Bennett v. City of Clemson, 22755

Citation293 S.C. 64,358 S.E.2d 707
Decision Date19 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. 22755,22755
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesJohn E. BENNETT, John R. Richbourg, Bob Haymond, James G. Rodger, Charles F. Tisdale, William H. Wiley, Anne E. Wiley, Claudette H. Bennett, Jacqueline L. Hammond, James R. Woodruff, Elizabeth Woodruff, Sybil Hughey, Michael Hughey, Betty L. Thomas, Lawrence W. Grimes, Karlos W. Kithil, Thelma F. Kithil, Elva Hoover, Anna R. Brown and Ann R. Mitchell, Appellants, v. CITY OF CLEMSON, Respondent. . Heard

Larry C. Brandt, of Larry C. Brandt, P.A., Walhalla, for appellants.

Henry L. Floyd, Pickens, for respondent.

Christopher G. Olson, of Olson and Lindsay, Clemson, amicus curiae for Frederick L. Russell, trustee.

FINNEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a zoning decision of the Board of Adjustment of the City of Clemson granting Wyant Associates' (Wyant) request for a variance to construct a multifamily development in Clemson. This request for variance was initially denied by the Board of Adjustment (Board) but upon reconsideration, it was approved. The Board of Adjustment's decision was affirmed by the circuit court. We reverse.

Appellants are landowners residing in single-family units in the neighborhood where Wyant proposes to build a multifamily housing development. In October, 1984, Wyant Associates, the developer of the housing project, submitted a proposal to the Clemson Planning Commission to construct a 324 unit group housing development. The Planning Commission denied Wyant's request because the zone, when combining the proposed development with existing housing, exceeded the 500 unit maximum housing density permitted by Clemson's 1971 Zoning Ordinance.

On November 5, 1984, Clemson's City Council passed a revised zoning ordinance lowering the density requirements. On November 12, 1984, Wyant resubmitted a revised plan for the construction of 294 multifamily units and 10 single-family units. The Planning Commission, in considering Wyant's revised request, chose to treat it under the 1971 Ordinance rather than the 1984 Ordinance. As a result, the Planning Commission approved Wyant's revised plan and recommended it to the Board of Adjustment. On June 13, 1985, the Board denied Wyant's request for zoning approval of the development. The next day, Wyant's attorney requested the Board to reconsider its decision. On July 1, 1985, the Board was reconstituted adding two members. On July 11, 1985, the reconstituted Board heard and approved Wyant's request by a vote of four to two.

I. Appellants contend that the Board of Adjustment acted illegally and/or in excess of its lawfully delegated authority in reconsidering its June 13, 1985, decision.

Whether a zoning board has the power or authority to reconsider and reverse a matter it has previously decided is a novel issue for this Court. The enabling statutes do not expressly prohibit or permit the Board of Adjustment to rehear a matter upon which it has rendered a decision. See, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 6-7-710 to 830 (Law. Co-Op 1977 & Supp.1986). Likewise, the City of Clemson's zoning ordinances do not contain any provision for the Board to reconsider a matter once it has rendered a decision in a case. See, City of Clemson Zoning Ordinances, Article XVI, §§ 1603-5 (1971); Article IX, § 914 (1984). In the absence of a legislative pronouncement prohibiting the Board from reconsidering a matter, we find no illegality or acts in excess of lawfully delegated authority under the facts of this case.

An administrative agency's power to reconsider or rehear its previous ruling is curtailed significantly in most instances by enabling legislation. The reasoning advanced in support of a restriction on an agency's authority to reconsider a case is predicated upon the desirability, practicality and need for finality in the administrative decision-making process. See, Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938). Without finality in the decision-making process, all determinations and decisions would be subject to change at the caprice of a governing body's members, which would inevitably lead to uncertainty and instability in the decision-making process. See, e.g., Crawford v. Town of Winnsboro, 205 S.C. 72, 30 S.E.2d 841 (1944). In some jurisdictions, however, Courts have acknowledged that Boards have the power to rehear or reconsider its decisions in the absence of a specific grant of legislative authority. See generally, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 522 et seq. (1962 & Supp.1986). In cases permitting an agency to reconsider its decision, courts have emphasized that an agency's power to reconsider or rehear a case is not an arbitrary one, and such power should be exercised only when there is justification and good cause; i.e., newly discovered evidence, fraud, surprise, mistake, inadvertence or change in conditions. Id., at §§ 523, 524. See also, Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 134 S.E.2d 321 (1964), and Crawford v. Town of Winnsboro, supra, 30 S.E.2d at 844.

In the instant case, Wyant requested the Board to reconsider its decision, asserting (1) the absence of the attorney who was most familiar with the project from the hearing; (2) the fact that Wyant or the architect did not appear before the Board; and (3) the need to submit additional facts and data. Wyant contended such a reconsideration might possibly avoid subsequent litigation. We are of the opinion that enormous hardship could be the consequence of adopting a bright line rule of law which denies Boards the power to correct matters that were originally neglected, but are capable of speedy and practical resolution. People ex rel. Brennan v. Walsh, 195 N.Y.S. 264 (1922). This Court holds that under the circumstances, the Board did not abuse its discretion nor act arbitrarily in reconsidering its earlier decision.

II. Appellant further contends that the Board did...

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7 cases
  • Jones v. Dept. of Health and Env. Cont.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 2009
    ...an agency may reconsider its decision when there is justification and good cause, which includes mistake. Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 66-67, 358 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (1987). Thus, under Bennett, OCRM may reconsider a decision that was based on a mistake. Accordingly, we hold OCRM......
  • Kiawah Resort Associates v. South Carolina Tax Com'n
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1995
    ...In fact, S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(1) (Supp.1994) acknowledges that parties can request such a rehearing. Cf. Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987) (because no statute prohibited the Board of Adjustment to rehear a matter upon which it had rendered a decision, the......
  • Towles v. DIST. OF COL. BD. OF ZON. ADJ.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • July 24, 1990
    ...(Me.1985) (standard of review regarding substantive change of circumstances is abuse of discretion); see also Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987) (zoning adjustment board's decision to consider subsequent application reviewable only for abuse of discretion); Mazza......
  • Porcher v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 18, 2012
    ...request reconsideration within thirty calendar days from receipt of the agency's final written decision); Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 66, 358 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1987) ("An administrative agency's power to reconsider or rehear its previous ruling is curtailed significantly in most......
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