State v. Kinch

• Decision Date: 14 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 42787.,42787.
• Citation: 159 Idaho 96,356 P.3d 389
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Scott Andrew KINCH, Defendant–Appellant.

159 Idaho 96

356 P.3d 389

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Scott Andrew KINCH, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 42787.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 14, 2015.

Michael Jacques of Jacques Law Office, P.C., Caldwell, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Chief Judge.

Scott Andrew Kinch appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Kinch asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress in which he argued that his traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

An officer stopped Kinch's vehicle after observing that the vehicle did not have license plates. Although a temporary registration permit was taped in the top left corner of the vehicle's back window, the officer could not read the permit because it was bent, somewhat crumpled, and obscured by a layer of condensation on the window in the area where it was taped. After approaching the vehicle, the officer still could not read the permit due to the condensation and the bend in the paper. The officer informed Kinch that she stopped him because she was unable to read the temporary permit. After obtaining Kinch's license and the temporary registration permit, the officer asked Kinch if he had anything illegal in the vehicle. Kinch admitted that he had a pipe in his stocking cap on the passenger seat. The officer seized the pipe and cited Kinch for possession of drug paraphernalia. Subsequent testing on a white powder residue in the pipe confirmed the presence of methamphetamine. Kinch was then additionally charged with possession of a controlled substance and a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator of the law.

Kinch filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer's inability to read the temporary registration permit did not provide reasonable suspicion to perform the traffic stop. After a hearing at which only the officer testified, the district court denied Kinch's motion to suppress. It held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Kinch because the temporary registration permit was not readily legible, as required by statute. Kinch filed a motion to reconsider based on new evidence—the video of the traffic stop. The district court denied Kinch's motion after a hearing, finding that the video supported its prior ruling. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kinch pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37–2732(c)(1), and preserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. In exchange, the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge and sentencing enhancement. The district court sentenced Kinch to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of one and one-half years. Kinch appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

III.ANALYSIS

Kinch argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress on two bases. First, he asserts that the district court's findings of fact were not supported by substantial and competent evidence based on Kinch's interpretation of the condition of the temporary registration permit as shown in the video of the traffic stop. Second, he contends that the district court erred in its interpretation of I.C. § 49–432(4), which governs the placement of temporary registration permits. Thus, he claims that his traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and, therefore, violated his rights under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions.¹

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979) ; State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694–95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628–29 (1981) ; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct.App.1988).

A. Findings of Fact

When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual findings unless the defendant shows that they are clearly erroneous. State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128, 233 P.3d 52, 59 (2010) ; State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 560, 112 P.3d 845, 848 (Ct.App.2005). Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009) ; State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct.App.2003). As noted above, we will not substitute our view for that of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d at 997 ; Schevers, 132 Idaho at 789, 979 P.2d at 662.

Kinch contends that the district court erred in crediting the officer's testimony and finding that the temporary permit was "bent, crumpled, unreadable" and obscured by a "fogged over" window. Instead, Kinch argues that the video clearly shows a "flat, crisp, paper document that is not crumpled." The low-resolution video of the traffic stop fails to settle whether the temporary permit was displayed as Kinch now contends or as the officer testified and the district court found. However, the video tended to support the officer's testimony that she could not readily view the information on the temporary permit even after approaching the vehicle due to the condition of the permit and condensation on the window where the permit was placed. The video showed that the bottom right corner of the permit was bent.² Additionally, the officer stated to Kinch that the permit was unreadable and, after removing it from the window, specifically pointed out to Kinch and illuminated with her flashlight the opaque condensation blocking view of the permit. This, combined with the officer's consistent testimony at the suppression hearing, provided substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that the temporary permit was not readily legible as displayed. Accordingly, we will not disturb these factual findings on appeal.

B. Statutory Interpretation

Kinch next contends that the district court erred in interpreting I.C. § 49–432(4)³ and, specifically, the term "readily legible" as used in the statute. This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999) ; State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation.

Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67.⁴

Kinch contends that his temporary permit was not required to be readily legible from the vantage point of a police vehicle or any vehicle on the road. Instead, he claims the permit needed only to be readily legible "upon a closer inspection." Kinch provides no support for this reading of the statute aside from a reference to I.C. § 49–443(1), which governs the size and nature of license plates so that they may be visible during daylight hours from a distance of 75 feet.⁵ This difference in purpose, along with the nighttime circumstances present here, make this statute irrelevant to Kinch's case.

Similarly, in his reply brief, Kinch argues that I.C. § 49–429⁶ addresses an analogous issue of the placement of applications for specialty license plates, so the lack of certain language in that statute—specifically, any requirement that the application be legible or even readable—should impact the interpretation of I.C. § 49–432(4) at issue here. See State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) (holding that where a statute addressing one subject contains a certain provision, the omission of that provision from a similar statute addressing a related subject is significant to show that a different intent existed). Kinch's comparison...