Lambert v. People of the State of California
| Citation | 355 U.S. 225,2 L.Ed.2d 228,78 S.Ct. 240 |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 47,47 |
| Parties | Virginia LAMBERT, Appellant, v. The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 355 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct. 410.
Mr. Samuel C. McMorris, Los Angeles, Cal., for the appellant.
Mr. Warren M. Christopher, Los Angeles, Cal., as amicus curiae.
Messrs. Philip E. Grey, Los Angeles, Cal., and Clarence, A. Linn, San Francisco, for the appellee.
Section 52.38(a) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code defines 'convicted person' as follows:
'Any person who, subsequent to January 1, 1921, has been or hereafter is convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in the State of California, or who has been or who is hereafter convicted of any offense in any place other than the State of California, which offense, if committed in the State of California, would have been punishable as a felony.'
Section 52.39 provides that it shall be unlawful for 'any convicted person' to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without registering; it requires any person having a place of abode outside the city to register if he comes into the city on five occasions or more during a 30-day period; and it prescribes the information to be furnished the Chief of Police on registering.
Section 52.43(b) makes the failure to register a continuing offense, each day's failure constituting a separate offense.
Appellant, arrested on suspicion of another offense, was charged with a violation of this registration law.* The evidence showed that she had been at the time of her arrest a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years. Within that period she had been convicted in Los Angeles of the crime of forgery, an offense which California punishes as a felony. Though convicted of a crime punishable as a felony, she had not at the time of her arrest registered under the Municipal Code. At the trial, appel- lant asserted that § 52.39 of the Code denies her due process of law and other rights under the Federal Constitution, unnecessary to enumerate. The trial court denied this objection. The case was tried to a jury which found appellant guilty. The court fined her $250 and placed her on probation for three years. Appellant, renewing her constitutional objection, moved for arrest of judgment and a new trial. This motion was denied. On appeal the constitutionality of the Code was again challenged. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment, holding there was no merit to the claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2). We noted probable jurisdiction, 352 U.S. 914, 77 S.Ct. 218, 1 L.Ed.2d 121, and designated amicus curiae to appear in support of appellant. The case having been argued and reargued, we now hold that the registration provisions of the Code as sought to be applied here violate the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The registration provision, carrying criminal penalties, applies if a person has been convicted 'of an offense punishable as a felony in the State of California' or, in case he has been convicted in another State, if the offense 'would have been punishable as a felony' had it been committee in California. No element of willfulness is by terms included in the ordinance nor read into it by the California court as a condition necessary for a conviction.
We must assume that appellant had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register under this ordinance, as she offered proof of this defense which was refused. The question is whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.
We do not go with Blackstone in saying that 'a vicious will' is necessary to constitute a crime, 4 Bl.Comm. *21, for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient. There is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578, 31 S.Ct. 612, 617, 55 L.Ed. 582. But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive—mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed. Cf. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284, 64 S.Ct. 134, 138, 88 L.Ed. 48. The rule that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse' (Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minnesota, supra, 218 U.S. at page 68, 30 S.Ct. at page 666) is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the powers of local government, the police power is 'one of the least limitable.' District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149, 29 S.Ct. 560, 563, 53 L.Ed. 941. On the other hand, due process places some limits on its exercise. Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act. Recent cases ullustrating the point are Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 76 S.Ct. 724, 100 L.Ed. 1021; Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178. These cases involved only property interests in civil litigation. But the principle is equally appropriate where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for condemnation in a criminal case.
Registration laws are common and their range is wide. Cf. People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989; United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754. Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the present ordinance is entirely different. Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover, circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking. At most the ordinance is but a law enforcement technique designed for the...
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