New London County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nantes
| Decision Date | 21 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | 18759.,Nos. 18758,s. 18758 |
| Citation | 36 A.3d 224,303 Conn. 737 |
| Parties | NEW LONDON COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Maria V. NANTES et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Edwin L. Doernberger, with whom was David G. Jordan, Hamden, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).
Allan B. Taylor, with whom were Martin J. Magnusson and, on the brief, James H. Rotondo, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.
Two houseguests suffered serious injuries after their host left her car running overnight in an attached garage and the house filled with carbon monoxide. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the guests' injuries are covered by a homeowner's insurance policy issued by the plaintiff, New London County Mutual Insurance Company, to the named defendant, Maria V. Nantes, that excludes coverage for injuries “[a]rising out of ... [t]he ... use” of a motor vehicle. The plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action against Nantes, the homeowner, her guests, Armenui Dzhgalian and Aida Melikyan, and Nantes' automobile insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO),1 seeking a declaration that Nantes' homeowner's policy does not cover the injuries suffered by Dzhgalian and Melikyan. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the policy does not cover these injuries because they fall within the policy exclusion for injuries “[a]rising out of ... [t]he ... use” of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. Dzhgalian and Melikyan are medical school graduates and residents of California. In February, 2007, they traveled to Connecticut to participate in a month long, unpaid internship at Griffin Hospital (hospital) in the town of Derby. During their internships, Dzhgalian and Melikyan lived with Nantes, a hospital employee, at her home in the town of Ansonia. As part of the living arrangement, Nantes drove Dzhgalian and Melikyan to and from the hospital each day. Dzhgalian and Melikyan each agreed to pay Nantes $460 to cover their share of utilities and car expenses.
At the end of the work day on February 12, 2007, Nantes drove Dzhgalian and Melikyan to her house and parked her car in the attached garage. Nantes exited the car without turning off the engine, closed the garage door, and went into the living quarters of the house, which did not contain a carbon monoxide detector. The car's engine continued to run overnight, and the house filled with carbon monoxide. Dzhgalian and Melikyan suffered serious neurological injuries from carbon monoxide poisoning. They suffered additional injuries when Nantes dragged them, unconscious, out of the house. 3
Several days later, the plaintiff received claims from Nantes for Dzhgalian's and Melikyan's medical expenses. The plaintiff promptly disclaimed coverage, relying mainly on the fact that Nantes' homeowner's policy contained the following exclusion: “[c]overage [for] [p]ersonal [l]iability and ... [m]edical [p]ayments to [o]thers do[es] not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ ... [a]rising out of ... [t]he ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an ‘insured’....” Soon thereafter, Dzhgalian and Melikyan returned to California. Nantes subsequently relocated to California as well.
Dzhgalian and Melikyan then brought an action against Nantes in California state court to recover for their injuries. In February, 2008, they reached a settlement pursuant to which Nantes assigned Dzhgalian and Melikyan her rights under the homeowner's policy for the amount of any damages that Dzhgalian and Melikyan might recover against her. Nantes also assigned Dzhgalian and Melikyan her right to recover for the plaintiff's alleged bad faith in declining to settle within the policy limits. Nantes retained the right to recover nonassignable benefits under the policy, including her right to recover for emotional distress and punitive damages against the plaintiff. All parties agreed to waive their right to a jury trial on the issue of Dzhgalian's and Melikyan's damages and to submit that issue instead to binding arbitration in California, a proceeding in which Nantes would have the right but not the obligation to testify and present evidence. Nantes also agreed not to oppose Dzhgalian and Melikyan's application to confirm the arbitration award. In return, Dzhgalian and Melikyan agreed that they would not execute on any judgment against Nantes personally and would seek to recover only from the plaintiff. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the defendants stipulated that, after the arbitration award was confirmed and judgment was rendered thereon, Dzhgalian and Melikyan would file a direct action against the plaintiff in California to enforce their rights as Nantes' assignees. Nantes agreed that she would testify in the action. The settlement agreement also provided that Nantes would have the right to join the action “to prosecute her rights to recover on her nonassignable rights under the homeowner's policy, such as damages for emotional distress and for punitive damages against [the plaintiff].” 4
In June, 2008, before arbitration had commenced, the plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action against the defendants. Relying primarily on the motor vehicle exclusion, the plaintiff sought a declaration that Nantes' homeowner's policy does not cover Dzhgalian's and Melikyan's injuries. On August 4, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming, inter alia, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan under Connecticut's long-arm statute, General Statutes § 52–59b.5 The trial court, Hon. George W. Ripley II, judge trial referee, denied the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that Dzhgalian and Melikyan had transacted business in Connecticut and therefore were subject to the court's jurisdiction.6 In November, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, contending, inter alia, that the complaint constituted a misuse of the declaratory judgment statute, General Statutes § 52–29(a).7 The trial court, Radcliffe, J., denied the motion to strike, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint “set forth a proper claim for declaratory relief....” The plaintiff then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Nantes' homeowner's policy does not cover Dzhgalian's and Melikyan's injuries because they fall within the policy's motor vehicle exclusion. The trial court, Bellis, J., agreed with the plaintiff, granted the motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon for the plaintiff. Additional procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan, that the plaintiff's complaint constituted a proper use of the declaratory judgment statute and that Dzhgalian's and Melikyan's injuries are not covered by Nantes' homeowner's insurance policy. We reject each claim.
We first address the defendants' contention that the trial court, Hon. George W. Ripley, judge trial referee, incorrectly determined that it had personal jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan under § 52–59b (a)(1) upon concluding that they had transacted business in Connecticut and that the plaintiff's cause of action against them arose out of this transaction. Specifically, the defendants challenge the trial court's determination that it had jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan because, before entering the state, they had arranged for paid lodging and transportation with Nantes, a stranger to them, and because their one month medical internship with the hospital, “while unpaid, conferred substantial benefits to their careers by providing valuable experience and by fulfilling a prerequisite to their medical licensing....” We conclude that the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan.
“[A] challenge to the jurisdiction of the court presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.” Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007). This court previously has explained that § 52–59b (a)(1) “authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact any business within the state provided that the cause of action arises out of such transaction.” Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 449, 472 A.2d 21 (1984). An individual “[t]ransacts ... business” in Connecticut under § 52–59b (a)(1) if he or she engages in “a single purposeful business transaction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, at 119, 918 A.2d 867.
We agree with the trial court that Dzhgalian and Melikyan's lodging and transportation arrangement with Nantes constituted a purposeful business transaction within the meaning of § 52–59b (a)(1) and that the plaintiff's cause of action against Dzhgalian and Melikyan arose out of this transaction. Nantes allowed Dzhgalian and Melikyan, two people whom she did not know, to stay in her house for several weeks, and she drove them to and from the hospital each day. In exchange, they each agreed to pay her $460. As a general matter, if a host agrees to provide lodging and transportation to guests previously unknown to her, and the guests agree to provide money in return, the resulting arrangement constitutes a purposeful business transaction. Furthermore, the plaintiff's cause of action against Dzhgalian and Melikyan unquestionably arose from their participation in the lodging and transportation arrangement. The...
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