Crownover v. Keel

• Decision Date: 26 May 2015
• Docket Number: 112,728.
• Citation: 357 P.3d 470,2015 OK 35
• Parties: Vernon L. CROWNOVER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Garland KEEL, County Treasurer of McIntosh County and Board of County Commissioners of McIntosh County, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

357 P.3d 470
2015 OK 35

Vernon L. CROWNOVER, Plaintiff/Appellant
v.
Garland KEEL, County Treasurer of McIntosh County and Board of County Commissioners of McIntosh County, Defendants/Appellees.

112,728.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 26, 2015.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 14, 2015.

Michael P. Brogan, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant Vernon L. Crownover.

Carman D. Rainbolt, Checotah, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Garland Keel.

Gregory R. Stidham, Assistant District Attorney for McIntosh County, Eufaula, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees County Treasurer of McIntosh County and Board of County Commissioners of McIntosh County.

Opinion

COMBS, V.C.J.:

¶ 1 The question presented on appeal is whether an owner of real property received constitutionally sufficient notice of the sale of his property for delinquent taxes when notice was provided only by publication and certified mail that was returned undelivered. We hold that he did not.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 At issue in this cause is the ownership of certain real property in McIntosh County, Oklahoma. Plaintiff/Appellant Vernon L. Crownover (Crownover) originally obtained title to this property by virtue of warranty deed recorded in the McIntosh County Clerk's Office on May 18, 2001. The undisputed facts indicate Crownover ceased paying taxes on this property after paying the 2005 ad valorem taxes by check dated January 1, 2006.

¶ 3 After Crownover failed to pay taxes on the property for several years, the property was offered by McIntosh County for sale during the 2010 resale, pursuant to 68 O.S.2011 §§ 3105 and 3125. It is undisputed that the notice provisions of 68 O.S.2011 § 3106, mandating notice by mail and publication, were complied with. Notice was sent by certified mail to Crownover at the address he provided when he purchased the property in McIntosh County, and was also published in a newspaper in McIntosh County. Unbeknownst to county treasurer's office, Crownover no longer lived at the address to which notice was sent.

¶ 4 Defendant/Appellee Garland Keel (Keel) purchased the property at the 2010

357 P.3d 472

tax resale and received a resale tax deed. Keel contacted Crownover after obtaining the resale tax deed to inquire about a boat and trailer Crownover had left on the property. Apparently only at this point did Crownover become aware that the property had been sold at the tax resale due to his failure to pay delinquent taxes.¹

¶ 5 Crownover filed suit against Defendants/Appellees County Treasurer of McIntosh County and Board of County Commissioners of McIntosh County (collectively, “County”) in the District Court of McIntosh County on August 12, 2010, alleging he was the true owner of the subject property and seeking to quiet title in himself. Crownover alleged that Keel's resale tax deed was void because Crownover received no actual notice of the delinquent taxes or the tax resale. Crownover argued that he did not receive notice because while the notices of delinquent taxes and of the resale were sent to the address he provided to McIntosh County when he purchased the property, Crownover no longer lived at that address. Crownover asserted that the County should have sent notice to the address listed on the last check he wrote for taxes on January 1, 2006. Crownover asserted that had notice been mailed to his correct address and had he received it, he would have immediately paid taxes on the property and would have redeemed it from the tax resale. Accordingly, he claimed he was denied his right to redemption by the County's failure to provide him with notice.

¶ 6 On June 4, 2013, Crownover moved for summary judgment, alleging that there was no dispute as to the material facts and that he was denied due process because he did not have actual notice of the delinquent taxes and 2010 tax resale, and that the County's efforts were insufficient to provide him with that notice. The County responded to Crownover's motion for summary judgment on August 20, 2013, and also moved for summary judgment, alleging that it complied with all statutory notice requirements by: 1) mailing notice by certified mail to the address Crownover had originally provided; and 2) publishing notice of the resale in a publication in McIntosh County. The County asserted the burden was on Crownover to provide notice that his address had changed, and that it should not have been required to assume that a single check with a different address constituted that notice.²

¶ 7 In a response to County's motion for summary judgment filed on September 6, 2013, Crownover contended that the notice sent by the County to his old address via certified mail was returned to the County treasurer marked “Not Deliverable as Addressed Unable to Forward.”³ In two separate orders filed on March 11, 2014, the trial court overruled Crownover's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the County.

¶ 8 Crownover appealed, filing his Petition in Error and Preliminary Statement on April 7, 2014, in accordance with Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.36, 12 O.S. Supp. 2013, Ch. 15, App. 1, governing accelerated procedure for summary judgments. This Court issued a show cause order on April 9, 2014, directing Crownover to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an

357 P.3d 473

appealable order because the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the County did not dispose of Crownover's claims against Keel. Crownover responded to the show cause order on April 23, 2014, and asserted that adequacy of notice was the controlling issue in determining the validity of Keel's tax deed. Because adequacy of notice to Crownover would determine the validity of the tax deed issued to Keel, Crownover asserted the trial court's order denying his motion for summary judgment was a final order disposing of his claims against all parties, including Keel. This Court agreed, and allowed Crownover's appeal to proceed.

¶ 9 In an unpublished opinion issued on December 5, 2014, the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The COCA determined that the County completed all the statutory requirements to vest in the County treasurer the authority to issue the tax deed, including mailing notice to Crownover's address of record. The COCA also noted that pursuant to 68 O.S.2011 § 3106, Crownover's failure to receive this notice did not invalidate the sale.⁴ Further, the COCA stated that although Crownover claimed the County Treasurer's records showed the envelope sent to his previous address was marked “not deliverable as addressed unable to forward,” Crownover did not attach a copy of the envelope and therefore it was not part of the record.

¶ 10 Crownover filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 26, 2014, arguing that the COCA erred by incorrectly stating that Crownover failed to attach a copy of the certified mail envelope marked “not deliverable as addressed unable to forward.” Crownover further asserts that under the undisputed facts he was entitled to summary judgment as notice via certified mail was insufficient to satisfy due process when the County was aware that he did not receive that notice. He also argues that a simple inquiry on their part would have allowed them to determine his current address and provide actual notice, which they failed to do. This Court granted Crownover's Petition for Certiorari on March 30, 2015, and the cause was assigned to this office on April 1, 2015.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 A moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other evidentiary materials establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Miller v. David Grace, 2009 OK 49, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1223 ; Davis v. Leitner, 1989 OK 146, ¶ 9, 782 P.2d 924. In reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, this Court views all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidentiary materials in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Trinity Baptist Church v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Services, LLC, 2014 OK 106, ¶ 9, 341 P.3d 75 ; Miller, 2009 OK 49, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1223 ; Wathor v. Mut. Assurance Adm'rs, 2004 OK 2, ¶ 4, 87 P.3d 559.

¶ 12 Because a grant of summary judgment is a purely legal issue, this Court's standard of review on appeal is de novo. Trinity, 2014 OK 106, ¶ 9, 341 P.3d 75 ; Miller, 2009 OK 49, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1223 ; Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 1051. In conducting a de novo review of a trial court's legal rulings, this Court possesses plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented. Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Co., L.L.C., 2013 OK 48, ¶ 10, 306 P.3d 544 ; Martin v. Aramark

357 P.3d 474

Servs., Inc., 2004 OK 38, ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 96.

III.

NOTICE TO A PROPERTY OWNER VIA CERTIFIED MAIL PRIOR TO SALE OF THE PROPERTY FOR DELINQUENT TAXES IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS WHEN THAT NOTICE IS RETURNED...