end, specialized machinery of mediation and arbitration was established. The 1926 Act—unique in that it had been agreed upon by the majority of the railroads and their employees4—incorporated practically every device previously used in settling disputes between carriers and their employees. These included (1) conferences between the parties; (2) appeal to a Board of Adjustment; (3) recourse to the permanent Board of Mediation; (4) submission of the controversy to a temporary Board of Arbitration; and (5) the establishment of an Emergency Board of Investigation appointed by the President.

Dissatisfaction with the operation of this legislation led to its 1934 amendments. 48 Stat. 1185.5 One of the most significant changes was the creation of the National Railroad Adjustment Board composed of equal numbers of carrier representatives and representatives of unions national in scope. The Board was divided into four divisions, each with jurisdiction over particular crafts or classes and their disputes. § 3. This arrangement made available a National Board to settle disputes in case the carrier and its employees could not agree upon a system, group or regional board. The National Board was given jurisdiction over 'minor disputes,' meaning those involving the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreements in a particular set of facts. Either party to such a dispute could bring the other before the Board in what was, in fact, compulsory arbitration. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622. Provisions were made for the enforcement of a Board order against a carrier in a United States District Court. § 3, First (p).

Section 2, Fourth, of the 1934 amendments insured to railroad employees the right to organize their own unions and the right of a majority of any craft or class of employees to select the representative of that craft or class. Section 2, Ninth, authorized the newly created National Mediation Board to hold representation elections and to certify the representative with which the carrier must deal. Section 2, Fourth, provided that the employees shall have the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. On numerous occasions, this Court has recognized that the Railway Labor Act protects and promotes collective bargaining. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548—549, 553, 57 S.Ct. 592, 599 600, 602, 81 L.Ed. 789; Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 300, 302, 64 S.Ct. 95, 97, 88 L.Ed. 61; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346—347, 64 S.Ct. 582, 585, 88 L.Ed. 788; Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202, 65 S.Ct. 226, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173; Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233, 235, 76 S.Ct. 714, 718, 719, 100 L.Ed. 1112.6

If the Railway Labor Act applies to the Belt Railroad, then the carrier's employees can invoke its machinery established for adjustment of labor controversies, and the National Railway Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over respondents' claims. Moreover, the Act's policy of protecting collective bargaining comes into conflict with the rule of California law that state employees have no right to bargain collectively with the State concerning terms and conditions of employment which are fixed by the State's civil service laws. 7 This state civil service relationship is the antithesis of that established by collectively bargained contracts throughout the railroad industry. '(E)ffective collective bargaining has been generally conceded to include the right of the representatives of the unit to be consulted and to bargain about the exceptional as well as the routine rates, rules, and working conditions.' Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, 321 U.S. at page 347, 64 S.Ct. at page 585. If the Federal Act applies to the Belt Railroad, then the policy of the State must give way.8

'* * * a State may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect. Thus, in Hill v. State of Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 89 L.Ed. 1782, the State enjoined a labor union from functioning until it had complied with certain statutory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on the ground that the Wagner Act included a 'federally established right to collective bargaining' with which the injunction conflicted.' Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474, 75 S.Ct. 480, 484, 99 L.Ed. 546.

Under the Railway Labor Act, not...

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