NLRB v. Inglewood Park Cemetery Association

• Decision Date: 14 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 19741.,19741.
• Citation: 355 F.2d 448
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INGLEWOOD PARK CEMETERY ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

355 F.2d 448 (1966)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INGLEWOOD PARK CEMETERY ASSOCIATION, Respondent.

No. 19741.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

January 14, 1966.

Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Melvin J. Welles, Richard S. Rodin, Attorneys, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Richard W. Lund, John S. Welch, Robert B. Wessling, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Before POPE, DUNIWAY, and ELY, Circuit Judges.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

The National Labor Relations Board petitions, under section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), for a decree enforcing its order issued against respondent, Inglewood Park Cemetery Association. Respondent urges that we deny the petition on the ground that the Board lacked jurisdiction for the issuance of its order.

The Board concluded that the respondent violated section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the NLRA,¹ by interrogating and threatening its employees with regard to their protected activities, by discharging three employees because of their activities in behalf of the union, and by discharging a fourth employee because of his close association with the union organizers. The Board's order requires respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from, in any other manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their protected activities, and affirmatively requires respondent to reinstate the discharged employees immediately to their former or substantially equivalent positions, to make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of respondent's discriminatory conduct, to preserve and make available records relevant to the computation of backpay due, and to post appropriate notices.

In our court, respondent does not challenge the conclusions and order of the Board as they pertain to unfair labor practices; hence, our consideration is confined to the Board's conclusion that respondent's business affects interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it would effectuate the policies of the Act for it to assert jurisdiction.

Respondent is a California corporation engaged in the operation of a cemetery located in Inglewood, California. From a period beginning July 1, 1962, and ending June 30, 1963, during which the four employees were discharged, the respondent received in excess of $500,000 from the sale to the public of services, burial lots, crypt spaces, and related items. During the fiscal year period, respondent purchased $3,086.31 worth of goods from sources outside the State of California.

"The Congress shall have Power * * To regulate Commerce * * * among the several States * * * and To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, * * *." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The Board derives its existence, power, and direction from national labor legislation enacted by Congress under the authority of article I, section eight of the Constitution. Section 10(a) of the NLRA provides that "The Board is empowered, * * *, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice * * * affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). "Commerce" is defined as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, * * *" (29 U.S.C. § 152(6)) and "affecting commerce" is defined as "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce" (29 U.S.C. § 152 (7)).

The respondent contends that its activities are essentially local, that the doctrine of de minimis is applicable as to its interstate purchases, and, thus, that its operations do not "affect commerce".

It has been established that it is within the province of Congress to regulate essentially local activity if such activity affects commerce among the several states. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). It is also established that "Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause." N. L. R. B. v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226, 83 S.Ct. 312, 313, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963). (Emphasis in original.) And with regard to the exercising by the Board of its jurisdiction the Supreme Court has stated:

"The Act establishes a framework within which the Board is to determine `whether proscribed practices would in particular situations adversely affect commerce when judged by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress. Whether or no practices may be deemed by Congress to affect interstate commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board. Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce.\' Polish Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S., 643 at 648 64 S.Ct. 1196, at 1199, 88 L.Ed. 1509. See also National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S., 601 at 607-608 59 S.Ct. 668, at 672, 83 L.Ed. 1014." N. L. R. B. v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. at 226, 83 S.Ct. at 313.

We cannot ignore the fact that business concerned with death is "big" business,² and the Board has determined that in the interlacings of business across state lines the particular operation involved can and may affect interstate...