Stevenson v. State

Citation131 Nev. Adv. Op. 61,354 P.3d 1277
Decision Date13 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 62965.,62965.
PartiesJoseph Jamil STEVENSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Nevada

Casey A. Landis, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before SAITTA, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION1

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

NRS 176.165 allows a defendant who has pleaded guilty, but not been sentenced, to petition the district court to withdraw his plea. When this court first examined NRS 176.165, we held that a court may grant such motions for any substantial reason that is “fair and just.” See State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Bernardelli), 85 Nev. 381, 385, 455 P.2d 923, 926 (1969). Many years later, we significantly narrowed that holding, stating that the only relevant question when determining whether a defendant presented a fair and just reason sufficient to permit withdrawal of his plea is whether the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Crawford v. State, 117 Nev. 718, 721–22, 30 P.3d 1123, 1125–26 (2001). In this appeal, we consider whether Crawford's exclusive focus on the validity of the plea is supported by NRS 176.165. We hold that it is not. We also hold that appellant failed to present a fair and just reason favoring withdrawal of his plea and therefore affirm his judgment of conviction.

I.

Appellant Joseph Stevenson was charged with numerous offenses relating to his sexual attacks of three women between 2007 and 2009. The evidence against him appeared to be strong, consisting of identifications by the women and a DNA match. The cases were consolidated, and Stevenson chose to represent himself. As trial approached, he attempted to obtain a surveillance video of the Cheetahs gentlemen's club parking lot where one of the women was sexually assaulted. When it became clear that the State had lost the video, Stevenson moved to dismiss the charges. The district court denied his motion on March 9, 2011. On November 9, shortly before trial was set to begin, Stevenson informed the district court that Cheetahs still had the actual machine that the club had used to record surveillance footage: According to Stevenson, the manager had unplugged the machine when the video had been requested, but it required a password that she did not know and therefore she could not retrieve the recording. Stevenson argued that the video should exist on the machine's hard drive and he would not be ready for trial until he saw it. The parties decided that a computer technician would attempt to “break into” the machine and access the video overnight. The next day, without any explanation, Stevenson pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sexual assault.

On February 21, 2012, before sentencing, Stevenson moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that he had been misled about the existence of the video. According to Stevenson, he had only pleaded guilty because his court-appointed standby counsel told him that the video could not be viewed unless the machine was sent back to the company that made it, which would take several months and could erase the video. But after he pleaded guilty, Stevenson allegedly learned that the video could be extracted in mere days and there was no risk of damaging it in the process. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding this claim where Stevenson's investigator, the computer technician, and Cheetahs' manager testified. After their testimony, the district court denied Stevenson's motion pursuant to Crawford, 117 Nev. at 721–22, 30 P.3d at 1125–26, finding that his plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

II.

Stevenson argues that Crawford's exclusive focus on whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent lacks foundation in NRS 176.165. He points out that, before Crawford, this court had interpreted NRS 176.165 to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing for any “fair and just” reason, which included reasons beyond just whether the plea was validly entered. See Bernardelli, 85 Nev. at 385, 455 P.2d at 926 (“The granting of the motion to withdraw one's plea before sentencing is proper where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137, 141, 848 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1993) (holding that the appellant presented a fair and just reason to withdraw her plea where she had a credible claim of innocence, the State would not be prejudiced, and only a minor amount of money was involved).

A.

In order to resolve Stevenson's contention, it is necessary to understand how this court's interpretation of NRS 176.165 has evolved over time. In relevant part, NRS 176.165 provides that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may petition the court to withdraw his plea “before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended.” Although the statute makes clear that a defendant can move to withdraw his plea, it says nothing about the circumstances in which his motion should be granted. This court first outlined these circumstances shortly after NRS 176.165 was enacted. In Bernardelli, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his plea. 85 Nev. at 385, 455 P.2d at 926. Because the statute was silent regarding the issue, we looked to federal courts for guidance, recognizing that NRS 176.165 was modeled after an almost identical federal rule, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d).2 Id. Relying on Gearhart v. United States, 272 F.2d 499 (D.C.Cir.1959), we held that a district court may grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing “where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems ‘fair and just.’ Bernardelli, 85 Nev. at 385, 455 P.2d at 926.3

In cases subsequent to Bernardelli, we did not explain what constituted a fair and just reason sufficient to permit withdrawal of a plea. Instead, we acted on a case-by-case basis and considered the totality of the circumstances to determine whether allowing withdrawal would be fair to the defendant and the State. But we were not always careful to explain the test we were applying, see Jezierski v. State, 107 Nev. 395, 396, 812 P.2d 355, 356 (1991) (reversing based upon “public policy” considerations); Mitchell, 109 Nev. at 141, 848 P.2d at 1062 (reversing without mentioning the “fair and just” language), and a discussion of whether the plea was validly entered began to creep into our analysis, Mitchell, 109 Nev. at 140, 848 P.2d at 1061 (explaining that the defendant bore the burden of demonstrating that her plea “was not entered knowingly and intelligently” (quoting Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 721 P.2d 364 (1986) )). This confusion came to a head in Crawford, when, for the first time, we focused the “fair and just” analysis solely upon whether the plea was valid, holding that [t]o determine whether the defendant advanced a substantial, fair, and just reason to withdraw a plea, the district court must ... determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” 117 Nev. at 721–22, 30 P.3d at 1125–26. Since Crawford, we have repeatedly observed that the only relevant question when considering whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea before sentencing is whether the plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. In applying this standard, we have refused to permit withdrawal of pleas that were valid even if the defendant presented an otherwise fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea.

B.

We now turn to the question of whether the withdrawal standard announced in Crawford is supported by NRS 176.165. [Q]uestions of statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law, which this court reviews de novo.” City of Reno v. Reno Gazette–Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003). “When Nevada legislation is patterned after a federal statute or the law of another state, it is understood that the courts of the adopting state usually follow the construction placed on the statute in the jurisdiction of its inception.” Advanced Sports Info., Inc. v. Novotnak, 114 Nev. 336, 340, 956 P.2d 806, 809 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As we observed in Bernardelli, NRS 176.165 was modeled after Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d). Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea ‘if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’ Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) ); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir.1969) (“In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice.”). What constituted a fair and just reason was unsettled, and a conflict eventually emerged between courts who held that withdrawal should be permitted in almost every circumstance and courts who held that the defendant must first present a plausible ground for withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d) advisory committee's note (1983).4 But under either view, withdrawal was permitted for reasons other than merely whether a plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See, e.g., Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963) (Rule 32(d) imposes no limitation upon the withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence is imposed, and such leave should be freely allowed” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C.Cir.1971) (“For example, a judge may but need not allow presentence withdrawal when the defendant establishes that there are circumstances which might lead a jury to refuse to convict...

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