356 U.S. 634 (1958), 21, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural
|Docket Nº:||No. 21|
|Citation:||356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030|
|Party Name:||International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural|
|Case Date:||May 26, 1958|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell
Argued December 11-12, 1957
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
In 1952, respondent, a nonunion employee in an industry affecting interstate commerce, brought a common law tort action in a state court against a labor union and its agent to recover compensatory and punitive damages for malicious interference with his lawful occupation, alleging that, by mass picketing and threats of violence during a strike, they prevented him from entering the plant where he was employed and from engaging in his employment for over a month. It is assumed that such action also constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, for which the National Labor Relations Board could have awarded respondent back pay under §10(c).
Held: the Act did not give the Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter as to preclude the state court from entertaining the action and awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Pp. 635-646.
(a) The union's activity in this case clearly was not protected by federal law. P. 640.
(b) Congress has not deprived a victim of the kind of tortious conduct here involved of his common law rights of action for all damages suffered. United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656. Pp. 640-642.
(c) That, under § 10(c) of the Federal Act, the Board had limited power to award back pay to respondent does not create such a conflict as to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to award common law damages for lost pay. Pp. 642-645.
(d) To hold that the limited power of the Board under § 10(c) to award back pay in its discretion excludes the power of the State to enforce the employee's common law rights of action would, in effect, grant to unions a substantial immunity from the consequences of mass picketing or coercion such as was employed here. Pp. 645-646.
(e) An employee's right to recover in the state courts all damages caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly be said to be preempted without a clearer declaration of congressional policy than is found here. P. 646.
(f) The power to award punitive damages is within the jurisdiction of the state courts, but not within that of the Board. P. 646.
BURTON, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether a state court, in 1952, had jurisdiction to entertain an action by an employee, who worked in an industry affecting interstate commerce, against a union and its agent, for malicious interference with such employee's lawful occupation. In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657, [78 S.Ct. 934] we held that Congress had not
given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice
under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, or the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.1 For the reasons hereafter stated, we uphold the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case as we did in the Laburnum case.
This action was instituted in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama, in 1952, by Paul S. Russell,
the respondent, against the petitioners, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, an unincorporated labor organization, here called the union, and its agent, Volk, together with other parties not now in the case. Russell was a maintenance electrician employed by Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division) in Decatur, Alabama at $1.75 an hour and earned approximately $100 a week. The union was the bargaining agent for certain employees of that Division, but Russell was not a member of the union. nor had he applied for such membership.
The allegations of his amended complaint may be summarized as follows: the union, on behalf of the employees it represented, called a strike to commence July 18, 1951. To prevent Russell and other hourly paid employees from entering the plant during the strike, and to thus make the strike effective, petitioners maintained a picket line from July 18 to September 24, 1951. This line was located along and in the public street which was the only means of ingress and egress to the plant. The line consisted of persons standing along the street or walking in a compact circle across the entire traveled portion of the street. Such pickets, on July 18, by force of numbers, threats of bodily harm to Russell and of damage to his property, prevented him from reaching the plant gates. At least one striker took hold of Russell's automobile. Some of the pickets stood or walked in front of his automobile in such a manner as to block the street and make it impossible for him, and others similarly situated, to enter the plant. The amended complaint also contained a second count to the same general effect, but alleging that petitioners unlawfully conspired with other persons to do the acts above described.
The amended complaint further alleged that petitioners willfully and maliciously caused Russell to lose time from
his work from July 18 to August 22, 1951, and to lose the earnings which he would have received had he and others not been prevented from going to and from the plant. Russell, accordingly, claimed compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and for his mental anguish, plus punitive damages, in the total sum of $50,000.
Petitioners filed a plea to the jurisdiction. They claimed that the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of the controversy to the exclusion of the state court. The trial court overruled Russell's demurrer to the plea. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court and upheld the jurisdiction of that court, even though the amended complaint charged a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act.2 258 Ala. 615, 64 So.2d 384.
[78 S.Ct. 935] On remand, petitioners' plea to the jurisdiction was again filed but this time Russell's demurrer to it was sustained. The case went to trial before a jury, and resulted in a general verdict and a judgment for Russell in the amount of $10,000, including punitive damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. It also affirmed the judgment for Russell on the merits, holding that Russell had proved the tort of wrongful interference with a lawful occupation. 264 Ala. 456, 88 So.2d 175. Because of the importance of the jurisdictional issue, we granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 915.
There was much conflict in the testimony as to what took place in connection with the picketing, but those conflicts were resolved by the jury in favor of Russell.3 Accepting a view of the evidence most favorable to him, the jury was entitled to conclude that petitioners did, by mass picketing and threats of violence, prevent him from entering the plant and from engaging in his employment
from July 18 to August 22. The jury could have found that work would have been available within the plant if Russell, and others desiring entry, had not been excluded by the force, or threats of force, of the strikers.4
This leaves no significant issue of fact for decision here. The principal issue of law is [78 S.Ct. 936] whether the state court had jurisdiction to entertain Russell's amended complaint, or whether that jurisdiction had been preempted by Congress and vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board.
At the outset, we note that the union's activity in this case clearly was not protected by federal law. Indeed the strike was conducted in such a manner that it could have been enjoined by Alabama courts. Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266.
In the Laburnum case, supra, the union, with intimidation and threats of violence, demanded recognition to which it was not entitled. In that manner, the union prevented the employer from using its regular employees and forced it to abandon a construction contract with a consequent loss of profits. The employer filed a tort action in a Virginia court and received a judgment for about $30,000
compensatory damages plus $100,000 punitive damages. On petition for certiorari, we upheld the state court's jurisdiction and affirmed its judgment. We assumed that the conduct of the union constituted a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act. Nevertheless, we held that the Federal Act did not expressly or impliedly deprive the employer of its common law right of action in tort for damages.
This case is similar to Laburnum in many respects. In each, a state court awarded compensatory and punitive damages against [78 S.Ct. 937] a union for conduct which was a tort and also assumed to be an unfair labor practice. The situations are comparable except that, in the instant case, the Board is authorized, under § 10(c) of the Federal Act, to award back pay to employees under certain circumstances. We assume, for the purpose of argument, that the Board would have had authority to award back pay to Russell.5 Petitioners assert that the possibility of partial relief distinguishes the instant case from Laburnum. It is our view, that Congress has not made such a distinction and that is has not, in either case, deprived a victim of the
kind of conduct here involved of common law rights of action for all damages suffered.
Section 10(c) of the Federal Act, upon which petitioners must rely, gives limited...
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