Levy v. Miami-Dade County

• Decision Date: 05 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-11589.,03-11589.
• Citation: 358 F.3d 1303
• Parties: Morgan I. LEVY, Rolando Oses, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

358 F.3d 1303

Morgan I. LEVY, Rolando Oses, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-11589.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

February 5, 2004.

Bradford Swing, Eugene E. Stearns, Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Nathan Dorlan Clark, Coral Reef Law Offices, P.A., Randy A. Duvall, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Lee Alan Kraftchick, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before DUBINA, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Residents of the Unincorporated Municipal Service Area ("UMSA") within Miami-Dade County ("the County") appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Miami-Dade County has a two-tiered governing structure with a thirteen-member County Commission that functions both as the UMSA municipal government (the "first tier") and the government for the County as a whole (the "second tier"). In its first-tier capacity, the County regulates development, provides local services, and levies local taxes within UMSA. In its second-tier capacity, the County provides other services funded by county-wide taxes, including airport, transportation, and environmental services. Approximately 1.2 million Miami-Dade residents live within UMSA, forming some 52% of the County's population.

The Appellants' claims are more fully set forth in the district court's opinion. Essentially, however, the Appellants argue that, as residents of unincorporated areas, their votes for municipal government have been unconstitutionally diluted by residents of incorporated areas who also vote in county elections. Because the County Commission also acts as the municipal government for the unincorporated areas, the incorporated residents effectively vote for that first-tier government when they vote for the Commission. The Appellants contend that the configuration of the single-member Commission districts¹ means that a majority of Commission members have a majority of incorporated residents in their districts, effectively giving majority control over UMSA municipal areas to non-UMSA residents. The Appellants allege a multitude of pernicious consequences from this arrangement, including the diversion of UMSA revenues to incorporated and county-wide services.² In addition, the Appellants argue that the County imposes impermissible conditions upon any unincorporated areas that now wish to incorporate.

After trial, the district court dismissed the Appellants' constitutional claims on two separate grounds. First, the court concluded that the vote dilution claim was not justiciable because the Appellants did not offer a viable remedy. Levy v. Miami-Dade County, 254 F.Supp.2d 1269, 1284-87 (S.D.Fla.2003). In an alternative analysis, after assuming that UMSA was a distinct geopolitical jurisdiction, the district court examined the merits of the Appellants' Equal Protection claims with respect to both vote dilution and to the conditions imposed upon newly incorporating areas. It concluded that rational bases existed for the County's existing electoral and incorporation schemes.

Although justiciability presents a central issue in this case, the nature of the term has been somewhat difficult to define precisely. In general, justiciability "is the term of art employed to give expression to [the] limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). In essence, justiciability asks whether "a claim ... may be resolved by the courts." Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). However, as the Supreme Court has noted, the concept of justiciability "has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations" with "uncertain and shifting contours." Flast, 392 U.S. at 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942. Generally, justiciability encompasses a range of doctrines such as standing, see Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) ("Thus, the only open justiciability question in this case is whether appellees satisfy the requirements of Article III standing."); mootness, see City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (describing mootness as a question of justiciability); ripeness, see Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 2030, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) ("Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed `to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'"); political question, see Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228, 113 S.Ct. 732 ("A controversy is non-justiciable — i.e., involves a political question — where there is `a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it...'"); and the prohibition against advisory opinions, see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) ("no justiciable controversy is presented when...