State v. Anonymous
| Decision Date | 25 May 1975 |
| Citation | 358 A.2d 691,33 Conn.Supp. 34 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Common Pleas |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. ANONYMOUS (1976-6) * . . BELINKIE, Judge. In this case, the defendant was arrested on |
In this case, the defendant was arrested on May 25, 1975, and charged with the crimes of burglary in the third degree, General Statutes § 53a-103, and larceny in the fourth degree, General Statutes § 53a-125, alleged to have been committed on or about April 9, 1973. The arrest was based on an arrest warrant which had been issued on May 1, 1973. In an amended motion to quash the information, dated August 21, 1975, the defendant has moved to quash both charges.
In the original motion to quash information, dated July 10, 1975, the defendant had moved to quash only the charge of larceny in the fourth degree on the basis that the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 54-193, barred that prosecution 'but within one year next after the offense has been committed.' In the amended motion to quash, the defendant moved to quash both charges, although paragraph three of the amended motion appears to be directed only to one charge as being barred by the statute of limitations. The court will treat the amended motion to quash as claiming the statute of limitations as a defense to both charges.
The applicable statute of limitations at the time of this offense, General Statutes § 54-193, among other things, provided as follows: 'No person shall be prosecuted . . . for any crime or misdemeanor of which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, except within five years next after the offense has been committed; nor shall any person be prosecuted for the violation of any penal law, or for other crime or misdemeanor, except crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, but within one year next after the offense has been committed . . ..' Prior to 1969, that statute of limitations of prosecution for offenses did not contain the phrase, 'Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers,' but, rather, the requirement of imprisonment in the 'State Prison' to determine whether the five-year or one-year period of limitation applied. In 1969 Public Acts, No. 297, it was provided in part, 'Wherever in the general statutes, the words 'State Prison,' appear, they shall be construed to mean the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers.'
Prior to the effective date of our penal code, October 1, 1971, there was no classification by degree of the offenses of burglary or larceny. The applicable statutes provided in the case of what is now designated as larceny in the fourth degree, for imprisonment in a jail for not more than six months; General Statutes, Rev.1949, § 8401 (Rev.1958, § 53-63); and in the case of what is now burglary in the third degree, a period of imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years. General Statutes, Rev.1958, § 53-68.
Under our present penal code, larceny in the fourth degree is classified as a class C misdemeanor and burglary in the third degree as a class D felony. A felony is defined as '(a)ny offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year.' General Statutes § 53a-25. A class D felony provides for a maximum term of imprisonment for five years. General Statutes § 53a-35. A misdemeanor is defined as '(a)n offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year.' General Statutes § 53a-26. A class C misdemeanor provides for a maximum term of three months. General Statutes § 53a-36.
This court is unable to find anywhere in the penal code any provision for either a sentence of imprisonment in a jail or state prison or commitment in the Connecticut correctional institution, Somers. Outside the penal code, although the provisions for sentencing of criminal offenses leave something to be desired insofar as uniformity of language within the framework of the statute of limitations is concerned, there are indications that some attention has been given to the place of commitment, more so, to be true, in statutory revisions prior to 1969.
At the present time, General Statutes § 53-29, entitled 'Attempt to procure miscarriage or abortion,' provides for imprisonment in state prison. A number of other statutes, §§ 53-21, 53-30, 53-31, 53-35, 53-37, 53-39, 53-41b, 53-202, 53-215a, 53-334, 53-368, 53-391, to mention only a few, provide for a period of imprisonment for terms of either days, months, one year or a number of years, without specifying the locale of incarceration.
Prior to our penal code, a number of statutes provided for imprisonment in jail. See General Statutes, Rev.1949, §§ 8555, 8570, 8571, 8623, 8624, 8625, 8626 (Rev.1958, §§ 53-231, 53-246, 53-247, 53-324, 53-325, 53-326, 53-327). In much earlier times, most criminal statutes specified whether a sentence of imprisonment should be in jail or state prison; State v. Eckart, 127 Conn. 719, 720, 18 A.2d 366. At a later time, penalty provisions in criminal statutes were changed to read 'for imprisonment for a period not to exceed a certain term, leaving the matter of fixing the imprisonment as in jail or state prison to be determined' by the application of statutes such as § 8826 of the 1949 Revision. That section required that any sentence to the state prison be for at least one year, and that sentences for not more than one year may and sentences for less than one year must be to jail. State v. Eckart, supra. That section has been construed as providing that where the maximum sentence for an offense is imprisonment for one year, it cannot be to the state prison. Leifert v. Turkington, 115 Conn. 600, 603, 162 A. 842. That construction is in line with the definitions of felonies and misdemeanors in our penal code, §§ 53a-25 and 53a-26, and perhaps has led to the popularly recognized view that felonies are state prison offenses and misdemeanors are jail offenses, although the penal code does not make that distinction in terms of the place of commitment.
We now turn to the question of the application of our present statute of limitations, § 54-193, to the present case, in the light of this background information. Section 54-193 specifically provides for a five-year period of limitation for any crime or misdemeanor of which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in the Connecticut correctional institution, Somers. The court is mindful of the word 'may.' It goes on to state, however, that no person shall be prosecuted for the violation of any penal law, or for other crime or misdemeanor, 'except crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, but within one year next after the offense has been committed.' It does not say, except crimes which 'may' be punishable.
The state now argues that all crimes, including misdemeanors, are subject to the five-year statute of limitations. That argument is based on the provisions of the presently existing statute, § 54-120, which provides that 'punishment by imprisonment, . . . when not otherwise provided, shall be by commitment to the custody of the commissioner of correction in such institution or facility of the department of correction as he determines,' thereby replacing the requirements of § 8826 of the 1949 Revision (Rev.1958, § 54-120) which dictated jail sentences for all commitments for a year or less. State v.Eckart, supra. The argument of the prosecution is that under § 54-120, since commitments in the discretion of the commissioner of correction may be to the Connecticut correctional institution, Somers, even for misdemeanors, the five-year statute of limitations applied to all crimes. The court is not persuaded.
The obvious intention of the legislature in amending § 54-120 to its present form was to give discretion to the commissioner of correction in order to provide for the most efficient use of correctional facilities available not to extend the statute of limitations. Secondly, if the legislature desired to extend the statute of limitations to five years for all crimes, it could easily have said so, instead of...
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