Priester v. Lowndes County

• Decision Date: 07 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-60750.,02-60750.
• Citation: 354 F.3d 414
• Parties: Eve PRIESTER, Individually and as next friend of Her Son Terry L. Priester, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOWNDES COUNTY; et al., Defendants, Lowndes County School District; Sammy Townsend, in his capacity as the Superintendent of Education, Lowndes County School District; New Hope High School; Mike Halford, in his individual and representative capacity as principal, New Hope High School; Rick Cahalane; in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Dale Hardin, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Kent Farris, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Danny Browning; Lundy Brantly, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

354 F.3d 414

Eve PRIESTER, Individually and as next friend of Her Son Terry L. Priester, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOWNDES COUNTY; et al., Defendants, Lowndes County School District; Sammy Townsend, in his capacity as the Superintendent of Education, Lowndes County School District; New Hope High School; Mike Halford, in his individual and representative capacity as principal, New Hope High School; Rick Cahalane; in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Dale Hardin, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Kent Farris, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Danny Browning; Lundy Brantly, in his individual and representative capacity as coach at New Hope High School; Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-60750.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 7, 2004.

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Alvin O. Chambliss, Jr. (argued), Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert Mims (argued), Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Oxford, MS, Vardaman Kimball Smith, III (argued), Bryan, Nelson, Randolph & Weathers, Hattiesburg, MS, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART and PRADO Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

This civil rights appeal stems from a racially motivated attack, during a high school football practice, resulting in a serious eye injury. Eve Priester, individually and as next friend of her son, Terry Priester, brought this action against the Lowndes County School District, the New Hope High School Columbus, Mississippi, the school district superintendent, and the high school's principal and football coaches, in their individual and representative capacities, alleging that the defendant's acts and omissions amounted to a conspiracy between the assailant and coaches to deprive the appellant of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state tort laws. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion upon a finding of an absence of state action. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts are as follows. On September 14, 1999, Terry,¹ an African-American tenth-grade student at New Hope High School, sustained a serious eye injury during football practice allegedly caused by a white teammate Eli Ward ("Ward"). Leading up to the injury, Ward slapped Terry on the back of the head and derided him in the locker room and during warm-up drills on matters such as his weight and race. On previous occasions, the head football coach Rick Cahalane ("Cahalane") subjected Terry to numerous racial epithets and derogatory comments concerning his weight.² After hearing such comments from Cahalane, Ward used the same derogatory terms toward Terry. The day of the injury, Ward also approached Terry and, without provocation, hit him on the helmet with a rock. Terry was also hit in a similar manner by another fellow player. Cahalane allegedly heard the statements and witnessed the assaults, but he did nothing to protect Terry or take the necessary actions that could stop or prevent the recurrence of the incident. Terry's mother witnessed these events and immediately informed the high school principal, who said he would handle the problem in the morning.

In the midst of a full-contact drill during football practice, the injury occurred subsequent to Terry's successful block of Ward. In response, Cahalane walked over to Ward to "get on to him" about the previous play. While Cahalane and Ward talked, Ward apparently looked at Terry throughout the conversation. Immediately following the conversation, Ward told Terry that he "had something for him." On the next play from scrimmage, Terry alleges that Ward lunged toward him, thrust his hands through his helmet, and gouged his eye. Terry's injury resulted in permanent damage including a torn right lower eyelid, a laceration to his lower punctum and caniliculus (tear duct), chronic tearing, and blurry vision. The school's response was two-fold. First, upon interviewing the coaches and players, New Hope High School principal Mike Halford compiled a report of the incident. In the report, however, no one admitted seeing anyone hit Terry. Second, the school declined to pay Terry's medical bills.

On January 8th, 2001, Eve Priester, individually and as the next friend of her son Terry Priester, pursuant to section 1983, filed suit in federal district court against Lowndes County School District, Sammy Townsend, in his capacity as the Superintendent of Education of the Lowndes County School District, New Hope High School, Mike Halford, in his individual and representative capacity as principal, New Hope High School, Rick Cahalane, Dale Hardin, Kent Farris, Danny Browning, and Lundy Brantly in their individual and representative capacities as coaches at New Hope High School (collectively, "school officials").³ Priester alleged an agreement between Ward and the coaches to deprive her son of his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.⁴ Additionally, she alleged state-law claims of negligence and intentional torts resulting in emotional distress and physical injury.

On February 2, 2001, Priester amended her complaint to include Ward as a defendant, alleging that Ward, motivated by racial animus, subjected Priester to physical and verbal assaults. Ward moved for a Rule 56 summary judgment to dismiss the claim. On August 15, 2001, Ward was dismissed as a defendant by order of the district court because he was not a state actor under Section 1983 and the one-year statute of limitations tolled on September 14, 2000, for the applicable Mississippi tort.

The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that Priester failed to allege any state action to support her section 1983 claim. The district court granted the defendants' motion finding no requisite fair attribution or special relationship between the school and Priester, and thus, an absence of state action to support a section 1983 claim. The district court dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice. Priester timely filed a notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's conclusion, under Rule 12(b)(6), that a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted de novo. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.1999). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is "viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997). The complaint is liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor, and all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true. Id. The determining issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Jones, 188 F.3d at 324. Therefore, this court will not dismiss a plaintiff's claim, "unless the plaintiff will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in his complaint." Id.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir.2000)(internal quotations and citations omitted). Doubts are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, and any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party. See Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

The issues raised on appeal are whether the district court: (1) erred in dismissing Ward based on his state law one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts; (2) erred in granting the school officials' summary judgment motion under section 1983 based on a finding of no state action; and (3) abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. We will address each issue in turn.

I. Dismissal of Ward Pursuant to State Statute of Limitations

On appeal, Priester contends that the district court erred in dismissing the former defendant Ward under the one-year statute of limitations for an intentional tort, rather than a theory of negligence. Specifically, Priester argues that the three-year statute of limitations should apply, instead of a one-year statute of limitations, because of both the civil rights nature of this case and the policy of not allowing states to circumvent section 1983 by adopting shorter statute of limitations standards. A close scrutiny of the record, however, reveals that Priester has misconstrued the district court's opinion dismissing the claims stemming from Ward's actions. The district court dismissed Ward as a defendant on two theories; the intentional tort claims were dismissed pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, while the section 1983 claims were dismissed for lack of state action.

A. Intentional Tort Claims

We find that the district court correctly construed Priester's amended complaint as...