Lunde v. Ruigh, 83-1091
| Decision Date | 17 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1091,83-1091 |
| Citation | 356 N.W.2d 566 |
| Parties | Paul D. LUNDE, Plaintiff, v. Judge Dale E. RUIGH and The Iowa District Court for Story County, Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Paul D. Lunde, Ames, pro se.
Mary Richards, County Atty., for defendants.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, SCHULTZ, and CARTER, JJ.
This is an original certiorari action brought in this court to challenge the amount of attorney fees awarded to a court-appointed attorney in a contempt proceeding.
The plaintiff, Paul D. Lunde, is an attorney who represented Jerry D. Skinner in a contempt proceeding in the Iowa District Court for Story County growing out of a domestic relations child support decree. Such representation by attorney Lunde (hereafter plaintiff) was pursuant to court appointment following a finding of indigency on the part of Jerry D. Skinner and a "predictive evaluation" by the district court that a jail term might result. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982).
The contempt proceeding in the district court produced a finding that plaintiff's client, Jerry D. Skinner, was in contempt for failure to pay court-ordered child support and a jail sentence was imposed as punishment. Upon record entry of that judgment, plaintiff filed on behalf of Skinner an original certiorari action in this court seeking to establish illegality in the district court's findings and order for punishment in the contempt proceeding. In that action, plaintiff also asked on behalf of Skinner an order appointing counsel to represent him in this court. We granted the petition for certiorari and appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender to represent Skinner in prosecuting the original certiorari action. Our decision on the merits of that certiorari action upheld the finding of contempt which had been made by the district court and upheld the jail sentence which had been imposed on Skinner. See Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1984).
The present original certiorari action seeks review of the order of district judge Dale E. Ruigh (hereafter defendant or defendant judge) allowing fees and related expenses to plaintiff for (a) his representation of Skinner in the district court contempt proceedings, and (b) his preparation and filing of Skinner's petition for writ of certiorari in this court. We consider these issues in inverse order.
As has been noted, although plaintiff prepared the petition for writ of certiorari to this court in the Skinner v. Ruigh matter, all subsequent representation of Skinner in that matter was handled by the appellate defender's staff. Plaintiff's claim for fees in the certiorari action is therefore limited to the work expended in preparing and filing the petition and the necessary out-of-pocket expenses incident thereto.
In passing on this claim, the defendant judge did not doubt plaintiff's entitlement to fees for these services under the holding of McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982), but believed that an order for payment of such fees could only be made under direction of this court. Accordingly, the defendant judge awarded plaintiff no fees or expenses for the work undertaken on the petition for writ of certiorari.
The mechanics of appointing and compensating counsel for indigent persons who face imprisonment for contempt of court was established in our McNabb decision. The district court is to make such appointments based on a finding of indigency and a "predictive evaluation" that there is a likelihood of imprisonment. Id. at 14. The district court is to fix and order the compensation for such court-appointed counsel using the guidelines of Iowa Code section 815.7. Id. at 17.
In McNabb, we appointed, albeit retroactively, the counsel who represented the contemner in the certiorari action. Such procedure was rendered necessary in that case due to its seminal nature in the creation of a right to counsel for indigent contemners who face imprisonment. We deem it more appropriate as a general rule, however, that all appointments of counsel, even for proceedings in this court, be made by the district court. This is consistent with the provisions of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(1) which applies to criminal appeals. If the district court fails or refuses to appoint counsel when requested to do so, application for appointment of counsel may then be made to this court.
It would be unduly harsh to deny plaintiff reasonable compensation for time and expense incurred in preparing the petition for certiorari in the present case simply because he applied to the wrong court for appointment. We therefore sustain the writ only for purposes of directing the district court to make a determination of such fees and expenses following issuance of procedendo in this action.
Plaintiff's application for fees and expenses for services performed in representing Skinner in the district court under court appointment sought compensation for 30 hours and 8 minutes of attorney time and $85.76 in out-of-pocket expenses. The amount of compensation requested for the attorney time was $1808. The district court allowed the claimed out-of-pocket expenses to be reimbursed in full but awarded only $990 for attorney time.
The nature of the services rendered by plaintiff in the district court, as shown by his application for fees, can be categorized as follows:
Research and drafting 21 hrs. 50 mins
Review of court file 2 hrs. 5 mins
Conferences with client 3 hrs. 3 mins.
Conferences with opposing
counsel 10 mins.
Courtroom proceedings 3 hrs. 0 mins.
-----------------
30 hrs. 8 mins.
In fixing the amount of plaintiff's compensation, the defendant judge purported to consider all of the factors we deemed pertinent in Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981). In justification of the reduction which was made in the amount claimed by plaintiff, the defendant judge stated:
The court has no doubt, whatsoever, that Mr. Lunde actually spent this amount of time.... The necessity of spending that much time, however, is of some concern to the court. More than two-thirds of Mr. Lunde's time was consumed by research and drafting.... Some of those issues are novel and have yet to be resolved by an appellate court. Others have been determined previously by well-known precedents. The court cannot question the zealous manner in which Mr. Lunde has represented his client. It can, however, question the reasonable necessity of spending as much time as he did in legal research and drafting.... He had to spend some amount of time to familiarize himself with the relevant legal principles in this area, but the time actually spent in this endeavor may not have all been strictly necessary. Mr. Lunde shows over three hours devoted to conferences with [his client]. Most of the conferences were by telephone. Many of them occurred during a time period after the ... hearing when the necessity of conferences would have been questionable.
In Walters v. Herrick, 351 N.W.2d 794, 796-98 (Iowa 1984), we observed that there are two types of challenges to trial court orders determining compensation for court-appointed counsel; (1) those asserting that an incorrect legal standard has been applied in fixing fees; and (2) those asserting an abuse of discretion in the application of the proper legal standard. We pointed out in Walters that:
Our scope of review depends on what part of the challenge is...
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Duffy v. Circuit Court, Seventh Jud. Cir., 22837.
...a writ of certiorari an appropriate means to bring the issue before a higher tribunal have limited the scope of review. Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 1984); Bye, 701 P.2d at 60 (Colo.1985). The Iowa Supreme Court limits review to whether the lower court used the correct legal st......
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Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk County
...1985), it applies to fees incurred in district court proceedings, as well as fees incurred in the appellate courts, see Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Iowa 1984). See generally State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Muscatine County, 594 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Iowa 1999) (holding counsel a......
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Green v. Iowa Dist. Court for Mills County, 86-594
...is not necessary for a court to specify how many hours it deems reasonably necessary in carrying out the representation. Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Iowa 1984). The district court must look at the whole picture and, using independent judgment with the benefit of hindsight, decide o......
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Coonrad v. Van Metre, 83-1419
...district court who applies the Hulse standard has broad discretion in setting the amount of the fee. Id. at 709. See also Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1984); Walters v. Herrick, 351 N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1984). Judges may call upon their own knowledge and experience as to value of legal ......